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Türkiye 1999 yılında Avrupa Birliği'ne (AB) üyelik  için resmi aday statüsünü kazandı.
Türkiye  1999-2004  yılları  arasında  AB  müktesebatına  uyum  sağlamak  ve  Kopenhag
kriterlerinin sağlanması için yedi uyum paketi kabul etti. Bu tez çıkarılan uyum yasalarının
ne  derecede  uygulandığınına  dair  farkları  incelemektedir.   Uygulama  farklarının
incelenmesi  için  vaka  çalışması  olarak  özel  Kürtçe  kursların  kapanması  ve  namus
cinayetlerine  verilen  ceza  indirimleri  gazete  ve  uygun  Internet  sitelerinin  içeriklerinin
4
incelenmesi yöntemiyle çalışılmıştır. 
Çalışmanın sonuçları hukuk ve uygulanması arasında bir fark olduğunu ortaya koymuştur.
Haksız tahrik iddiası üzerine verilen ceza indirimlerinin uygulanmasındaki fark hakimlerin
ve savcıların kendi aralarındaki bir konvansiyondan kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu konvansiyon
çeşitli  STK  ve  akademisyenlerin  namus  üzerine  yaptığı  araştırmaları  doğrulamakta  ve
toplumun genelindeki  namus anlayışıyla  örtüşmektedir.   Özel Kürtçe kurslar alanındaki
uygulama  farkı  ise  hem  devlet  bürokrasisi  hem  de  Kürt  milliyetçilerinden
kaynaklanmaktadır.  Çalışma  sırasında  devlet  bürokrasisinin  işlemleri  geciktirerek  kurs
sahipleirni  ekonomik zarara  uğrattıkları  ve  bu sebeple kursların  kapanmasına sebebiyet
verdikleri  gözlenmiştir.  Bunun yanı  sıra Kürt  milliyetçileri  de eğitim konusunu politize
edip kurslara maddi katkıda bulunmayı  reddederek  bu kursların  kapanmasına sebebiyet
vermişlerdir.   Sonuç olarak,   namus cinayetleri  ve Kürtçe kurslar  alanındaki  hukuk ve
uygulama  arasındaki  karşılaştırmalı  analiz  uygulama  sorununun  farklı  sebeplerden
kaynaklandığına ve bu sebeple farklı çözümlerin gerektiğine işaret etmektedir. 
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ABSTRACT
POLITICAL REFORMS IN TURKEY AND EU MEMBERSHIP:
HONOR KILLINGS AND KURDISH LANGUAGE RIGHTS
DENİZ ERDEM
Master of Arts in Political Science 
MA Thesis, 2008
Thesis Supervisor: Prof.  Dr. Ayşe Kadıoğlu
Keywords: European Union, harmonization laws, honor killings, minority rights,
citizenship and identity studies
Turkey  became  an  official  candidate  for  European  Union  (EU)  membership  in  1999.
Between 1999-2004, Turkey passed seven harmonization packages to comply with the EU
acquis and to abide by the Copenhagen criteria. This thesis explores the extent to which the
harmonization laws are implemented in Turkey.  The gap is analyzed by examining the
closure of Kurdish private language courses and penalty reductions given to honor killings
by using content analysis of the newspapers and pertinent Internet sites as methodology. 
The  findings  of  the  study reveal  that  there  is  a  gap  between law and implementation
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Turkey.   The  gap  on  sentence  reductions  upon  provocation  stems  from  a  juridical
convention between the judges.  The juridical convention between the judges is similar to
the general attitude towards honor in the society as the researches of various NGOs and
academicians about how honor is perceived in Turkey indicate. The gap between law and
implementation  regarding  the  private  Kurdish  language  courses  stem  from  the  state
bureaucracy and the Kurdish nationalist stance towards education. During the study, it was
observed that the state bureaucracy lingered the opening of the courses, which brought the
course  owners  in  an  economically  disadvantaged  position.   The  Kurdish  nationalists
obstructed  the  process  and  caused  the  courses  to  close  by  politicizing  the  issue  and
refusing to provide economic funding to the courses.  
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INTRODUCTION
The Turkish Republic  was established on the basis  of  a  state-centric  modernity model
composed of four elements - a strong state tradition, national developmentalism, an organic
vision of society and the republican model of citizenship (İçduygu and Keyman 2005, p.
5). These four elements together composed what İçduygu and Keyman (2005) calls state-
centric functioning of society, which entered a legitimacy crisis that began in the 1980s and
became well entrenched in the1990s (pp. 5-8).  In other words, the path in front of Turkey
has become bifurcated between partial democracy, in favor of the state, and full democracy,
in  favor  of  society (İçduygu  and  Keyman  2005,  p.  9).  While  there  are  developments
indicating that Turkey is moving towards full democracy, there are also examples pointing
to  the  continuation  of  the  traditional  state-centric  modernity  model  with  only  partial
democracy.  The  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  explore  the  issues  corresponding  to  Turkey's
journey towards  full  democracy.  It  does  this  by examining  the  gap  between  the  laws
pertaining to civil  rights and their implementation. With this purpose,  two subjects are
explored: Kurdish minority rights and women's rights. 
Kurdish minority rights are analyzed by exploring why the Kurdish language courses were
closed shortly after they had been made legal by the parliament.  The implementation laws
guaranteeing women's rights, which were passed by the parliament to comply with the EU
acquis  in  2002 and 2004,  respectively,  is  investigated  by examining the application of
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sentence reductions for honor killings. 
The effect of the EU on Turkish democracy is examined in the first chapter, “Turkey and
the  European  Union-Historical  Background  of  the  Relationship.”   This  chapter  first
provides a detailed description of the history of Turkish-EU relations. Secondly, it aims at
describing a summary of the laws passed to comply with the EU acquis. The first part of
the thesis is devoted to the history of Turkish-EU relations since the main objective behind
the  harmonization  laws  was  to  comply  with  the  EU  acquis,  which  will  not  be  fully
understood without a background of the relationship. The turning points of this relationship
are  particularly  emphasized  in  the  chapter  and  special  attention  is  given  to  the
harmonization laws passed to comply with the EU acquis. 
The  second  chapter  of  the  thesis  follows  from the  first  chapter  and  conducts  a  more
detailed analysis of these laws that were passed to improve the conditions of minorities and
women  in  Turkey  in  line  with  the  Copenhagen  Criteria.  Turkey  passed  seven
harmonization packages and many laws and decrees between the years 1999-2004. These
laws included the amelioration of fundamental civil rights and liberties, political rights, the
rule of law and civil-military relations. This thesis is concerned with fundamental  civil
rights  and  liberties.  Among  these  civil  liberties  were  the  rights  given  to  the  Kurdish
minority regarding the use of the Kurdish language.  Another aspect of fundamental civil
rights was introduced by providing more equality among the sexes through altering the
civil code.  The second chapter aims at providing a thorough description of these laws
before  the  subsequent  chapters,  which  explore  the  extent  to  which  these  laws  are
implemented in Turkey. 
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Chapter three explores the dynamics of the gap between law and implementation regarding
the sentence reductions given to those guilty of honor killings.  To provide a valid and
reliable analysis of this gap, several sources which provide information on honor killings
and sentence reduction cases were used.  The first resource was the raw data provided by
the  Diyarbakır  Bar  Association  on  the  rationale  behind  the  sentences  given  to  the
perpetrators of honor killings between 1999-2005.  The data was analyzed according to the
genders of killers and perpetrators and reasons of sentence reductions.  However, since
most of the cases were finalized before the civil code reform of 2004, more resources were
used to analyze the rationale of the judges regarding sentence reductions on honor killings.
Accordingly, various newspapers and feminist websites were examined to understand why
the judges still continue to implement sentence reductions.  
 
In chapter four, the reasons behind the closing of private Kurdish language courses were
examined to see if  a gap between law and implementation on Kurdish minority rights
existed. Analyzed were the seven Kurdish language courses that began in 2004 and were
closed down by their owners one year later in 2005 on the grounds that there were not
enough students. However, the courses were opened with massive demonstrations, with
thousands of activists participating in the celebrations.  The thesis began by asking if there
were other reasons for their being closed besides lack of interest in them. At this point, it
was hypothesized that there was a gap between the law and its implementation that lead the
closing of these courses. 
Various sources and methodologies were used to test this hypothesis to provide validity
and  reliability.   The  first  methodology  employed  a  content  analysis  of  Turkish  daily
newspapers and pertinent Internet sites that made reference to the course owners and their
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declarations on the issue. Second methodology was in-depth interviews were conducted
with Betül Çelikand a Kurdish language rights activist (Remzi Çakın) 
In conclusion, this thesis aims at exploring various dynamics regarding the gap between
law and its implementation in Turkey with respect to civil rights.  The primary aim is to
detect the patterns in which the gap is revealed in the implementation process in women's
lives and the Kurdish minority.  The thesis is relevant in the sense that it examines two
significant case studies which have remained rather unexplored in the literature.  The case
of honor killings has been studied by many feminists; however, the provocation clause and
the  legally  correct  way  of  applying  the  provocation  clause  have  not  been  studied
thoroughly.   This  thesis  also  aims  at  providing  the  existing  academic  works  on  the
provocation clause, which is vital when it comes to sentence reductions in honor killings. 
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CHAPTER 1
HISTORY OF
TURKISH-EU RELATIONS 
Turkey applied to the European Economic Community (EEC) for associate membership in
1959 and  the Ankara  Agreement  was  signed  four  years  later  in  1963 after  drawn out
negotiations (Dedeoğlu 2003, p.95-97).  The lengthy negotiations of the Ankara Agreement
became a characteristic pattern between EU and Turkey because of the doubts in Europe
about  Turkey,  which  are  still  valid  today.   They  have  to  do  with,  for  example,  the
implementation of fundamental civil rights, freedom of speech, minority rights, Armenian
dispute, the Cyprus Conflict, the size of Turkey's population, cultural differences, religion
and economy.  These problematic issues and the historical background of Turkey and EU
have been  discussed  and  analyzed  by many scholars,  including Meltem Müftüler  Baç
(1997, 2001, 2008), Semin Süvari Erol (2001), Berdal Aral (2005), Fuat Keyman (2004),
Sanem Aydın  (2004),  Beril  Dedeoğlu  (2003),  Esra  Çayhan  (2003),  Edward  Weisband
(2008), Nicholas J. Kiersey (2008), Aslı Ceylan Oner (2008), David Dansereau (2008),
Yannis  A.  Stivachtis  (2008),  Aylin  Güney (2008),  Ozgur  Tonus(2008),  and  Ioannis  N.
Grigoriadis (2008).
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Meltem  Müftüler  Baç  explores  EU-Turkish  relations  from  a  realist  international
perspective and argues that the onset of relations has been a matter of restoring stability in
Europe, especially after the Cold War (pp. 119-120).  According to Baç, the cornerstones
of  the  relationship  are  the  Ankara  Agreement  (1963),  application  for  full  membership
(1987), the beginning of the customs union (1995), acceptance of candidacy (1999) and the
start of accession negotiations (2005). 
Beril  Dedeoğlu  (2003)  argues  that  today's  Europe  has  its  roots  in  ancient  Greek
civilization,  Ancient  Rome  and  the  Middle  ages,  the  Renaissance,  the  Reform  and
Westphalia, which altogether characterize the nature of unification in Europe. Dedeoğlu
also argues for a possibility of a United States of Europe due to this common history. 
Esra Çayhan (2003) states that the acceptance of Turkey's candidacy was among the most
important  turning  points  of  the  relations.   Çayhan  further  argues  that  the  future  of
membership status depends on the political will of Turkey regarding the implementation of
reforms. 
Fuat Keyman and Sanem Aydın (2004) examine the relations from the perspective of the
extent to which Turkey has succeeded in implementing the Copenhagen Criteria and argue
that the EU is an important catalyzer for the consolidation of Turkish democracy.
Berdal Aral (2005) takes a different position regarding the ability of the Turkish state to
harmonize with the EU acquis and argues that Turkey has been materially worse-off in its
relations with EU, which is evident in its trade deficit with the EU countries. 
16
Edward Weisband, Nicholas J. Kiersey, Aslı Ceylan Oner and David Dansereau (2008)
also take a skeptical view and argue that the main obstacle to Turkey's membership has not
been the Cyprus problem.  Instead, they argue that the main issue of the relationship is a
matter of whether or not to include Turkey as a full member, which in return will change
the future of Europe.  In this sense, the authors also argue that Turkey has been facing
organized hypocrisy against her.  In this sense, the future of membership will not only
depend  on  Turkey's  ability  to  harmonize  with  the  acquis,  but  also  to  the  discussion
regarding the Union's future among the member states. 
Ioannis N. Grigoriadis (2008) and Semin Süvari Erol (2001), on the other hand, disagree
with the above authors and discuss how the Cyprus problem has been an obstacle between
Turkey and EU. 
Yannis A. Stivachtis (2008) explores Turkish-EU relations from the perspective of identity
politics and argues that how the EU views Turkey is a matter of its policy against “others.”
In other words, according to the author, Turkey has been an important factor of identity in
Europe in terms of defining its own identity and this forms the basis for the problematic
nature of the relationship. 
Aylin Güney (2008) concentrates on the accession negotiations after 2005, and analyzes
the possible problems that Turkey might face during the negotiations. These include, for
example, psychological barriers, technical difficulties, the Cyprus issue, and the integration
capacity of EU. 
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Ozgur Tonus (2008) looks at Turkish-EU relations from a macro-economic perspective and
argues that the primary objective of Turkish aspirations as been achieving stability. 
The above work of the scholars is included in this chapter to provide a literature review of
the relationship. The following part of the chapter will provide the historical background
and chronology of Turkish-EU relations with references to some of the above authors and
official websites of EU and the Turkish government. 
1.1  HISTORY OF TURKISH-EU RELATIONS 
1945-1969 
End of neutrality and beginning of the Western Alliance 
Turkey maintained  a  policy of  neutrality  during  the  Second  World  War  (WWII)  even
though the government was under pressure by the European states to declare war  and  of
actively engaging in WWII, Turkey symbolically declared war on Germany at the end of
the war in order to be included in the United Nations (Baç 1997, p. 53). Accordingly, the
end of neutrality between Turkey and West commenced right after WWII,  when Stalin
demanded Turkish territory (Baç 1996,  p.  30).   Acccording to  Baç (1997),  this  period
marks  an interval  characterized  by Turkish  endeavors  to  be  recognized as  a  European
power (p. 55). Turkey aimed at realizing its aspirations to become a European power by
“joining all the right clubs” (Baç 1997, p. 54). These clubs include the OECD in 1948, the
Council of Europe in 1949 and NATO in 1952. Turkey further enhanced its relations with
Europe and U.S. by receiving Truman aid . 
18
In other words, the immediate post-WWII years were the beginning of Turkey's allegiance
to the European states (Baç 1996, p. 30).  These years also witnessed the beginning of a
particular  relationship  with  another  state,  which  has  been,  and  continues  to  be  a  vital
element interfering with Turkish-Western relations: namely Greece (Grigoriadis 2008, p.
151). Greece and Turkey were both allies of the west against the Soviet Union (USSR)
after WWII and received Truman aid. The relations ameliorated during this period and the
Ankara agreement was signed on September 1963.1 Ankara Agreement aimed at integrating
the Turkish economy and the EEC with the goal of achieving customs union followed by
eventual  membership and it  began with the prologue “the aim of  this Agreement is  to
promote  the  continuous  and  balanced  strengthening  of  trade  and  economic  relations
between  the  Parties,  while  taking  full  account  of  the  need  to  ensure  an  accelerated
development of the Turkish economy and to improve the level of employment and the
living conditions of the Turkish people” (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı 1993). 
The terms of the agreement stated the need to establish a customs union to realize the aims
mentioned in the sentence. The customs union and eventual membership was to be realized
in three stages: preparatory, transitional, and final (Baç 1996, pp.57-58).2
Preparatory  stage:  Planned  to  last  between  5-9  years.  Consisted  of  unilateral
concessions on behalf of the EC and Turkey's responsibility was to maintain economic
development.
Transitional  stage:  The time interval  for the transitory stage was between 12-22
years. Turkey and the EC would make mutual concessions in this period regarding tariff
reductions, including the concession of granting free movement of workers by 1986. 
1 (http://www.ikv.org.tr/sozluk2.php?ID=989)
2 Full text of the Ankara agreement can be retrieved from Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, Avrupa Topluluğu ile ilişkiler
Genel Müdürlüğü, 1993, Ankara Anlaşması ve Katma Protokol, cilt 2: http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr
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Final stage: Was to be initiated when Turkey is ready to become a full member and
establish a  customs union.  A customs union would be realized  after  the integration of
Turkey into the Common Agricultural Policy and aligning its tax structure with the 
EEC.
Turkish-EEC relations  between  1964-1970 constituted  the  above-stipulated  preparatory
stage of the Ankara Agreement. These years witnessed significant changes, for both the
EEC and Turkey. The stagnant Turkey of the 1950s was left behind and a new economic
boom coupled with a new democratic constitution (Birand 2005, pp. 140-141).  
The new era of democracy in Turkey was introduced with the comparatively liberal 1961
Constitution after the 1960 coup. The 1961 Constitution enabled the marginal voices, such
as the Turkish Workers’ Party (TWP), to be represented in the parliament.3 Furthermore,
the Justice Party (JP) (which was the continuation of DP, banned after 1965) headed by
Süleyman Demirel won the majority of the seats in parliament.  The new JP government
gained prestige as the economy boomed and inflation rates dropped to 15-20 % in 1966.
Another development during this era was the migration of Turkish workers to Germany,
which operated as a significant source of foreign currency income.
The Protocol  was  signed  in  this  plight  on  November  23,  1970,  at  which time Turkey
accepted the model prepared by EEC on following terms (Baç 1996. p.59):4 
Obligations of Turkey:  To incrementally reduce tariffs on European imports; this
would be realized in two phases. In the first phase, to last for twelve years, Turkey would
3 Even though there is general contention that the 1961 Constitution was rather democratic, scholars like Heper &
Çınar (1996) claim that the 1961 Constitution initiated the dominance of the bureaucratic staff over the will of the
nation by introducing National Security Council (NSC), Council of the State and Constitutional Court.
4 Original document of the Additional Protocol can be downloaded from 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21970A1123(01):EN:NOT
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be obliged to reduce tariffs on 55% of industrial goods. In the second phase, to last twenty-
two years, Turkey would reduce tariffs in the remaining 45 %. 
Obligations of EC: In return for Turkey's reduction of tariffs, EC was to gradually
introduce its common tariff policy against trade with third parties. A total reduction of 20%
had been introduced by 1978, when the relations were frozen. The EC agreed to reduce all
tariffs on 37% of agricultural exports of Turkey. Among industrial products, Turkey was to
enjoy a zero tariff policy except for textiles and petroleum products. 
BETWEEN 1970-1980 
Additional Protocol and Deterioration of Relations 
The EC enlarged to nine members upon the finalization of negotiations with three new
member states (Britain, Ireland and Denmark) in 1971 and the signing of their membership
treaties  in  1972  (http://europa.eu).5 While  the  EC was  busy  with  enlargement,  Turkey
encountered  another  military intervention on 12 March 1971.  The intervention did not
suspend the parliament but replaced Demirel with Nihat Erim and the civil government
continued to rule, although under the auspices of military. The Additional Protocol was
signed during this crisis of 1971. 
The oil crisis of 1974 triggered an economic crisis in Europe that lasted until the 1980s and
resulted in the EC diverting its attention to the oil-exporting Mediterranean countries. This
meant that Turkey was losing its preferential status granted by the Additional Protocol and
the Turkish workers were no longer welcomed due to high unemployment rates, leading to
the  deterioration  of  the  relationship  between  Turkey  and  EC  (Baç  1996.  p.  60).
Furthermore, in 1974, the Cyprus Crisis came added on top of these issues and also marked
5 All electronic citations hereafter cited in the text of this thesis in abbreviated form; complete citation link is to be
found in bibliography.  
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a  turning  point  regarding  Turkey's  relations  with  EC –  one  which  would  impede  the
membership process from then on, until today.6  
Greek application forced Turkey had to make a critical decision regarding her own status
(Birand 2005, pp. 204-260) . The contention revolved around whether to impede the Greek
application process by submitting a Turkish application. The EC was aware of the tension
created in Turkey by the Greek application. The EC agreed to give make some concessions
regarding the Additional Protocol during this period to ease the Turkish tension.  However,
Turkish officials did not have a consensus regarding which parts of the Additional Protocol
to amend. In sum, Turkey was unable to take advantage of the Greek application either by
extracting concessions via negotiation or by impeding the process by applying in 1976-
1977. 
The following year, 1978, was a crucial period in Turkey because economy was on the
verge of collapsing: the IMF warned all the global financial institutions about not lending
money to Turkey (Birand 2005, pp. 261-291). Domestic terror was increasing every day
and the government was unable to control  the violence.  In such a predicament,  in the
Commission meeting of 1978, Ecevit demanded a period of exemption from the Turkish
obligations  of  the  Additional  Protocol.  The  EC  accepted  the  exemption  demand  and
relations were frozen until 1979, when Demirel won the elections partially and changed the
EC policy.  To the surprise of the EC, Demirel suspended the exemption policy of Ecevit
and prepared for application for full membership in October 1980. However, the military
coup of 12 September 1980 interfered with this process.
6 Starting in 1974, the Cyprus dispute became an intricate impediment on Turkish membership up until today.
Therefore, separate space is reserved particularly for the Cyprus Conflict, which can be found at the end of the
chapter. 
22
BETWEEN 1980-1990
The Military regime and the Özal Government 
The military junta of 12 September 1980 strained the relations between Turkey and the EC.
The relations were not frozen until the beginning of 1981 but military junta showed its
despotic  face  in  the  second  half  of  1981  when  consecutive  capital  punishments  were
carried  out  for  those  suspected  of  involvement  in  terrorism  and  other  penalties  were
imposed. These incidents met with grave protests  in Europe,  especially from syndicate
representatives. 
While the above events were taking place in Turkey, Greece became a full member and
acquired veto power starting as of January 1, 1981 – which was another turning point in
Turkish-EC relations. In 1982, the EC suspended all relations with Turkey because of the
undemocratic policies of the military junta.
Elections  took  place  in  1983  and  Turgut  Özal,  the  ex-president  of  State  Planning
Organization (SPO) became the prime minister.  The EC believed that the 1983 elections
were undemocratic and that the election of Özal, an opponent of Evren (president of the
military intervention), gave rise to beliefs that plural democracy was in fact still operational
in Turkey (Birand 2005, pp. 313-340). However, even democratically held elections did not
help to ameliorate the relations since the capital punishment continued to be imposed on
politicians. There were other issues on the EC agenda regarding Turkey's problems and
many of  those  issues  crystallized  in  1984-1985.   Among these  problems,  which  were
vehemently debated in the European Council, were the Kurdish problem, the Armenian
problem, democracy and human rights, and the Cyprus and Aegean disputes.  
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In this political situation, Turgut Özal submitted the official application in 1987 despite the
negative signals from the EC to do otherwise. It took the EC two years to make an official
declaration on Turkish application. The application was rejected on the grounds that EC
was not ready for another period of enlargement until 1993 due to the start of the single
market.  The abolition of Berlin Wall and the eventual end of the Cold War in 1990 altered
all   dynamics  in  the  world  and  in  Europe.   Turkey  benefited  from  this  far-reaching
alteration of  the balance in the European order  and in  1990, the Commission issued a
package to improve relations with Turkey. 
 BETWEEN 1990-2008
Official Candidacy and the beginning of accession negotiations 
1990 witnessed the end of Cold War and beginning of a new era for Turkey in terms of its
strategic importance in Europe.  It was in this period that Turkey began to understand the
importance of the EC (which became the European Union (EU) with the Maastricht Treaty
in 1992).  Europe attributed a new importance to Turkey as well.   In  1991, the official
Association Council meetings re-started for the first time since 1986, when Turkey had
walked out on the EC because of the Cyprus dispute.  The revival of the relationship came
in 1992, when Turkey was underlined as a state that “had increasingly gained importance
in the wake of political circumstances” during the Lisbon Treaty of 1992 (Birand 2005, p.
349). 
In  1993,  the  President  of  Turkey,  Turgut  Özal  died;  he  was  succeeded  by  Süleyman
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Demirel.   Tansu Çiller,  who was a western/modern-looking woman,  became the prime
minister, which raised hope in the eyes of the public. While these events were happening in
Turkey,  a  very  significant  summit  was  taking  place  in  Copenhagen,  issuing  the
Copenhagen  Criteria.  At  that  time,  the  Copenhagen  Summit's  primary  importance  for
Turkey was its  stipulation on Cyprus since Cyprus had been excluded from the list  of
candidate countries. In other words, Turkey was not aware that the Copenhagen Criteria
would be critical in future negotiations with the EU.  Before the Copenhagen Summit, the
political and democratic conditions had been policed by the Council of Europe and the
European Court of Human Rights as its main instrument (Hale 2003, p. 108).  
The Copenhagen Criteria gave the European Council the opportunity to officially  audit the
candidate countries by stipulating that “membership requires that the candidate country has
achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and
respect for protection of minorities” (Hale 2003, p. 108). Turkey strived to harmonize its
legal system with the Copenhagen Criteria, beginning in 1993 up until 2004, when she was
agreed to begin negotiations for full membership.7
The Customs Union was the main theme of relations between 1993-1995, when in 1995,
the United States interfered by pressuring the European Countries to accept Turkey into
customs union.  Finally, on 6 March 1995, the Customs Union Agreement was signed and a
one-year  period  was  provided  for  implementation  despite  the  domestic  disagreements
within the EU (Baç 1996, p. 69).  
The  Customs  Union  did  not  manage  to  bring  a  sustainable  amelioration  of  relations.
7 A detailed summary of the laws passed to harmonize with the EU and abide by the Copenhagen Criteria is written at
the end of this chapter. 
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Furthermore, in 1996, Turkey and Greece reached the verge of war when the Kardak Crisis
exploded. Kardak was a piece of rock in the Aegean and it had a symbolic value regarding
the historical animosity between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean.  The EU sided with
Greece in the Kardak dispute. Besides this foreign predicament , 1996 was also a year of
domestic instability in Turkey. The Yılmaz-Çiller government failed to reach a consensus
and lost credibility. However, the government did not give up its aspirations to be included
on the list of candidate countries and Yılmaz engaged in a rigorous itinerary of lobbying to
realize  this  goal  at  the  December  1997  Luxembourg  Summit.   However,  Turkey  was
disappointed at the Luxembourg Summit since she was excluded from the list of candidate
countries, while many of the newly applied countries such as Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia
and Bulgaria were included. This also caused resentment in the public opinion. 
The above events caused the relations between Turkey and the EC to become strained until 
1999 Helsinki Summit, which was a turning point for EU-Turkish relations since Turkey 
was included on the list of candidate countries (Baç 2008; Çayhan 2003). Even though the 
relations had been strained before 1999, Turkey had achieved the status of candidacy as a 
result of the following events: the Kosovo crisis, the US support for Turkey to be included in
the EU, German politics being ruled by Social Democrats again, the new coalition composed
of Ecevit-Yılmaz-Bahçeli passing many laws to harmonize with the democratic criteria of 
EU,  the capture of Abdullah Öcalan (leader of the PKK), the beginning of  a peaceful  
process  in  southern  regions,  and  the  amelioration of  relations  with Greece  with  Smitis-
Papandreu (Birand 2005, pp. 391-392).    Because of these developments, coupled with  
Turkey's concession to Cyprus regarding the acceptance of its membership with or without a
political solution, Turkey was granted candidacy  status. However, it was not until the 2001 
Nice Summit that the European Commission agreed to “publicly approve” the Accession  
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Partnership Document (Dansereau, Oner, Kiersey & Weisband 2008, p. 52).
Domestically,  the year  2000 began with disagreements  among coalition partners which
kept the process from coming up with a unified program for enacting harmonization laws.
Furthermore, the harmonization laws included drastic reforms that the coalition partners
refrained from issuing (Birand 2005, pp. 409-430).  Among these were the most critical
Copenhagen conditions regarding the abolition of capital punishment, reduction of military
power over civil administration and enacting laws regarding Kurdish rights.  During 2000
nobody, including Günther Verheugen (European Commissioner for enlargement), believed
that these radical changes could have been made in a few years time. For example, the
Commission expected the Accession Partnership Document (APD) in June 2000 at  the
latest, but it was not prepared until the June of the following year (Birand 2005, pp. 409-
430). The capture of Abdulllah Öcalan, the leader of PKK, on February 1999 played the
leading role in delaying preparation for APD. 
The multiparty coalition managed to meet the expectations of the EU after Öcalan was
captured.  The nationalist segment of the government, with Bahçeli, played a vital role and
did not impede the process of abolishing capital punishment (Birand 2005, pp. 409-430).
In sum, the tumultuous circumstances after Öcalan's capture ended with the enactment of
significant reform packages and preparation of the APD at the end of 2001.  However,
besides these positive political developments on the road to the EU, 2001 also witnessed
one of the most disastrous economic crises in Turkey.  The Turkish Lira was devalued by
70-80% within  a  few days  during February 2001,  and  twenty-one private  banks  went
bankrupt  (Birand  2005,  pp.  409-430).  The  government  was  under  an  unprecedented
pressure. It was in this context, during March, that the Commission declared the ADP and
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also the National Program (NP) to adopt the ADP in line with Copenhagen Criteria.  
The  NP included  many of  the  most  sensitive  issues  including  the  abolition  of  capital
punishment and minority rights, but to the shock of EU, the Turkish parliament passed the
NP without  any major  objection.  Furthermore,  serious  steps  were  taken  regarding  the
Cyprus conflict when the possibility of bilateral meetings between Denktaş and Clerides
emerged  (Birand  2005,  pp.  409-430).  In  sum,  in  2001  there  was  an  initiation  of  a
metamorphosis in Turkey, both politically and economically, even though the former was a
positive and the latter was a negative process. Towards the end of 2001, on 11  September
2001 (9/11),  however,  the whole world system and politics  literally changed when the
World Trade Center was attacked. 
George  Bush  declared  the  Bush  Doctrine  in  his  speech  on  9/11:  “We  will  make  no
distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them”
(http://www.whitehouse.gov). Furthermore, in subsequent speeches, Bush highlighted the
nations which are on an “axis of evil” versus an “axis of good,” with Turkey taking a
position  under  the  rubric  of  “axis  of  good”  by  allying  with  the  U.S
(http://www.acronym.org.uk). 
Meanwhile, the European Council announced that Turkey had made “good progress and …
was closer to the EU” in its report of the June 2001 meeting (Dansereau, Oner, Kiersey &
Weisband 2008, p. 52). In October, parliament enacted the first harmonization package,
which  had  not  yet  included  the  most  controversial  issues.  To  summarize,  2001 was  a
positive year in Turkey regarding Turkish-EU Relations. 
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Turkey  went  through  a  series  of  changes  in  2002.  Three  developments  marked  the
significance  of  this  year:  developments  regarding  the  Cyprus  conflict,  acceptance  of
revolutionary harmonization laws and the election of Justice and development Party with
majority in November (Birand 2005, pp. 409-430) . With respect to the Cyprus Conflict, in
January, Denktaş and Clerides met, but no solutions came out of that meeting. The main
problem lay with Ecevit  and Bahçeli,  who were in  favor of  keeping the status  quo in
Cyprus rather than initiating a political solution. The United Nations decided to intervene
after the failure of these talks, with the Annan plan being  issued on 11 November 2002
after the JDP won the parliament seats with a majority (Birand 2005, pp. 409-430). Prior to
these events, the enactment of the third reform package made its mark on the coalition
government in August as its last act before its demise. This reform package included the
abolition of capital punishment and the recognition of Kurdish minority rights, including
those of education and broadcasting.  However, it was the JDP rather than the coalition
partners that made the enactment of this package possible, since the nationalist Bahçeli and
his deputies refused to vote for the package. Instead, the JDP supported the package from
outside.   Ironically,  two  months  later,  the  JDP emerged  as  the  majority  party  in  the
parliament, altering Turkish policies in many areas, including Cyprus.
The new Cyprus policy of Erdoğan and his JDP altered the previous stance arguing for
keeping the status quo. Denktaş was among those opting for the status quo and this was the
main  reason  why  he  refused  to  accept  the  Annan  Plan  of  11  November  2002.   The
strenuous endeavors to find a solution continued during 2003; the final step turned out to
be holding a referendum on both the Turkish and the Greek Cypriot sides (Birand 2005, pp.
409-430).   Erdoğan's  new policy worked  and  the  Turkish  side  accepted  the  plan  in  a
referendum while the Greek Cypriots rejected it in 2004 (Birand 2005, pp. 409-430). The
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JDP made other  radical  transformations and passed the  fourth,  fifth,  sixth and seventh
reform packages between 2003-2004. In sum, with the beginning of a serious effort to find
a solution to the Cyprus problem and the enactment of radical reform packages, Turkey
took a leap forward towards the EU. 
 
Overall,  between  2001-2004,  Turkey  passed  175  clauses  and  ratified  twenty-eight
international agreements to harmonize with the Copenhagen criteria (Birand 2005, p. 456).
Even  though  there  was  opposition,  especially  on  behalf  of  Kurdish  Organizations  in
Europe  regarding  the  Turkish  eligibility  for  the  start  of  negotiations,   EU  officials
recognized  these  developments  and  Turkey  began  negotiations  for  membership  on  3
October 2005.8 However, this decision to begin negotiations was open ended and does not
include a guarantee for membership in the end.  
The screening process was completed one year after the Summit, in October 2006, at which
time Turkey began accession negotiations. However,  negotiation on eight chapters were
frozen on 11 December 2006 due to  disputes between the Turkish government and the EU
regarding  Cyprus  and  opening   Turkish  ports  to  Greek  Cypriots  ships  and  airports  to
planes. This was reflected in a deterioration of relations between Turkey and the EU. These
developments lead to suspicion among EU scholars, such as Müge Kınacıoğlu (2008) who
states that “it will take at least a decade for full membership to  materialize  due to the
lengthy negotiations of the 35 chapters but also due to the language used by the European
Council in its reports stating that negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of
which cannot be guaranteed beforehand” (p. 75). 
8 For example,  Kerim Yıldız, The Kurds in Turkey: EU Accession and Human Rights (London, Pluto Press, 2005),
discusses that Turkey had not fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria.
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In conclusion, the above events and decline in the relationship between EU and Turkey
because of the Cyprus conflict are the impediments to Turkish membership.  However,
between 1993-2004, Turkey took some positive steps by passing many harmonization laws
to comply with the Copenhagen criteria. These will be  summarized in the next section. In
sum,  even  though  the  future  of  Turkish-EU  relations  seems  to  be  deteriorating,  the
developments like the ones discussed below also indicate prospects for amelioration.
1.2 DEMOCRATIZATION REFORMS 1993-2004
The  reforms  and  amendments  mentioned  in  this  section  of  the  chapter  are  borrowed
directly from Ergun Özbudun and Serap Yazıcı, Democratization Reforms in Turkey (1993-
2004).  A more condensed version of  these reforms can be found in Keyman & Aydın
(2004).
The reform packages amended the 1982 constitution, which had been designed under the
tutelage of a military regime, aiming mainly at protecting the state from the citizens rather
than granting the citizens fundamental civic rights and liberties to protect them from the
state. The 1982 Constitution was amended eight times after the restoration of democracy in
1983 in 1987, 1993, 1995, 1999 (twice), 2001, 2002 and 2004. These amendments mainly
aimed at restoring the democratic system and lessening restrictions of  fundamental rights,
rule  of  law  and  military  prerogatives.  Besides  constitutional  amendments,  in   2002-
2003,“harmonization  laws,”  composed  of  seven  comprehensive  reform  packages  to
achieve further democratization, were enacted. 
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The  constitutional  and  legislative  amendments  made  to  the  1982  Turkish  Constitution
between 1993-2004 can be traced under the following four headings
• Fundamental civil rights and liberties
• Political Rights
• The Rule of Law
• Civil-Military Relations
Reforms made regarding fundamental  rights and liberties and political  rights which are
relevant to the purposes of this study are paraphrased from Ergun Özbudun and Serap
Yazıcı in the following section.
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES (pp. 13-27)
The  constitutional  amendment  of  2001  was  the  most  comprehensive  one  in  terms  of
reforming fundamental  rights  and  liberties.  Article  13  on  the General  Grounds  for  the
restriction of Fundamental Rights and Liberties was amended so that the “essence” of basic
rights  was  protected.  In  other  words,  with  the  amendment,  general  grounds  for  the
restriction of fundamental rights were limited.  Following Article 13,  Article 14 was also
amended  and  by  changing  it  to  “None  of  the  rights  and  liberties  embodied  in  the
Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the
State with its territory and nation, and endangering the existence of the democratic and
secular  Republic  based  on  human  rights...” from   “none  of  the  rights  and  liberties
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embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible
integrity of  the state with  its  territory  and nation, of  endangering the existence of  the
Turkish State and Republic, destroying fundamental rights and  liberties, of placing the
government of the state under the control of   an individual or a group...”  Restrictions on
personal  liberty  and  security  were  eased  by shortening  detention  periods.  Liberty  and
individual life  was further  taken  under protection  by bringing a guarantee,  through an
amendment  to  Article  20,  against  unlawful  searches  and  seizures  of  a  person's  private
papers and belongings. Article 21 was amended similarly to that of Article 20, regulating
the inviolability of  one’s  domicile.  Freedom and confidentiality of  communication  and
freedom of residence and travel were further taken under constitutional protection. This
was done in two ways. The first was  removing the authority of administrative units to
violate confidentiality of communication without having first obtained the consent of a
judge authorized to make decisions regarding such matters. The second was  abolishing
restrictions on the citizen’s freedom to travel abroad, which had previously been subject to
the National economic situation (pp 13-27). 
Freedom of expression was expanded by a significant change to  Article 26 – by which the
phrase  “language  prohibited  by  law,”  which  had  originally  been  included  in  the
Constitution to enable the military to ban the use of Kurdish, was deleted. Furthermore, the
NSC (National Security Council) passed a law to that effect without mentioning Kurdish.
Although this law was repealed in 1991 and there has been no language prohibited by law
since then, the deletion of the phrase from the Constitution is crucial in terms of avoiding
future introduction of the prohibition of any language. 
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Another  crucial  change  regarding freedom of  expression includes  the  exclusion of  the
wording “thoughts and opinions” from Article 176, which had stated that  “no protection
shall  be  afforded  to  thoughts  and  opinions  contrary  to  Turkish  National  interests,  the
indivisibility of the State with its territory and Nation, Turkish historical and moral values;
and Atatürk's  nationalism, his principles,  reforms and modernism. The words “thoughts
and opinions” were replaced by the word “activity” in this phrase. 
Another constitutional amendment regarding freedom of expression –  the abolishment of
the  state  monopoly  on  radio  and  television,  was  introduced  in  1993.  This  led  to  an
immediate  proliferation  of  private  radio  and  TV  channels,  which  contributed  to
considerable political pluralism. 
The Anti-terror Law passed in 1991 repealed the notorious articles 141, 142, and 163 of the
Penal  Code,  which  punished  communist  and  anti-secular  propaganda and  organization.
Another amendment was made to the Article 312 of the penal code punishing people who
incite hostility and hatred on the basis of the differences of social class, race, religion, sect
and region. The amendment guaranteed that such expressions were to be considered as
crime only if they constitute a danger against public order. With the reform package of
August 2002, an amendment to Article 159 of the penal code, which considered insulting
and deriding the Republic, Turkishness, The Grand National Assembly, the Government,
the ministries, the military and security forces and the moral personality of the judiciary as
criminal  offenses,  was  enacted.  With  the  amendment,  it  was  stipulated  that  criticisms
without the intention of insult or contempt would not constitute an offense. The last vestige
of such “thought crimes” was eliminated by the Sixth Reform Package of July 2003, which
abolished Article 8 of the Anti-terror law penalizing separatist propaganda. 
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1) Freedom of the Press: Article 28 was amended in a similar fashion to that of Article
26 amending the phrase “language prohibited by law.” A further improvement was
brought  by the  constitutional  amendment  of  2004,  according  to  which  printing
presses  and  their  annexes  would   not  be  seized,  confiscated  or  barred  from
operation on the grounds of being an instrument of crime. 
2) Freedom of Association: Article 33, which originally prohibited associations from
pursuing political aims, engage in political activities, receive support from or give
support  to  political  parties,  or  take  joint  action  with  labor  unions,  public  or
professional organizations or foundations was extensively amended in 1995 . The
amendment removed the ban on the political activities of associations and permitted
them to engage in collaborative action with political parties and other civil society
organizations. 
3) Freedom of Assembly: The amendment of 2001 broadened the scope of freedom of
assembly considerably compared to the original text of Article 34. For example, the
clauses requiring the authorization of the local authority determining the route and
site of the demonstration, or prohibiting a meeting where there is the possibility of
disturbing  the  public  order  were  removed.  Furthermore,  the  Second  and  Third
Reform  packages  further  liberalized  certain  provisions  of  the  Law  on  Public
Meetings and Demonstration Marches.
4) The Right to a Fair Trial: The right to  a fair trial was added to Article 36 in 2001.
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This amendment also concerns the State Security Courts combining military and
civilian judges designed to deal with the crimes against the security of the state.
Article 143 of the constitution was amended in June 1999 to eliminate  military
judges and prosecutors from the courts. 
5) Abolition  of  the  Death  Penalty:  the  death  penalty  was  restricted  to  crimes
committed in cases of war or the imminent threat of war, and terror crimes by the
constitutional  amendment  of  2001.  The  Third  Reform  package  in  2002  also
eliminated the terror crimes exception. Finally, the 2004 constitutional amendment
totally abolished death penalty including the cases of war or the imminent threat of
war.
6) Prevention  of  Torture  and  Mistreatment:  Even  though  the  1982  Constitution
explicitly forbids torture, mistreatment and inhuman treatments in Article 17. 
Equality of Sexes: The original text of Article 10 states that “all individuals are
equal  without  any  discrimination  before  the  law,  irrespective  of  language,  sex,
political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect or any such consideration.
No privilege can be granted to any individual, family, group or class. State organs
and administrative authorities shall act in compliance with the principle of equality
before the law in all their proceedings.” The amendment in 2004 further underlined
the equality between the sexes by stating that “women and men have equal rights.
The State is obliged to put this equality into effect.” 
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POLITICAL RIGHTS (pp. 27-31)
1) Turkish citizenship:  With the constitutional  amendment of  2001, Article  66 was
changed  to  replace  the  sentence  “citizenship  of  a  foreign  father  and  a  Turkish
mother shall be determined by law” with the sentence “the child of a Turkish father
or a Turkish mother is a Turk.”
2) The right to vote: 1995 amendment lowered the voting age to 18. 
3) Eligibility  to  enter  Parliament:  the  very  broad  and  vague  term  precluding  the
eligibility to enter parliament based on involvement in “ideological and anarchistic
actions” were amended in December 2002 as only “terror actions”. 
4) Regulation and Prohibition of Political Parties: Articles 68 and 69 on the regulation
and prohibition of political parties were extensively amended in 1995 and 2001 and
the constitutional guarantees for political parties were significantly strengthened. 
5) Right to Petition: Also in 2001, the right to petition was extended to foreign citizens
residing in Turkey. 
6) Provisions  concerning  Civil  Society:  By a  change  in  Article  135,a  ban  on  the
political activities of public professional organizations was lifted.
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1.4 CONCLUSION 
Turkey's journey to membership in the  EU  has been going on since its application for
associate membership in 1959. Now, after nearly  half a century since the application, a key
Eurobarometer opinion poll shows that 59% of Europeans oppose Turkish membership,
with only 28% in favor (http://news.bbc.co.uk). Moreover,  the present leaders of Germany
and France contend that Turkey is not compatible with European democratic norms and
thus does not have what is necessary to become an EU member (http://news.bbc.co.uk).
There are polls in Turkey, too, indicating a sharp decrease in support for EU, from three
quarters of Turks to only half or even less of the population (http://news.bbc.co.uk).
Several problems lie ahead of Turkey and also the Union regarding  Turkish membership.
The EU opts for a Turkey continuing with democratic reforms including a political solution
to the Kurdish problem and enlargement of democratic rights to minorities. Furthermore,
freedom of speech laws continue to  constitute a major obstacle for membership. Among
these, is no. 301 of the penal code, on the basis of which many intellectuals have been
prosecuted for.  The Cyprus dispute is another issue impeding membership since Turkey
refuses to open free trade with Greek Cypriots while the Turkish side is still suffering from
sanctions.  The last concern the EU has concerns the Armenian issue. Turkey refuses to
accept  the  Armenian  claims  of  genocide  and  there  is  resentment  among the Armenian
population in Europe about this. 
Despite all these grievances, EU is reluctant  Turkey since it is now Europe's sixth-largest
economy,  a major transit  route for Europe's  energy needs,  and a major regional power
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(http://news.bbc.co.uk).  However,  this  does  not  change  the  fact  that  there  are  serious
reservations  concerning   Turkey’s  huge  population  and  Muslim  heritage.   France  and
Germany support conditional membership or a special partnership to protect themselves
from the unrestricted inflow of 
workers.  However, Turkey refuses conditional membership and is pushing for equal status
with that of existing members. The end of the negotiation process is still vague and the EU
as  a  whole  still  says  Turkey  will  not  be  ready  to  join  until  at  least  2014
(http://news.bbc.co.uk).
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CHAPTER 2
DEMOCRATIC REFORMS AND EU MEMBERSHIP
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The 1982 constitution was designed under the tutelage of the military junta to protect the
state from citizens rather than granting citizens fundamental civic rights and liberties so as
to protect them from the state (Özbudun and Yazıcı 2004, p. 13). This illiberal constitution
was amended eight times after the restoration of democracy - in 1983, 1987, 1993, 1995,
1999 (twice), 2001, 2002 and 2004 (Özbudun and Yazıcı 2004, p. 13). However, of these
years,  1999  is  a  turning  point  since  Turkey  became  an  official  candidate  for  EU
membership at the Helsinki Summit. In other words, 1999 marks the beginning of a phase
in which Turkish democracy is transformed, via eight reform packages, to comply with the
democratic  stipulations  the  Copenhagen  Criteria  imposed on   candidate  countries.:  the
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect
for and protection of minorities” (Yıldız 2005, p. 33). These reform packages mainly aimed
at  restoring  the  democratic  system  and  lifting  restrictions  on  fundamental  rights,
guaranteeing a rule of law and limiting military prerogatives.  In other words, Turkey has
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been going through a phase of radical legal reforms, leading to a transformation in almost
every aspect  of social life, including human rights, freedom of speech, minority rights,
regulation of civil-military relations and  women's rights. 
The  above-mentioned  legal  reforms  are  the  beginning  of  a  new  period  in  Turkish
democracy  and,  accordingly,  need  to  be  elaborated  in  more  detail.  With  the  two
democratization packages that transformed the system in 2003, the Political Parties Law
was further liberalized, the fight against torture was strengthened, freedom of the press was
further expanded, the procedures for setting up associations were eased and the restrictions
that applied to the acquisition of property by non-Muslim community foundations were
abolished  (Keyman and  Aydın  2004,  p.  16).   Furthermore,  as  for  minority rights,  and
Kurdish rights in particular,  legal cases were given the chance for retrial based on the
verdict of European Court of Human Rights. This opened the gate for a retrial of formerly
convicted Kurdish nationalists such as Leyla Zana, who was a former Kurdish deputy from
Democratic Peoples' Party defending Kurdish independence. 
Besides the above reforms, the ground-shaking reform package regarding the Kurdish issue
came with the Sixth Reform Package, which became effective as of mid-July 2003 and
generated  debate regarding the abolishment  of Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law (thus
further expanding the freedom of speech), as well as the restrictions on the use of  the death
penalty and the expansion of broadcasting rights in Kurdish (Keyman and Aydın 2004, p.
16). However, it was not until the last set of democratic reforms were enacted in late July
2003 that  radical  democratic  changes  were  made by empowering civilian  control  over
military domain, weakening torture with additional measures and invigorating fundamental
freedoms (Keyman and Aydın 2004, p. 16). In May 2004 and July 2004, there was  another
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set  of  constitutional  amendments  and  alteration  of  the  penal  code  to  comply with  the
Copenhagen Criteria and the Constitution was modified to take into account the previous
reform packages. The same year, another crucial modification, - the reform of the penal
code, had major ramifications for  women's rights in particular.
This  ongoing practice of reforming every layer of society via legal reforms began with the
proclamation  of  the  Turkish  Republic  in  1923.   This  first  phase  of  legal  reforms
transformed  all  layers  of  society,  including  the  status  of  women.   This  initial  reform
process, however, did not encompass minority rights. Instead, the republic was constructed
as a homogeneous Turkish Nation excluding all sorts of identities apart from  Republican
Turkishness.   Minority  rights  were  introduced  only after  Turkey  aspired  to  become a
European  Union  (EU)  member,  with  its  candidacy  becoming  official  at  the  Helsinki
Summit of 1999.  The Helsinki Summit marks a significant turning point in Turkish legal
history  in  terms  of  women's  and  minority  rights  since  it  triggered  a  stage  of  radical
reforms. In terms of women's rights, these  reforms were incarnated in the form of Civil
Code (2001) and Penal  Code (2004) reforms.  Under  the previous  system,  men legally
superseded  women  in  marriage  regarding  decision  making and  women's  were  familial
commodities  belonging  to  men.  These  juridical  frameworks  legitimized  human  rights
violations  like forced marriages,  marital  rape,  honor killings  etc  (Women for  Women's
Human Rights (WHHR) 2005).
The  following  part  of  the  chapter  will  elaborate  on  women's  and  minority  rights  in
particular with respect to recent legal reform enacted.  
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2.2 LEGAL REFORMS IN TURKEY-WOMEN'S RIGHTS
In the history of the Turkish Republic (TR), there have been two major phases of legal
reforms to improve the status of women. The first phase, which was  between  1926-1934,
consisted of the introduction of legal equality between the sexes.  The most important of
these legal reforms  were the establishment of equal property rights, including inheritance,
and suffrage rights. Furthermore, polygamy and Islamic courts were abolished; civil courts
of law, based on a secular principles, replaced religious courts, based on sharia. Men and
woman came to be treated on an equal basis in a court of law. 
Almost seventy years later, beginning in 1999, a new phase of reforming women's status
began when Turkey became an official candidate for EU membership.  The reform process
continued until 2004 when Turkey achieved the right to begin official negotiations for full
membership.  These  reforms,  including  equal  rights  in  marriage,  divorce  and  property
ownership and treating female sexuality as a matter of individual rights (as opposed to a
matter of societal order) was   considered by EU officials to be satisfactory in terms of
fulfilling  the  Copenhagen  Criteria   and  Turkey  gained  the  right  to  begin  official
negotiations.   However,  in  the  study of  the  World  Economic  Forum of  2006 (Global
Gender Gap Report), Turkey ranked 105 out of 115 on gender equality, behind Tunisia and
Ethiopia (European Stability Initiative, Sex and Power in Turkey, official report 2007, p.1).
This  indicates  the  inadequacy  of  social  improvement  by  mere  legal  transformation.
However, altering the juridical status of women is the first step for such ameliorations. The
following part of the chapter will discuss these legal reforms. 
In the official parlance of the Turkish Republic, women's status was regarded as having an
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equal status with men since the establishment of the Republic in 1923.  As of 1923, women
in Turkey were expected to appreciate and be grateful for the legal reforms granted to them
by the ruling Republican men.9 This was mainly the result of many legal reforms which
took place with the adoption of the civil code in 1926, when Atatürk outlawed polygamy,
gave  equal  divorce  rights,   introduced  equal  custody  rights  to  both  parents  and  gave
suffrage rights by 1934 (Kandiyoti 1987, p. 320).   However, the implementation of these
laws  in  reality  were  problematic;  furthermore,  there  were  clauses   in  the  constitution
rendering the sexes unequal.  Many feminists and sociologists examined the patriarchal
nature of the Republic and concluded that  the inequalities that prevailed until the Civil
Code was reformed in 2001 with the subsequent reform of the Penal Code in 2004.10 Baç
also noted the plight of women in 1999 by saying that  
“the seemingly bright picture – Turkey as the most modern, democratic, secular Muslim state 
that also secures women’s rights – is misleading in many ways. In fact, I propose that this  
perception  is  more  harmful  than  outright  oppression  because  it  shakes  the  ground  for  
women’s rights movements by suggesting that they are unnecessary.” (Baç 1999, p.313). 
Despite the fact that women were subject to blatant oppression within the legal  system
until 2001, there was a vibrant women's movement beginning in the 1960s and 1970s that
prepared the background for the 2001 reforms (European Stability Initiative, 2007). In this
initial stage, academicians like Deniz Kandiyoti (1987) investigated the changing family
9 This official ideology is still prevalent as illustrated by the following extract from the Office of the Prime Minister
Directorate General of Press and Information, regarding the evaluation of 1926 civil code and other legal reforms of
the newly established Republic:  “Through imposing nationwide consistency in the Turkish system on what had
previously been a patchwork of differing legal practices, the Turkish Code succeeded in keeping the country from
plunging  into  a  judicial  chaos.  It  furthermore  guaranteed  all  Turkey’s  citizens  equal  rights  before  the  law,
irrespective of their language, religion, race or gender, thus sweeping away all of the traditional and legal obstacles
to implementing a fully just legal system. Finally it bolstered the social status of Turkey’s women, providing them
with the same rights as any other citizen.” http://www.byegm.gov.tr/on-sayfa/new-civil-code.htm 
10 The Official ideology regards the 1920s reforms as revolutionary for the conditions of the time they were enacted
and concludes that laws need to change by time to adopt society. As illustrated in  the Office of the Prime Minister
Directorate General of Press and Information in the following extract from why the civil code was reformed in 2001:
Yet living conditions undergo constant change, society’s needs and the very nature of human relations cannot help
but be touched by new circumstances arising from economic and technological progress. Therefore, laws are fated to
always  fall  behind  the  times;  they  must  be  periodically  amended  and  renewed.   http://www.byegm.gov.tr/on-
sayfa/new-civil-code.htm 
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structure through case studies in Ankara. 
According to the European Stability Initiative Report (ESI 2007), these sociological studies
revealed the problematic nature of the 1920s reforms:  they did not penetrate the society
and  remained  distinct  to  the  small,  urban  elite.  Following  from  these  findings,  the
patriarchal nature of the society and Islam was blamed.  However, beginning in the 1980s,
feminists altered the way they analyzed the women's plight in Turkey (European Stability
Initiative 2007).  Şirin Tekeli was among these new feminists who identified that the main
problem aroused not merely from rural backwardness but from the law itself and found that
patriarchy was  the  defining  feature  of  the  Civil  and  Penal  Code prevailing  in  Turkey
(European Stability Initiative,  Sex and Power in Turkey,  official  report  2007, pp. 7-9).
Among such examples of patriarchal inequality of the Civil Code were the obligation to
obtain permission from the husband to work and unequal criminal treatment of husband
and wife regarding the punishment of extramarital sex. 
The above obstacles to  gender equality were further crystallized when Turkey became part
of the UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),
ratified in 1985, which vividly underlined the limitations of the Turkish law in the eyes of
the public (European Stability Initiative, 2007).  The public was informed that Turkey had
many reservations  to  the  CEDAW since  its  existing  legal  code  did  not  permit  gender
equality regarding marriage, divorce, property ownership and employment.11  The CEDAW
played a significant role in terms of guiding feminist movements towards achieving a goal:
to comply with CEDAW's international gender equality standards.  Turkey promised to
withdraw its reservations in 1995 and did so in 1999. However, the amendment of the Civil
Code had still not been made. Another actor  - the EU - came into the picture at this point,
11 According to ESI Report 2007, reservations were made to the Article 15 and Article 16 of CEDAW.
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triggering the enactment of gender equality in civil law in line with the criticisms of the EU
via  progress  reports.   Beginning  in  1999,  many women's  activist  NGOs,  scholars  and
feminists joined the campaign to reform the civil code.12 The campaign was successful and
the following changes were made to the civil code.
CIVIL CODE REFORMS OF 2001 
The  new civil  code  ratified  on  11  November  2001comprises  1,030  articles,  including
amendments to the civil code and  to  family law (http://www.byegm.gov.tr).
 Amendments:
Conditions for marriage:  The new civil code altered the minimum age of marriage
with Article 124 by changing the minimal age to 18 for both men and women, from
17 for men and 15 for women. However, a Court of Peace judge has the right  to
reduce the age required to get married in extraordinary circumstances after hearing
from the guardians of juveniles.
Enforced waiting period of three hundred days: A three hundred-day  mandatory
waiting  period  is  imposed  on  women  starting  from  the  court  decision  granting
divorce or the day of husband's death (Article 15 of the Marriage Regulations); this is
to ensure that a woman is not  pregnant from previous marriage. Women have to
prove that they are not pregnant if they want to marry before the end of this period.
The WHHR views  this clause  as discriminatory against women in the name of
12 For a detailed analysis of how women's organizations strived to achieve civil code reform see the publication of
Women for Women's Human Rights (WHHR)-New Ways , “Turkish Civil and Penal Code Reforms from a Gender
Perspective”: The Success of Two Nationwide Campaigns,” February 2005. 
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establishing  fatherhood.   The  WHHR  proposal  for  the  fatherhood  conflict  is  a
contemporary one – the use of  DNA testing rather than imposing a discriminatory
waiting period on women (WHHR Report 2005). 
Women in the family, the legal framework: The constitutional amendment of 2001
(Article 41) brought about equality between the spouses by initially demarcating a
general framework for the establishment of “head of the family” with the following
phrase: “the family is ....based on the equality between the spouses.” In line with
altering the general framework, the following details were added to realize further
equality between spouses:
1. Decision-making power  : The new Civil Code in 2001 (Article 186)
set the  terms of decision-making as equal between the spouses as
opposed  to  the  previous  clause  rendering   the  husband  solely
responsible for maintaining the family.  
2. Place of residence  :  The previous Civil  Code, considering that  the
husband  was  the  primary  decision-maker  of  a  married  couple’s
domicile,  established  the  wife’s  legal  residence  as  that  of  her
husband. However,  with the new code (Article 186),  the place of
residence is to be determined  by the spouses jointly. 
3. Family abode  : Spouses have equal rights pertaining to the decision
regarding all matters of home (Article 194). For instance, none of
the  spouses  can  change  the  rental  terms  of  the  house,  end  an
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agreement made upon the home or hand over  the residence rights of
the  abode  to  a  third  party  if  the  other  spouse  has  not  explicitly
agreed to do so.
4. Surname  : According to Article 187 of the new Civil Code, the wife
has the right to continue keeping and using her maiden name in front
of  the husband's  surname,  whereas  in  the  previous code no  such
opportunity was given.
5. Representative  authority  :  In  the  previous  code,  the  husband  was
granted the sole authority to represent the family in outside matters,
and was responsible for the family finances.  The new Civil Code
(Article  189)  poses  equal  representation  rights  regarding  family
matters,  including  savings  and  finances.  Furthermore,  to  protect
equality, upon application of one of the spouses, the judge may limit
the  authority  of  the  spouse  exploiting the  representation.  (Article
190). In addition to the relations with third parties, Article 193 gives
both spouses equal entitlements to establish legal transactions with
third parties.  
6. Work  :  Until 1990, the Civil Code recognized the husband to be the
sole  authority  in  the  family,  which  gave  him the   legal  right  to
proscribe his wife from working. However, in 1990, this clause was
removed, albeit with no insertion of a replacement, from the Civil
Code. The 2001 Civil Code reform recognized this need and, with
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Article 192, it  explicit  that “neither  spouse has an obligation to
seek the permission to work from the other.” However, the following
clause still makes this improvement insufficient by stating that “the
harmony and welfare of the marriage union should be borne in mind
when choosing and performing a job or profession,” since it could
be used to legitimize limiting women's  working rights  to  achieve
harmony and welfare of the marriage union. 
7. Financial contribution  : Article 196 of the new Civil Code introduced
for the first time the recognition of unpaid housework of the wife by
establishing the right to appeal to the court to determine the amount
that  each  spouse  should  contribute  to  the  household.  By  giving
women  the  right  to  explicitly  discuss  the  value  of  housework  in
terms  of  contributing  to  the  household,  women  were  given  the
chance to assign a value to the hitherto unrecognized housework.
8. The  legal  regime  : According  to  the  new  regime  regarding  the
ownership of acquired property, each spouse has the equal right to
the  property acquired  after  marriage,  irrespective  of  how and  by
whom it was obtained. In other words, women's invisible housework
is assigned an economic value with the introduction of this clause.
This is done by introducing two different types of property to the
marriage.  Acquired  property  (Article  219)  and  personal  property
(Article 220).  Personal property consists of  possessions acquired
before  marriage and acquired property is comprised of possessions
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acquired   after  marriage.  Personal  property belongs  to  the  owner
whereas  acquired  property  is  to  be  divided  equally,  endowing
women with new economic security in case of divorce or death of
husband.  Furthermore, under  personal property, the woman has the
right to keep her dowry since it is considered as a property obtained
before the marriage. 
De  Facto  Relationships (WHHR  Report  2005):  De  facto  relationships  are  not  legally
recognized by the state.  In other words, unmarried women in a relationship, whether living
together or alone, cannot claim any legal rights of property or alimony. The improvement of
the  Civil  Code  was  not  in  terms  of  recognizing  de  facto  relationships  but  in  terms  of
removing the term “illegitimate” from its clauses defining children born out of the marriage.
With the new Civil Code, children born out of wedlock have the same inheritance rights as
children born to a married couple; they are legally treated equally with respect to all matters.
According to Article 329, an unmarried mother has the right to claim alimony if she is the
one looking after the children. Another improvement regarding women's rights was made in
the final decision regarding children in marriage. The clause stating that the father has the
final decision in case of disagreement between the spouses was removed, opening the way
for legal equality vis-à-vis rights over children. Furthermore,  step- children acquire legal
protection with Article  338,  since  it  establishes  an obligation  to  take  care  of  and  show
compassion to them.
Alimony: Alimony rights were re-established on equal terms with the new civil code. In the
new Civil Code, men also have the right to claim alimony even if the woman is not wealthy,
unlike the previous provision stipulating the need to prove women's financial prosperity.
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One clause that was altered in favor of women concerned the place of the authorized court to
claim alimony.  The previous alimony article made it mandatory for the woman to go back
to the family abode to claim alimony, and some women refrained from following up alimony
cases as a result of this obligation, for various reasons. 
PENAL CODE REFORMS OF 2004
The Turkish penal code was adapted from the Italian penal code in 1926.  In 2004, almost
half of the penal code was already amended but a considerable number of clauses were still
out dated and discriminatory towards  women. The reformed version of the penal code was
on the parliament's agenda during the late 1990s but it was only in 2002 that the draft Code
was re-introduced to the government’s agenda thanks to the EU accession process. 
Amendments:13
1) Adultery  : Clauses on adultery were subject to annulment in 1996, 1998 and 2003,
respectively.  In 1996, Article 441, regarding adultery committed by men,  and in
1998, Article 440, on adultery by women, were removed on grounds that they are
against  the  constitution.  More  importantly,  Article  462,  which  granted  sentence
reduction in case of injuring or murdering a family member of committing adultery,
was abandoned in 2003 with the introduction of the Sixth Reform Package.
2) Rights of women deserted by their husband  : The new Penal Code provides for a
13 These amendments to the  Penal  Code are paraphrased from Women for Women's Human Rights (WHHR)-New
Ways , “Turkish Civil and Penal Code Reforms from a Gender Perspective”: The Success of Two Nationwide
Campaigns,” February 2005. 
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penalty of one year in jail for  any man who deserts a  woman he has impregnated,
regardless of whether she is his wife or a single woman.
3) Violence against women  : In 1998, the law called the Law on the Protection of the
Family (No: 4320) introduced many improvements on behalf of women, who are
the main victims of domestic violence. Accordingly, with this reform, any member
of the family who is subject to abuse can obtain a court order against the abuser.
Furthermore, the new Penal Code (Article 96) provides for  three to eight years of
imprisonment to those abusing a spouse or other family members.
4) Sexual rights and sexual violence  : 
i) Sexual  abuse  in  the  family  and  marital  rape  :  Criminalization  of
marital  rape  and  sexual  abuse  were  the  two  most  important
achievements for  women and children in 2004. Marital rape (Article
102) is now subject to up to twelve years  imprisonment.  Sexual
abuse of children within the family is also subject to imprisonment
ranging from 5 to 12 years.
ii) Sexual violence against women and girls  : In the new Penal Code, as
different  from the previous one,  crimes are re-defined thoroughly
under the rubric of “Crimes against Sexual Inviolability.” In the old
version of the Penal Code, sexual violence was regulated in terms of
“Felonies against Public Decency and Family Order” under “Crimes
against Society.”  In the new penal code of 2004 (Articles 104 &
105),  sexual assaults  are defined as crimes committed against  the
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individual  integrity  of  people  and  are  subject  to  much  longer
sentences. This underlines a significant rupture from the old notion
of considering sex as a patriarchal notion, thus introducing a break
from the old system. 
iii) Rape  :  Rape is  regulated  under the  sentences  of  “Sexual  Assault”
(Article 102). According to the article, sexual assaults are subject to
two to seven years of imprisonment while the number of years can
be raised up to twelve for rape. The definition of rape is extended so
that insertion of any object into the body besides the sexual organ is
considered  rape. 
iv) Sexual  Harassment:   Article  105  of  the  new  Penal  Code  defines
sexual  harassment  in  detail:  “any  act  of  harassment  with  sexual
intent” is considered to be sexual harassment and can be penalized
up to two years of  imprisonment.  This article  also defines sexual
harassment  in  the  workplace,  giving  up  to  three  years  of
imprisonment to those abusing the hierarchy in the workplace. This
includes harassment between employers, superiors or coworkers. 
5) Honor  Crimes  :   Honor  crimes  are  among  the  most  prevalent  human  rights
violations of women in Turkey. The WHHR defines an honor crime as the murder
of  a  woman “suspected of  having transgressed the limits of  sexual  behavior  as
imposed  by  traditions;  for  example  engaging  in  a  premarital  relationship  with
someone of the opposite sex or having extra marital affairs” (WHHR Report 2005
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(b), p. 62). A wide range of human rights are violated when a woman transgresses
traditional limits of chastity; this includes  her right to mobility and bodily integrity.
According to the WHHR report  of 2007, it  was the success of  women's  rights
activists that got honor killings  finally recognized as a particular method of assault
on  women in the world.   For  example,  in  its  23rd Special  Session, the United
Nations General Assembly passed a resolution rendering all states responsible for
“national  legislation and other  protective and preventive  measures  aimed at  the
elimination of (...) crimes committed in the name of honor”(WHHR Report 2005, p.
62).
In line with the above global developments, Turkey witnessed improvements regarding the
treatment of honor killings in Turkey, thanks to the new Penal Code.  Unlike the previous
code, in the new Penal Code, honor killings are not granted sentence reductions. This is
realized by the amendment of “Unjust Provocation” article to  “Unjust Acts.” This change
ensures that not all honor killing cases are subject to sentence reduction. However, it leaves
a loophole for  treating some honor killings as  the result  of “Unjust  Acts,”  resulting in
sentence reductions.  This is the weakness of the new Penal Code in terms of criminalizing
honor killings.  
Another weakness of the Penal Code is separating “killings in the name of custom” (töre
cinayeti) and “honor killings” by separating the two. The distinction between the two types
of  killings  is  as  follows:  in  “custom killings” a family assembly gathers  and makes a
decision about whether a woman who has acted contrary to the general norms of chastity
will live or die.   However,  in terms of honor killings that  are not custom killings,  the
murderer (can be a husband, brother or another family member) is assumed  to have been a
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spontaneous decision to kill based on the societal norms of honor, thus characterizing him
as a “victim” of such norms, and, accordingly,  is  granted a sentence reduction.  These
sentence reductions stem from the vagueness of the Penal Code because it gives the judges
an opportunity to interpret the killings as having been committed in name of honor.  The
notion of provocation will be elaborated in detail in  Chapter 3.
Besides the above weaknesses of the Penal Code, there are strengths  aiming at deterring
honor killings.  The previous code made it  possible for  the adult  males  of  the families
committing honor killings to circumvent imprisonment by forcing juveniles to commit the
crime.  It  used  to  be  the  case  that  a  murderer  under  the  age  of  eighteen  got  sentence
reductions and those under the age of eleven were not charged with any offense at all. legal
guardians of these juveniles were not held responsible for the crimes committed.  However,
with the new code (Article 38), anyone engaging in forcing another to commit a crime is
deemed eligible to receive the same penalty as the person actually committing the offense.
Furthermore, if the person forced to commit a crime is under, the sentence for the adult is
increased. 
The above problems regarding honor killings constitute one of the most prevalent problems
of implementation in Turkey.  Besides the legal problem of defining the concept, there is a
loophole giving the judiciary some opportunity to impose sentence reductions for honor
killings. Therefore, it is imperative to have a closer look at the issue of honor killings and
sentence reductions in Turkey as case studies of the implementation of law. The detailed
evaluation of the implementation of women's rights and honor killings, in particular, will
be  dealt  with  in  subsequent  chapters  to  illuminate  the  extent  to  which  the  EU
harmonization laws are implemented. 
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2.3 LEGAL REFORMS IN TURKEY-MINORITY RIGHTS
The status of the minorities in Turkey was determined by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne,
which  included  solely non-Muslims  under  the  rubric  of  minorities.  This  is  among the
reasons  why  the  minority  issue  in  Turkey  is  demarcated  between  Muslims  and  non-
Muslims; they are treated differently. According to Keyman & Aydın (2004), in Turkey, the
minority issue, and particularly the Kurdish issue, is very much linked to improvements in
human  rights.  In  this  respect,  the  period  between  1999-2004  witnessed  considerable
transformations of human rights that were beneficial to non-Muslim minorities, and Kurds
in particular, because of the acceleration of the EU accession process. These reforms can be
evaluated under two separate headings as pertinent to the problem of minorities in Turkey;
reforms  made  to  ameliorate  the  condition  of  the  non-Muslim  minority  and  the  legal
measures  taken to improve the condition of Kurds, in particular. The following part of the
study will concentrate on reforms made to improve Kurdish minority rights vis-à-vis the
general  aim of the thesis, as well  as evaluate legal  reforms directed towards the  non-
Muslim minorities.
Legal Reforms Enacted to Ameliorate the Condition of Non-Muslim Minorities
Non-Muslim minorities  were first  protected under the 1923 Treaty of  Lausanne.   The
Treaty ensured non-Muslims the right to equal protection and nondiscrimination under the
law, the right to establish private schools and provide education in their own language, the
conditional  entitlement  to  receive  government  funding  for  instruction  in  their  own
languages at the primary level in public schools, the right to settle family law or private
issues in accordance with their own customs and the right to exercise their religion freely
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(Keyman and Aydın 2004, p. 31).   However, the implementation of Lausanne rights have
not  been  fully  realized  especially  regarding  property  issues  and  religious/educational
institutions,  which in turn,  has  necessitated the revision of  the issue with amendments
during the EU accession process with harmonization laws (Keyman and Aydın 2004, p.
31).The  following  amendments  to  the  constitution  were  made  to  invigorate  the
implementation of these minority rights.
i) A general framework regarding the derogation of minorities was demarcated
by amending Article 312 of the Penal Code, introducing penalty to ones
degrading ethnic or religious minorities.
ii) One of the most significant problems of religious minorities was solved by
amending  the  foundations  law  to  return  confiscated  real  estate  to
community foundations.14 
iii) The number of non-Muslim minorities legally recognized was increased in
2003, giving the opportunity to benefit from Lausanne rights.
iv) The Construction Law was amended as to allow religious communities to
build their own places of worship.
According  to  Keyman  &  Aydın,  these  terms  of  the  Lausanne  Treaty  ares  legally
satisfactory to implement equality between the Muslim and non-Muslim Communities.  It
14According to Keyman & Aydın, real estate could be confiscated by the stated based on law NO 2762 (1936) since
only the properties written under this law were legally recognized as belonging to the foundations. The number of
foundations that could benefit from this law was only 160. This resulted in huge number of religious minority real estate
confiscations.  The  harmonization  packages  aimed  at  returning  these  properties  by amending  the  foundations  law.
However, the returning of these properties was rather problematic.  For example the foundations had to prove that they
owned the property and they are still using it, which introduced immense bureaucratic procedures paving a way for
future confiscations.  p.33
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is in the implementation of the Lausanne conditions what problems arise, so steps need to
be taken to change the mentality of the bureaucracy, which is slowing down the reform
process  designed  to  ameliorate  the  minority  problem.  According  to  Keyman  & Aydın
(2004), this can be done through introducing an effective process of dialogue between the
bureaucracy  and  non-Muslim  communities  (pp.  33-34).  The  lack  of  communication
exacerbates the implementation problem and reveals itself, for instance, in the form of the
infamous real estate confiscations of community foundations.
Legal Reforms Enacted to Ameliorate the Kurdish Issue 
The period following winning the War of Independence witnessed a Turkification phase,
including measures taken to make a monolithic republic and resulted in trouble within  the
Kurdish-populated southeastern region (Kirişçi & Winrow, pp. 89-110). However, a unified
Kurdish identity did not emerge until the 1950s due to the divided tribal structure of the
Kurdish  community.   According  to  Keyman  &  Aydın  (2004),  it  was  only  after  the
urbanization period of the 1950s that Kurds began to form a unified identity and demand
their rights with respect to their new societal position in the cities (p. 35).
Following from the urbanized organizations, the most famous of Kurdish illegal military
movements  emerged  in  1977;  the  Kurdish  Workers  Party  (PKK)  becoming  the  most
influential over time.  The PKK, which was established in 1977 and began its actions in
1978, became the most important actor between the Kurdish minority and the Turkish state
for a period of almost thirty years. The PKK engaged in activities defined as terrorist by the
state, causing the death of more than 35,000 people (Keyman and Aydın 2004, p. 34). This
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organized violence triggered many measures enacted on behalf of the state, which led to
many human rights  violations  ,including the anti-terror  law,  the ban  on the  use  of  the
Kurdish language in  public,  the state  of  emergency declared  on ten  Kurdish populated
provinces, enforced migration, and the village guards system (Keyman and Aydın 2004,
p.34). 
These measures led to a state of mistrust between the government and the Kurdish minority
since  the  regional  governors  and  village  guards  with  extraordinary powers  engaged  in
arbitrary and uncontrolled human rights abuses (Keyman and Aydın 2004, p. 37-40). In
other words, the uncontrolled and extraordinary regional powers of the administrators and
village guards led to mysterious fatalities among the Kurdish people, an occurrence that is
still a prevalent problem.  
The above problems still constitute a significant issue to be solved in terms of Kurdish
rights  in  Turkey.   However,  with  the  EU accession  process,  especially  after  the  1999
Helsinki Conference, considerable measures have been taken in terms of minority rights.
These measures can be grouped under two headings; the reforms that have indirect benefits
to the Kurdish minority and the reforms which are directly beneficial to them. Below is a
summary of these reforms taken from Keyman & Aydın (2004) and Özbudun & Yazıcı
(2004).
Among  these  reforms,  the  limiting  of  death  penalty  had  a  favorable  impact  on  many
Kurdish prisoners sentenced to death on the grounds of separatism. Freedom of speech was
extended by removing Article 8 of the Anti-terror Law, which had prohibited written or
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oral propaganda aimed at disrupting the indivisible integrity of the State of the Turkish
Republic, country and nation. The state of emergency in the ten provinces was also lifted to
introduce development in the Kurdish populated areas. 
The PKK's loss of influence in 1999 with  the capture of Abdullah Öcalan and the EU
accession process gave rise to a procedure of laws that specifically benefited the Kurdish
minority (Keyman and Aydın 2004,  p. 35). These reforms included the right to broadcast
in Kurdish, the right to learn the Kurdish language and the right to give children  Kurdish
names, putting a legal end to the many years of repression on these basic human rights
issues. These legal reforms and amendments, as listed by Keyman and Aydın (2004) are as
follows (pp. 35-40):
i) In 2001, the articles that contained (Article 26) the clause stating the list of
languages  prohibited  by  law  was  removed  from  the  constitution.
Furthermore,  with  Article  28,  the  languages  that  were  banned  from
broadcasting  were  also  removed,  opening  the  way  for  broadcasting  in
Kurdish.
ii) The implementation of the broadcasting in Kurdish was realized with the
third democratization package of August 2002, and within a year, this right
was expanded to the public and private radio and television stations. 
iii) August 2002 (third package) also witnessed an amendment paving the way
for the opening of Kurdish private language courses. However, this initial
amendment  included  many  bureaucratic  difficulties  rendering  the
60
amendment ineffective in terms of realization of the courses. Among these
bureaucratic statements were the obligation to have a separate building with
separate teachers and staff to open a Kurdish course.  Further amelioration
was  introduced  with  the  seventh  package  of  July  2003,  lifting  these
bureaucratic obligations and permitting the operation of Kurdish courses in
the already existing private language courses, thus making them feasible.
This seventh package also introduced an indirect  benefit  for the Kurdish
language since it  endowed the parliament with the decision- making and
regulatory power regarding the languages to  be taught  and excluded the
military National Security Council (NCS) from the process. 
iv) The seventh package, drawn up in July 2003, amended the Civil Registry
Law and permitted the use of Kurdish names. 
v) Following the seventh package, in August 2003 another law was enacted on
“social reinsertion” The social reinsertion project aimed at integrating ex-
PKK militants into the society by introducing partial amnesty which in five
months led to the release of 524 prisoners out of 2067 applications and the
surrender of 586 PKK militants (Keyman and Aydın 2004, p. 35).
The above legal ameliorations are coupled with projects like the “Return to Home and
Village” project,  aimed at  restoring the lives  of internally displaced people.   However,
these projects and the laws are not without shortcomings.  Upon closer inspection, there are
serious  drawbacks  regarding  the  implementation  of  these  reforms.  For  example,  the
internally  displaced  people  (IDP)  who  want  to  benefit  from the  “return  to  home and
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village” policy are to subject to serious threats to their lives by the village guards (Çelik,
Kurban, Ünalan 2007, p. 86).  The amount of broadcasting time in Kurdish is also limited.
Language rights are also impeded, especially in the area of education in Kurdish.  For now,
Kurdish can be taught at only private courses and no Kurdish center exists at universities. 
2.4 CONCLUSION
1999 was a  significant  year  for  Turkey since  it  witnessed  the  temporary halt  of  PKK
violence and also became an official candidate for the EU.  The initiation of  EU candidacy
marked the beginning of a phase of legal  reforms that  unprecedentedly transformed all
levels of society including minorities and women.  Eight harmonization packages were
passed between 1999-2004 to ensure that Turkey's political status regarding democracy and
human rights was compatible with the political criteria of the Copenhagen Summit. The
amendments and laws of the harmonization packages were welcomed and celebrated by
women  and  minorities  but  soon  after  it  turned  out  that  years  of  patriarchal  Jacobin
bureaucracy delays the implementation of the reforms (Keyman and Aydın 2004, p 36). 
The  implementation  of  the  reforms  underlined  in  this  chapter  depends  on  the  people
entitled  to  execute  the  reforms  in  reality.   There  are  many  examples  of  the  lack  of
implementation of  legal  frameworks in  Turkey.   Minority  rights  are  a  significant  case
illustrating the problems of implementation. This is mainly because in reality the terms of
the Lausanne Treaty are legally satisfactory in granting the non-Muslim minorities certain
rights  but  they are  not  implemented  in  reality.   Similar  problems exist  in  the  case  of
women's rights and non-Muslim rights. In sum, the changes in the Penal Code and the Civil
Code with ameliorations made to the constitution to democratically comply with the EU's
Copenhagen Criteria constitutes  only the first  step;  problems of implementation should
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also be addressed to realize the execution of laws in daily life. 
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CHAPTER 3
KILLINGS IN THE NAME OF HONOR
3.1 Introduction 
The Turkish penal code, which was first  established in 1926, was reformed in 2005 to
comply with the EU acquis and became effective beginning in June 2005. As illustrated in
more detail in chapter two, the reformed code, which was created with the main motive of
complying with the EU acquis, included clauses aiming at achieving gender equality by
removing  sentence  reductions  for  killings  in  the  name of  honor.   However,  since  the
lawmakers did not explicitly include the term honor as an act to be exempt from sentence
reductions,  some  judges  find  a  legal  loophole  and  continue  to  implement  sentence
reduction to killers upon provocation of dishonorable conduct. 
The main aim of this chapter will be to analyze the reasons beneath the gap between law
and implementation regarding sentence reductions given to culprits of honor killings. With
this  purpose,  the  chapter  will  first  focus  on discussions  in  the  literature  regarding  the
proper labeling of the killings in the name of honor.  In this part, first various propositions
regarding how to label  the killings  and what  to  encompass  when talking about  honor-
related crimes will be elaborated. 
Second, the theories of Nükhet Sirman and Dicle Koğacıoğlu on the reasons for killings in
the name of honor and the prevalence of sentence reductions will be described. These two
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theoretical  frameworks were deliberately chosen for  the analysis  of the reasons behind
honor killings since they complement each other by approaching the issue from different
angles. The perspective of Nükhet Sirman is one of concentrating on the family unit and
the relation of the individual to the state whereas Koğacıoğlu mainly focuses on the effect
of institutions. 
Next, the third part of the chapter will provide the literature on the killings in the name of
honor by providing qualitative and quantitative studies on why honor is an issue leading to
the murder of women in Turkey. This part will also discuss how people perceive honor and
in what circumstances some people commit these crimes by providing explanations based
on the theoretical framework of Sirman and Koğacıoğlu.
The last  part  will  analyze  various  honor  killing cases  in  which the judges  have  made
sentence reductions to indicate the pattern of such sentence reductions. This last part is the
major section of the chapter since it presents the analysis of the raw data from the study
conducted by the Diyarbakır Bar Association and also carries out an analysis of data from
National Police, UNDP and Dicle University. 
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3.2 Literature Review
The dispute about labeling killings in the name of honor has two dimensions.  The first
dimension concerns the appropriate labeling of the issue. The second dimension pertains to
the substantive part of the killings and it revolves around which crimes to include when
elaborating on killings in the name of honor.  In other words, there is a debate between the
feminists and sociologists regarding the scope of these killings and discussions revolve
around whether or not to include all types of human rights violations under the rubric of
honor crimes.  One of the sociologists who emphasizes  that the concept should include all
types of human rights violations and not just murders is Nükhet Sirman. 
Nükhet Sirman (2006) argues that the concept should be addressed as “honor punishments”
(Namus cezaları) rather than “honor killings” or “töre (traditions, established social norms)
killings”(p. 43). The appropriate naming should be honor punishments and not anything
else since women are subject to many human rights violations in the name of honor and
being  killed  is  only  one  of  these  violations.   For  example,  the  honor  punishments
encompass the complete human rights violations of women including the right to work, the
right to travel, the right to their own bodies and finally the right to live”  (Sirman 2006, p.
43). One concrete example to this large scope of honor punishments is cutting the woman's
nose to mark her permanently if she engages in dishonorable conduct.  Following from
these examples, Sirman (2006, p. 45) further criticizes naming the issue merely as “honor
killings” since such a conceptualization opens the way to interpret the problem as only
belonging to a particular region or a specific culture just as similar to calling the issue
merely a result of töre. 
 Confinement  of  the  issue  to  a  particular  region  and  culture  renders  the  problem
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insignificant  and/or  secondary  since  modernization  of  the  particular  region  within  the
general policy of total national development is seen as the panacea to the honor killing
problem.   In Turkey, such a reduction is reflected as attributing the concept of “töre” to the
killings and attaching the problem to the traditional underdeveloped cultural values and
norms of  the Eastern-Southern Kurdish region.  Koğacıoğlu  (2004,  p.  121) agrees  with
Sirman that confining the issue to the Eastern Kurdish region by calling it merely “töre”
killings  constitutes  one  of  the  major  obstacles   to  resolving  the  issue  since  once  the
tradition is blamed institutions, individuals do not take as much responsibility .  
The  above  discussions  by Sirman  and  Koğacıoğlu are  relevant  in  the  sense  that  they
indicate a mentality revealed in the discourse of the media and decision-makers regarding
the confinement of the issue to only the Kurdish populated regions of Turkey. For example,
during the review of newspapers, various feminist websites, independent news sites and
books, it was observed that the term “honor” and “töre” was being used interchangeably
and synonymously.  This synonymous labeling indicates a specific mentality confining the
problem to the Kurdish populated region in Turkey mainly characterized by töre. 
This  chapter  recognizes  the importance of  above discussions regarding the appropriate
labeling  of the issue and including all sorts of human rights violations of women when it
comes to crimes committed against women in the name of honor. However, the scope of
this chapter is concerned with the violations in the name of honor regarding the life of
women, namely the killings.  In this respect, the terminology used by KA-MER (Kadın
Merkezi), the NGO based in Diyarbakır which has established shelters and emergency call
centers for women who are in danger of falling victim to acts carried out in the name of
honor. The term includes the connotation of killing in particular but detaches it from the
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positive term “honor” by using it  as  “killings  in  the name of  honor” instead of  honor
killings.  
After this conceptual clarification, the following part will focus on various theories on the
reasons underlying killings committed in the name of honor. One of these theories belongs
to Nükhet Sirman and focuses on the relationship between family and state and the other to
Dicle Koğacıoğlu which concentrates on the role of institutions. 
Reasons for Killings in the Name of Honor 
Nükhet  Sirman  (2006)  identifies  various  types  of  societies  including  kinship-based,
household-based and the love-family based units (p. 44-61).  According to Sirman (2006),
Turkey  is  a  love-based  nation  state  derived  from  the  Ottoman  Empire,  which  was  a
household based entity centered on conquest (p. 50).  However, the Ottoman Empire also
had  residues  of  kinship-based  units  and  this  is  the  main  explanation  why  honor  has
different meanings for men and women in Turkey (p. 49).  For instance, a dishonorable
man in Turkey today is an unreliable one who cannot control the sexuality of women under
his  responsibility,  whereas  a  dishonorable  woman is  the  one  with no control  over  her
sexuality  (Sirman,  2006,  p.  49).  According  to  Sirman  (2006)  such  a  discriminatory
perception  of  honor  is  still  prevalent  in  Turkey  today  because  the  household-based
structure of the Ottoman Empire revolved around attributing honor merely to women's
sexuality and such a mentality continued in  the Turkish nation state  albeit  in different
disguise.  Below is the discussion regarding how the concept of honor regarding women's
sexuality and control was established in the Turkish Republic. 
According to Sirman (2006), in the nation state, the main basis of connection between the
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state  and individuals  is  rational  love and the  nuclear  family (p.  53).  For  example,  the
regulations of the nation-state,  such as  the Civil  Code, assume that  the individuals are
responsible for controlling their own sexuality (Sirman 2006, p.53).  In other words, with
the new nation state,  new laws and regulations were brought to organize sexuality and
honor  on  the  basis  of  individual  responsibility  and  the  rights  of  large  families  or
conglomerations on individual's honor were removed (Sirman 2006, p.53). 
Accordingly,  the nation state  delegitimized all  allegiances besides  the allegiance to the
nation  state.  Among  these  delegitimized  allegiances  were  cults  and  large  family units
(Sirman 2006, p.54).   Sirman criticizes this policy on the organization of sexuality in the
nation state through love-reason-based individualism since the approach “fails to see how
the patterns of politics and gender established by kinship,  large households and family
operate together” (p. 54).  In other words, the strategies of the people who adopt the view
that  individuals  will  come to  terms  with  the  irrational  attribution  of  honor  on  gender
discrimination and finally abandon the backward practice of honor killings are bound to
fail. 
Sirman (2006) also argues that the honor killings in Turkey will not disappear on their own,
since their prevalence is the product of the contract between the men and the nation state
based on the equality between men which was institutionalized with the Civil Code (p. 58).
In other words, the Civil Code established equality among all men regardless of their age,
education  or  economic  situation  by  giving  them  the  status  of  family  leadership  and
husbands.  The code on the surname is another byproduct of such an institutionalization.
The emphasis of the new nation state then, becomes the concept of gender in relation to
honor, which is sustained over women's bodies and revealed in the form of killings in the
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name of honor and women's human rights violations (p.59).  In other words, honor is a
gender-based power relation type in the supposedly modern family-based nation states and
it aims at disciplining women. This disciplining function of honor is also underlined by
Koğacıoğlu as discussed below. 
Koğacıoğlu (2004), agrees with Sirman that the newly established Republic provided only
men with equality and preserved the status quo regarding gender inequality.  Koğacıoğlu
(2004) also adds that the “tradition effect” is the main reason why the violations are still
prevalent in Turkey.   In other words, “honor” is demonstrated as a static and unchanging
traditional phenomenon in the media and this opens the path for institutions to eschew
responsibility  on  the  grounds  that  honor  killings  cannot  be  changed  by  institutional
intervention due to their ossified static structure. 
Koğacıoğlu (2004),  on  the  other  hand,  argues  that  the  concept  of  honor  has  to  be
reconstructed every day to survive and adapt to the changing institutional-economic-social
structures over time.  The reconstruction of honor reveals itself in the form of various
strategies to manipulate sentence increases for honor murderers such as  to commit suicide
or  manipulating  the  killing  stories  to  benefit  from  the  provocation  clause.   Such
manipulative strategies are implemented not only with respect to honor killings but also
vis-à-vis other forms of killing practices such as blood feud.  For instance, according to the
experiences of  Vildan Yirmibeşoğlu, a lawyer in Gaziantep, blood feud murderers depict
their stories in the form of honor killings and not as vendettas, so as to avoid  increased
sentences and benefit from reductions (2006, p.51).  In other words, just as Koğacıoğlu
illustrates, various traditional practices evolve over time in terms of their representation as
legal cases and in terms of how the murderer plans the action.  Then the relevant question
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becomes  the  reasons  underlying the  prevalence  of  such  killings  in  the  name of  honor
despite the evolution and reconstruction of honor over time.  
Koğacıoğlu (2004) explains the prevalence of honor killings by emphasizing the role of
various institutions such as the European Union (EU), the Justice and Development Party
(JDP)  and  the  juridical  system,  as  well  as  the  initial  patriarchal  establishment  of  the
Republic as a nation state.  The JDP has been the ruling party with a non-coalition majority
since November 2002 and has taken the primary role regarding penal code reform and
various  other  harmonization  packages  to  make  Turkish  law  compatible  with  the  EU's
acquis.  In this respect, the party's stance towards the women's issues is significant since
the JDP is the main actor,  widely criticized for  not including honor killings  under the
crimes to be exempt from sentence reduction of provocation.  
The JDP contributes to the prevalence of killings in the name of honor by placing women
mainly within the family domain, and also confining the issue to the Kurdish-populated
regions (Koğacıoğlu 2004, p. 129).  By confining the problem only to a particular region,
the JDP illustrates that the developed cities and the Turkish populated regions are exempt
from the issue.  
In fact, this was much easier to do few years ago when there was no statistical information
regarding the honor crimes.  However, studies on honor crimes by the Turkish National
Police,  UNDP and Dicle University reveal  striking facts  about killings  in the name of
honor, most of them being contrary to the general beliefs and contentions on the issue as
depicted  in  the  mainstream media  and  various  political  spheres.  These  studies  will  be
elaborated in detail in the following parts of the chapter.  However, for the purposes of this
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theoretical part, they are used to illustrate how the lack of information makes it possible for
the ruling party to further establish the tradition effect and confine the issue to a single
region to eschew institutional responsibility. 
Koğacıoğlu, however, underlines that institutions are not eschewing the responsibility by
emphasizing tradition as a strategy; on the contrary, it happens on its own once tradition is
blamed.  This, in fact, makes the effect of tradition  even more dangerous since once it is
in  operation,  the  possibility  that  an  institutional  set-up  can  take  measures  to  initiate
prevention seems impossible.  In other words, the emphasis on tradition makes the issue of
killings in the name of honor a problem that institutions cannot do anything about after a
point and they are left to time to be solved since traditions are so resistant to change.  
Contrary to  the above static  vision on traditions,  Koğacıoğlu criticizes the  EU for  not
including the gender equality issue in the short term priorities of candidate countries 2004,
p.134).  Koğacıoğlu  (2004)  adds  that  EU  is  a  mainly  market-based  institution  giving
priority to the market integration of the candidate countries and placing the market related
gender  equality  such  as  social  security and  equal  participation  in  the  labor  market  as
priorities (p. 135).  In this institutional mechanism of market forces, the issues that cannot
be  easily  related  to  market  mechanisms  are  marginalized  and  they are  not  considered
urgent and primary for the accession of candidate countries (p. 135).   It  is in this way
possible for the jurisdiction in Turkey to take measures that still make it legally possible to
impose sentence reductions for honor killings. 
Sentence  reductions  are  still  implemented  on  the  basis  of  provocation,  although  the
reformed  penal  code  gives  judges  the  authority  to  pronounce   life  time  sentences  to
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murderers  who  commit  killings  in  the  name  of  honor.  The  reformed  penal  code  is
problematic in the sense that it only explicitly states that the “töre” killings are exempt
from the reductions based on provocation and leaves honor killings out.  This gives the
judges the legal space to interpret the supposedly dishonorable acts of murdered women as
provocation.  Koğacıoğlu (2004),  states  that  the  judges  can  implement  punishment
increases to people who commit killings in the name of honor if they commit the crime
against  a  minor  and  a  family member,  which  is  usually the  case  in  the  honor  issues.
However, the judges almost never take up such measures and, furthermore, they implement
sentence reductions.  
Koğacıoğlu (2004)  calls  this  phenomenon  “juridical  convention”  where  “there  is  an
established way of interpreting and applying laws that is reproduced through the social
relations of legal professionals” (p. 124).  It is this juridical convention taking the social
norms into account when giving sentence reduction to the culprits of honor crimes even
though they find the practice primitive.    Judges sympathize with their colleagues who
implement sentence reductions since the juridical convention necessitates taking the social
norms into consideration while reaching a verdict.  Social norms are taken into account not
just in Turkey but in other countries as well (Yirmibeşoğlu 2006, p. 44).  
In other words, considering the effect of social norms on crimes is a prevalent practice in
jurisdiction  but  in  countries  where  rule of  law s  not  established,  the  social  norms  are
applied as superior to the universal laws in the country (Yirmibeşoğlu 2006, p. 44). In this
sense, according to lawyer Yirmibeşoğlu (2006) who worked on honor killings for many
years, the main problem under the sentence reductions is the lack of rule of law in Turkey
since the judges apply the social norms rather that the universal laws by finding loopholes
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in the law.  Vildan Yirmibeşoğlu (2006), criticizes this practice of judges and claims that
the modern legal establishment necessitates the rule of law, which should be superior to
social norms (p. 44-46).
Accordingly,  Yirmibeşoğlu approaches the issue from the perspective of rule of law and
states that in Turkey, the regional laws and social norms still prevail over the universal
laws, which is among the main reasons behind the sentence reductions.  Such a juridical
convention  is  also  underlined  by  the  feminist  lawyer  Hülya  Gülbahar  (Feminist
Yaklaşımlar,  2006)  who  states  that  sentence  reductions  should  be  applied  to  only  the
actions that cause grief and anger in the culprit. Furthermore, and more importantly, the
actions  of  the  victim  should  also  be  unjust/wrong  for  the  murderer  to  benefit  from
provocation. However, the judges implement reduction upon provocation  by considering
that wearing a piercing, jeans or white pants are unjust acts and none of these acts are
unjust-wrong in the universal  laws of Turkey. All  these cases indicate that the juridical
convention is the main reason behind the sentence reductions and merely reforming the
penal code is not sufficient to deter the killings in the name of honor in Turkey.
At this point, I want to underline that violence against women and the gap between law and
implementation is not particular to Turkey.  There are examples of legal cases failing to
implement sentence reductions from other countries, such as England as well. In England,
there is no phenomenon called “killings in the name of honor”, however, killings in the
name of honor, are only one form of establishing patriarchal control over women and there
are other types of establishing disciplining control over women's bodies common in US
and Europe as well. 
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For example, domestic homicide is another type of the killing of women where jealous
husbands  in  England  get  away  with  murder  with  sentence  reductions  based  on  a
provocation clause.  Mandy Burton (2003) criticizes the English judges for still applying
the provocation clause to husbands who murdered their wives on the ground of jealousy
even  though a  case  was  issued  in  2000  stating that  “male  possessiveness  and  sexual
jealousy should  not  today  be  an  acceptable  reason  for  loss  of  self  control  leading  to
homicide” (p. 280).  Burton analyzes three legal court verdicts that the provocation clause
based on jealousy was applied, despite the changes in the  English common law over the
last  decade in advantage of women regarding the provocation clause (p.  280).  In other
words, according to Burton, there is a gap between law and implementation in England
regarding  the  sentence  reduction  upon  provocation  and  the  main  reason  beneath  this
discrepancy is the judges' patriarchal mentality. 
Shahrzad Mojab (2002), also underlines the universality of patriarchal violence and states
that “the culture of patriarchal violence is a myth and dividing the cultures into violent and
violence free is a patriarchal myth” (p. 2). Violence free society, according to Mojab (2002)
is a myth because women are subject to male violence and killing everywhere, including
the most modern countries such as U.S. and Sweden, where about ten women are murdered
every day for wanting to divorce or leave the man.  Even though the main motives of the
killers in U.S. and Sweden are not identical to the motives of honor murderers in Turkey,
they are similar in the sense that both aim at exerting control over women. In a nutshell,
even in the countries where rule of law is well established, the problem of gender-biased
interpretation of laws to the disadvantage of women, giving way to sentence reductions is
prevalent.  
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In sum,  in her juridical convention analysis,  Koğacıoğlu argues that, murderers getting
away with murder even though the sentence reductions are no more legally viable with the
changes in the legal system is not just valid not only for Turkey but also  for other legal
systems where interpretation of the judges constitute the basis for verdicts.  In this respect,
the last part of the chapter will underline this juridical convention by demonstrating the
similarities of the verdicts on sentence reductions based upon provocation before and after
the penal code reform, after the following analysis the prevalence of killings in the name of
honor.
3. 3 Prevalence of Killings in the Name of Honor 
This part of the chapter includes the literature review regarding the killings in the name of
honor.   The  reviewed  five  studies  belong  to  UNDP (“Dynamics  of  Honor  Killings  in
Turkey: Prospects for Action”, Istanbul: 2005), Dr. Mazhar Bağlı (unpublished research,
2008) and Dr. Aytekin Sır  (KAMER Vakfı Yayınları, Diyarbakır, 2005),  of the Turkish
National  Police  (Töre  ve  Namus  Cinayetleri  Raporu”  Istanbul:2005)  and  KAMER
(Reports on Honor Killings 2005, 2006). These studies are discussed below. The first study
examined is that carried out by first elaborating on the UNDP on how people perceive
honor and why honor crimes are committed. The next study reviewed is that conducted by
KAMER, which  is an in-depth analysis regarding the profile of women who are threatened
by their  families  for  having engaged  in  dishonorable  conduct.  Aytekin  Sır's  study will
follow  KAMER's  and  illustrate  that  KAMER's  findings  are  confirmed  by   a  wider
quantitative  study.  Last,  Mazhar  Bağlı's  recent  study  conducted  with   killers  will  be
elaborated following the discussion of analysis made by the Turkish National Police. 
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3.3.A UNDP's Report On Honor Killings
The UNDP's report entitled  “Dynamics of Honor Killings in Turkey, Prospects for Action
(2005), was conducted in various districts in Istanbul, Adana, Batman and Urfa by in-depth
qualitative interviewing.  The participants were 195 in total and consisted of  people from
various professions, people living in different districts and representatives of NGOs.  
According  to  this  report,  the  perception  of  honor  depends  on  the  person's  age,  social
background, familial ties and residence (urban or rural).  During the interviews, the UNDP
observed that some people consider honor to be the ultimate reason for living but could not
define it properly. The definition the 19-22 year old, male university student from Şanlıurfa
seems to be very widespread: 
“Honor is the reason for our living now. That means we live for the cause of honor now. I 
don’t know, but without honor life has no meaning… It is okay if you don’t have money, 
but you must have dignity.” 
As the above quote illustrates, even for the males who are at the highest level of education,
who are expected to be rather articulate, at university, honor is a vague but indispensable
reason for living.  
The findings of the UNDP's study also indicate that there is a difference between the honor
perceptions of young and middle-old age men who are immigrants.   Young men between
the ages of 18 and 25 were hard liners and could easily talk about killing women who want
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a divorce or perform acts against chastity while middle aged men were rather tolerant and
forgiving. The reasons for this difference is unclear in the report but it seems like honor is a
more  vital  part  of  young men's  identity compared  to  middle aged  men,  who probably
define their identity not primarily in terms of  honor but vis-à-vis  other norms as well such
as taking care of the children and family and avoiding prison.  
The interviews conducted by the UNDP indicate that honor is mainly a term attributed to
female sexual chastity and virginity. A woman from Batman, working at a women's NGO
stated  that  70%  of  people  who  respond  to  their  questionnaires  claim  that  honor  is
synonymous with the women in their families.  The honor of a man, on the contrary, is
defined not on the basis of sexuality but on economic terms such as respecting the father
and handing his earnings to the family. 
However, the findings also reveal that the honor of women is not just about sexuality but a
much wider concept which can go beyond sexuality and be used to exert discipline over
women  when  they  disobey.  The  below  quote  from  the  UNDP study  illustrated  the
perception of honor as going beyond sexuality.
“Honor is not only related with sexuality.  But what is understood by sexuality is quite
wide. In Batman, a girl was executed just because she wanted a song in from the radio
program ‘from all lovers to those beloved’. In Mardin, the same thing happened when a
girl  went  to  the  cinema and to  another  one  when she  wore  trousers  to  a  wedding…”
(UNDP 2005, Batman, female, age 31, NGO activist)
The  respondents'  conception  of  honor  killing  and  töre killing  differed,  especially  in
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Istanbul, among the immigrant respondents.  For example, the respondents from the Black
Sea region insisted that there were no töre killings in their region but only honor killings. A
man from Southeastern Turkey said that they do not have töre killings in their family and
like many other respondents he distanced himself from  töre killings as much  as possible.
As the below quote illustrates,  töre is  considered to  be distant  and brutal  since it  is  a
planned action but honor killings are seen as the only fair treatment a dishonorable woman
deserves. 
“Töre killings are something different…It is brutality. I’m from Şirvan, but I never heard
about it there. Maybe in Şanlıurfa, Adana, Mardin… However, when there is dishonorable
conduct, the morals dictate to kill. In my family, there are family councils, but no killing
decision  has  ever  been  made.  In  my family,  morals  are  more  contemporary…  In  my
opinion,  99% of honor killings take place spontaneously depending on the situation at that
moment…but in ‘töre’ killings some people decide beforehand that it  should be done.”
(UNDP 2005, Istanbul, male, age 33, elementary school, from East Turkey)
In sum, the above results of the interviews point to a wide and vague perception of honor
in the eye of the respondents.  In other words, at the widest description, acts against honor
consist of any behavior  engaged in by women that challenges male dominance and family
control.  Taking this perception into account,  the report  identified the following specific
dishonorable conducts as sufficient reasons to kill a woman.
3.3.A.1 Dishonorable Conduct Leading to Killings in the Name of Honor:
The UNDP's report identifies seven reasons for committing killings in the name of honor.
The dishonorable conducts, from most dishonorable to least dishonorable are as follows:
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1. A married woman having an extra-marital relationship
The UNDP's report involves the stories of 20 women who were involved in extra marital
relationship  and  14  of  these  cases  resulted  in  murder.   The  findings  indicate  that
extramarital relationship is the strongest reason to kill a woman in the name of honor since
the definition of the term itself very much revolves around loyalty to the husband.  The
respondents tell that in case of such a relationship, it is not only the woman but also the
male  lover  who  gets  killed.   Furthermore,  nobody,  including  the  male  lover’s  family,
questions these murders. However, as illustrated below, there are various dynamics leading
to the decision of the family to murder or to release the woman, illustrating the non-static
nature of killings. 
The dynamics of killing change if the husband cannot prove the relationship and the lover
has high economic status.  For example, the husband or other family members stalk the
woman when she goes out to see her with her lover or the woman should get pregnant from
the lover when the husband is  away to be killed.  In  other words,  mere suspect  of the
husband is not sufficient to kill. Furthermore, the respondents from the UNDP report stated
that tribal relations play a significant role in determining punishment.  For example, if the
lover comes from an economically well-off tribe, than it becomes much harder to kill him.
Instead,  families  have  other  settlements  such  as  bargaining  for  money in  return.   The
phenomenon  of  exchanging  material  goods  or  money  in  return  for  the  tainted  honor
indicates that honor has connotations in  economic power relations as well. In other words,
as people describe honor as the sole issue to be lived for, and as a concept that cannot be
gained once tainted, from time to time it is possible to bargain for the tainted honor.  
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The respondents of the UNDP report  told the stories  of families  who had to  sell  their
houses for such restoration of honor.  These economic transactions in return for cleansing
the honor support  Koğacıoğlu's  finding that  traditions  and the concept  of  honor is  not
static; it evolves and adapts to  changing circumstances. 
Another  dynamic  which  determines  the  decision  to  kill  involves  the  mentality  of  the
husband regarding the adulterous conduct.  For example, in one of the cases where the
woman met her lover in a car, the husband protected the wife and told the family that they
would migrate.  The family respected husband's decision but they cut the woman's nose to
leave a life time mark on her face.  This incidence shows that honor over women's body is
not a phenomenon between husband and wife, but as Sirman (2006) states, “patterns of
politics and gender established by kinship, large households and family operate together”
(p. 54).   This joint operation of large households and family reveal itself in the form of
killing the married woman in a relationship since the husband does not see divorce as a
solution. Divorce is not an option because, according to the UNDP's respondents, being
engaged in a relationship even after divorce is not an option for the ex-wives. 
2. A married woman running away with a man 
The same rules of killing apply to a married woman running away with her lover.  The act
is considered a very serious one in the society and has a specific name like “running away
from the marriage bed,” In all the stories, the woman, the man or both were killed.  In one
of the cases where the woman and the lover escaped, the brother of the lover was killed in
the name of honor and the lover's family had to accept this.  
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The most striking inference from the stories of the dishonorable married woman is that,
according to the respondents, the incidents are disguised and covered up by the families.
In  other  words,  none  of  these  incidences  reached  the  police  or  the  court.   This  can
especially  be  possible  since  the  women  who  were  killed  do  not  have  any  type  of
identification cards; they do not exist in the state records. This makes it much easier for
families to get away with murder.
3. A married woman getting separated or divorced 
The woman deserves to be killed even if she did not commit adultery like in the above
cases.  It is sufficient to opt for divorce or separation.  According to the report, the woman
can get divorced when the husband wants to get a second wife and the second wife insists
on official marriage.  Another acceptable divorce is when the woman's family decides that
the husband cannot take care of the daughter and gives permission for divorce.  However, a
woman  cannot  decide  on  her  own,  independently  to  divorce  the  husband  since  it  is
considered an extremely devious act deserving   punishment.
Even if  a  woman succeeds  at  obtaining a  divorce,  she still  risks  getting killed on the
grounds  of  dishonorable  conduct  if  she  has  a  relationship  with  another  man after  the
divorce.  Furthermore, a divorced woman is in a very strictly controlled environment by
her ex-husband, her family and relatives since she is seen as a potential threat to the family
honor as someone who has already acted disobediently.  
4. A divorced woman having a relationship with another man 
Besides married and divorced women, unmarried women are also in danger of being killed
if they have lovers or run away with a man. In the case of unmarried women, the stories of
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the respondents indicate that the younger the woman is, the more likely she is to be killed.
Single girls committing a dishonorable act are killed at the age of 13-14.  However,  single
women are supposedly luckier than  married woman if they get lovers because there is the
possibility of getting married with the lover and cleaning the honor in that way.  However,
in incidents where marriage is  not possible,  such as if  the man is already married,  the
family usually decides to kill the girl. 
5.  A young unmarried girl having a relationship 
The findings of the report have indications contrary to the prevalent idea that the sons in
the family always  obey the family verdict  to  kill  the daughter.  For  example,  there are
incidents where the brother independently acts against the family decision and goes for
another solution to the issue by helping the eloped couple to get  married.  There were
respondents who were even against  killing the single girl if she was caught in bed with the
lover:
“I had a friend and he had a girl friend. He loved her very much. I heard that they were
caught in bed, the woman was killed and the man is still hiding. We have denounced these
people…They loved one another; okay what they did was not right, but one should not do
this. They should have called them before everybody heard about this affair and they could
have gotten them married in an appropriate way…If people hear about it, then they would
probably blame them, make them feel ashamed later when they have a home or start a
family.” (UNDP 2005, Şanlıurfa, male, age 35)
7. A woman (married or unmarried) being kidnapped and/or raped
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The above quote belongs to a man with rather more tolerant principles, at least towards an
unmarried girl.  However, according to the report, there are people ready to kill a raped girl
since she no longer has a value as a non-virgin.  In other words, there are a significant
number of people who consider the raped woman (married or single) as guilty as the man
who rapes her. The  anecdote below from a women's NGO in Diyarbakır illustrates the
attitude against raped woman. 
“I observed it at her (a raped girl’s) funeral; she had been killed by her brother and the
brother was in jail…Usually mothers do not cry after the dead in such cases; however, I
think the fact that the victim was taken up by women’s organizations and other NGOs had
encouraged the woman and aroused her instincts as a mother so that she started to cry by
her grave. At that moment, her younger son (9 or 10 years old) warned the mother by
kicking her and saying ‘Why do you cry after all? Cry for our brother who is in jail instead
of that whore. He will stay in prison for so many years…’ Then one starts to think about
the young people who become murderers. Families put so much pressure on them, saying
that they could clean the family honor; then they are forced to kill their sisters. In other
words, it is different when people themselves feel that ‘it is our honor, we have to go and
kill’, but when the family forces the young person by saying that he must kill, this is his
task, etc., this situation is really more complicated.” (Şanlıurfa, from a group interview of
women at a women’s NGO)
3.3.B KAMER's Findings on Prevalence of Honor Killings
The above findings of the UNDP are supported by KAMER's 2006 report on killings in the
name of honor.  KAMER reports the statistical information regarding women who applied
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to them for protection and shelter.  158 women who were in danger of being killed applied
between 2003-2006. 
94% of these women were subject  to violence by their  families,  including the spouse,
father and brothers, before applying.  The death verdict was also given by primarily the
woman's family or spouse.  The study confirms that the most common reason to kill  a
woman on the basis of honor is actually disobedience and not chastity.  In other words,
KAMER's report adds to the UNDP's report by extracting the disobedient acts deemed to
be dishonorable acts by the victim's family.   Among the disobedient acts are refusal to
marry the person the family chooses, refusing to have sex with a member of the family,
complaining about the husband to the police, challenging the elders or husband by arguing
and refusing prostitution.  Slander turned out to be the second reason and UNDP's seven
dishonorable  conducts  came  only  after  these  two  most  common  accusations.   This
comparison of the UNDP and KAMER reports is striking in the sense that the difference
indicates the possibility of a significant variation between what people say about honor and
what happens in reality.  In other words, the comparison of KAMER's report, which was
inferred from real stories, and UNDP's report which concluded  by interviewing people on
the concept, reveal that in reality, attitudes towards disobedient women is much harsher
even though people would not report that a disobedient woman would deserve to die. 
The reports of KAMER and the UNDP in brief¨; the two studies indicate considerable
qualitative  results  regarding  the  prevalence  and  underlying  reasons  of  honor  killings.
However, there is no generalizable quantitative study on honor killings except for the study
of  the  Turkish  National  Police  encompassing  the  urban  cities  and  Prof.  Aytekin  Sır's
research on people's perception of honor conducted in  Eastern villages and cities in the
East where migration is high.  
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3.3.C Aytekin Sır's Research 
Aytekin Sır's research (KAMER Vakfı Yayınları, Diyarbakır, 2005) is compatible with the
findings of the UNDP but since it was conducted with 423 people from the Kurdish, Zaza
and Alawi villages in the East, the extent of its generalizability is questionable.  However,
the findings indicate striking results especially with a qualitative question asking whether a
single  girl  refusing  to  marry  the  uncle's  son  should  be  punished,  91%  said  no.  The
discrepancy between such  a  declaration and KAMER's  findings  that  disobedience  is  a
significant factor contributing to the killing of  women should be researched. 
3.3.D The Turkish National Police Study
The  Turkish  National  Police  (Töre  ve  Namus  Cinayetleri  Raporu”  Istanbul:2005)
questionably categorized 1091 murders in all 81 cities between 2000-2005, all of which
were all considered under the rubric of töre. According to the national police  töre, then is
an  all  encompassing  term  which  includes  blood  feud,  killings  in  the  name  of  honor,
familial  conflict,  bridal  exchanging,  sexual  harassment,  forbidden  relationship (such as
adultery or premarital sex) and rape.  In other words, the analysis conducted by the national
police  indicated  that  killings  in  the  name of  honor  and  killings  in  the  name of  rape,
forbidden relationship, bridal exchange, sexual harassment and familial conflict were not
the same thing. However, reports of Aytekin Sır,  KAMER and the UNDP indicate that
families kill women in the name of honor when they are raped or sexually harassed or
engage in forbidden relationships.  
In this sense, the analysis of the findings of the national police regarding the killings in the
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name of honor should be re-evaluated as follows.
Department's Categorization and Analysis Regarding the Reasons of Töre Killings:
Table I. The reasons for the Killings that can be Categorized under the Rubric of Töre
Province Blood
Feud
Bridal
Exchange
Familial
Conflict
Sexual 
Harassment
Forbidden
Rel.
Rape Honor Other Total
81 109 30 318 95 159 36 322 19 1091
Above, is the categorization made by the national police. It can be seen that honor killings
make up most common reason to kill in the name of töre  (29%). Familial conflict is in fact
as strong as honor but the content of the familial conflict is not explained. However, the
findings should be re-arranged as follows based on the studies conducted. 
Table II. reasons for the Killings that can be Categorized under the Rubric of Töre
Re-arranged
Province Blood Feud Familial
Conflict
Honor Other Total
81 109 318 642 19 1091
With this re-arrangement, the percentage of murders in the name of honor becomes 59%,
which is much more striking.
The study, however, contrary to expectations indicates that most of the victims are men
even though 59% of the killings were made in the name of honor. Out of 1190 killed, 710
(60%) were men and 480 (40%) were women. The ratio between men and women who
were perpetrators is as expected; out of 1593 suspects 1413 (89%) men and 180 (11%)
women. Even though this study indicates that more men are killed than women in the cities
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when it comes to honor, the number of women who were killed is still significant and the
fact that almost all the murderers are men confirms the patriarchal violence against women
and men in the name of honor. 
The above qualitative and quantitative studies confirm that killings in the name of honor
occur in all parts of Turkey in all sorts of social, economic and ethnic milieu.  Furthermore,
such violations are supported by the state just as the following example depicts.  In the
UNDP's report, a journalist from Adana stated that it is not only the family members and
tribes but also the state officials, including the police, who demonstrate tolerance towards
people who commit crimes involving honor, as illustrated in the following quote.
“The  woman  was  divorced  and  she  had  relationships  with  other  men.  People  in  the
community start to provoke her son. Then the son goes and kills the lover of his mother. I
was in the room when the police interrogated him. I saw how the police officers were
acting toward him. They were in a way praising him by saying ‘good for you; here, have a
cigarette, have a cup of tea on my account’ etc…” (Adana, male, age 30, journalist, Adana
native)
Such a tolerant, and even admiring, stance towards honor murderers continues in prison as
well. Mazhar Bağlı, from Dicle University conducted interviews in 2007 with murderers to
understand the rationale behind the killings and was kind enough to share the first findings
of the unfinished study.  According to his interviews, the murderers do not regret what they
have.  They also say that they would have done the same thing even if the punishment was
much more severe.  Also many think that they could have received much lesser sentences if
they had had a better lawyer.  They are well respected in prison by other criminals and they
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are accepted into all kinds of social environments after they get out of prison.
The  findings  of  Bağlı  also  disprove  many widely  held  beliefs  about  the  killers.   For
example, the interviews indicate that the murderer's economic situation or education does
not have an independent effect on the killings.  Furthermore, the families do not usually
make minors  in  the family commit  the  crime;  usually the  elders  kill  the  dishonorable
woman.  
In sum, the social respect and acceptance after the cleansing of honor acts as the strongest
motive for the killers to commit these crimes.  In  other words,  the social  psychological
factor of compliance plays a significant role in the murder of these women and this is also
the main rationale of the provocation clause of the penal code.  However, the provocation
clause  can  be  interpreted  by  the  judges  to  the  disadvantage  of  woman  sometimes
considering wearing jeans  as provocation under the rubric of “unjust-wrong acts.” The
following  is  the  analysis  these  legal  cases  before  and  after  the  penal  code  reform,
illustrating the social convention between the judges either supporting or having the same
mentality with the killers who committed the murders in the name of honor. 
3.4 Legal Cases Where the Provocation Clause was implemented
The first part of this section will include a comparison of the old penal code and the new
penal code regarding the provocation clause. In the second part, the legal cases in which the
provocation clause was implemented on the basis of the old penal code will be discussed.
Finally, the gap between law and implementation regarding the provocation clause of the
new penal code will be analyzed by providing examples of legal cases.
89
3.4.A  Comparison  of  Old  and  New  Penal  Codes  and  Legal  Description  of  the
Provocation Clause 
Devrim Aydın (2005) compares the old and new penal code in terms of the provocation
clause.  Aydın defines provocation as a legal term as follows “provocation, in its simplest
form, is the sentence reduction in a crime where the suspect committed a crime as a result
of other people’s  unjust-wrongful acts and committed a reaction crime” (p.  228).   The
author states that the provocation clause has a place in modern law but the main issue is
about the interpretation of the concept.
The interpretation of the provocation clause became problematic with the new penal code
since the term honor was not included under the rubric of qualified murders that require
life sentences. However, the term töre was included, instead, which according to prominent
feminist lawyers such as Hülya Gülbahar, should be interpreted to encompass all sorts of
honor killings (http://www.bianet.org).  Aydın (2005) makes a similar argument and states
that the provocation clause should not be interpreted to include honor killings because the
new penal code defines provocation not only on the basis of provocation but also on the
basis of unjust-wrong acts of the victim.  Another change regarding the provocation clause
in the new code is removing the differentiation between modest and excessive provocation
and leaving the amount of sentence reduction to the judges' discretion. 
Aydın (2005) states that the above changes aim at preventing  töre and honor killings as
explained in the rationale of the law in the penal code. Accordingly, for the provocation
clause to be implemented in the new penal code, the victim should engage in wrongful and
unjust act that generate feelings of rage and suffering (hiddet ve elem). In other words, the
effect of the unjust act on the suspect's feelings which cause a crime of passion is attributed
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a legal value with the provocation clause. 
Aydın (2005) make a thorough explanation of what constitutes an unjust act.  The unjust
act  should primarily cause feelings  of  rage and suffering in  the suspect.  Secondly,  the
unjust act should be unjust-wrong (p 233).  Being unjust-wrong is defined as being against
the law, e.g., adultery, which does not constitute a crime per se but is a cause for divorce in
the civil  law (p.  234).  Aydın (2005) states  that  provocation with an unjust  act  can be
accepted as provocation and sentence reductions can be implemented if the unjust act is
against  social  norms as  well.   The rationale behind the imposition of  unjust  acts is  to
preserve  the  legal  order  and  this  constitutes  the  main  rationale  behind  implementing
sentence reductions when the victim engaged in acts that are incompatible with law. 
Accordingly, acts such as not greeting someone on the street, not visiting the family during
the holiday, acting against general traditional  codes of conduct are not acceptable legal
unjust acts even if they provoke the suspects because they do not contradict law.  Aydın
(2005) criticizes the lawmaker for not including the term honor in the law itself but just
writing  it  under  the  reasons-justifications  clause  and  leading  to  confusion  regarding
sentence reduction on honor killings. In conclusion, the old penal code legally gave the
judges discretion to provide sentence reductions to killers who committed crime in the
name of  honor  and  many judges  did  not  choose  certain  clauses  over  others  to  avoid
sentence reductions and implement punishment increase (Koğacıoğlu,  2004).  However,
with the new penal code, the judges who implement sentence reductions are not only using
their own discretion of interpretation but acting against law when they implement sentence
reductions to murderers of honor killings (Hülya Gülbahar, 2006, http://www.bianet.org/).
Below is a comparison of the sentence reductions before and after the penal code reform,
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which confirms the continuation of the juridical convention to the disadvantage of women,
illustrating the gap between law and implementation.
3.4.B Legal Cases  Before and after the Reform
The legal cases that ended with sentence reduction verdict before the reform were taken
from the book of lawyer Vildan Yirmibeşoğlu (2006) and the study of the Diyarbakır Bar
Association. The sentence reduction of honor killings after the reform, constituting a period
of three years between June 1st 2005 and May 2008 were taken  from newspapers and
various  feminist  web  sites  such  as  BIANET,  Uçan  Süpürge,  Kazete  and  Feminist
Yaklaşımlar. 
3.4.B.1 Analysis of the Gap between Law and Implementation  before the 2005 Reform 
The Diyarbakır  Bar Association's  work is  a  rather  compressed one analyzing the cases
between 1999-2005 to find out the juridical attitudes towards honor, the defenses of the
families and the reasons why the judges implemented sentence reductions.   During the
period  between  1999-2005,  59  legal  cases  reached  a  verdict  in  which  46  resulted  in
sentence reduction due to provocation. There were 71 victims and 81 murder suspects.
Half of the victims were men and the other half were women. The findings of the study
reveal that when the victims were men, the justification for sentence reduction upon unjust
provocation were rape, sexual harassment, abduction and  forcing for prostitution.  The
killers  of  women,  on  the  other  hand,  benefited  from  sentence  reductions  because  the
women acted against chastity, flirted with other men, engaged in relationship with other
men and cheated.  
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Besides the above analysis of the Bar Association, a detailed analysis of the cases were was 
conducted to provide a better  understanding of the patterns that  led to the provocation  
decisions. I reached the following by utilizing the data provided by the Diyarbakır Bar  
Association regarding the rationale of the judges about giving sentence reductions.
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Table III. Rationale of the judges to implement  sentence reductions
 upon significant provocation
when the victims are men
Raping the perpetrator’s  wife/daughter or sister-in-law 6
Forcing the daughter of the perpetrator into  prostitution 1
Sexual Harassment 1
Having relationship with the wife 3
Abducting the niece 1
Total 12
Table IV. Rationale of the judges for granting   sentence reductions
 Upon simple  Provocation
when the victims are men
Raping the perpetrator's sister/daughter/wife 7
Slandering the perpetrator’s wife 1
Sexually harassing the perpetrator’s wife 2
Abduction/Attempt at abduction 4
Joking about honor 1
Forcing the perpetrator  into prostitution 2
Having relations with the perpetrator’s wife 3
Forcing the perpetrator’s  sister into prostitution 1
Total 21
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Table VI. Rationale of the judges for granting   sentence reductions
 Upon simple  Provocation
when the victims are women
Gossip about the women that she has been acting against
chastity
7
Gossip about the woman that she has been cheating 2
Being raped 1
Going around with men 3
Leading a dishonorable life and insulting the perpetrator 1
Cheating 3
Total 17
Table V. Rationale of the judges for granting   sentence reductions Upon Significant
Provocation when the victims are women
Gossip about the women that she has been acting against
chastity
1
Going  around with men 1
Gossip about the woman that she has been cheating 4
Cheating 2
Total 8
Even though the above number of perpetrators and victims is rather limited to make 
generalizable inferences. Certain patterns can be detected in whether and to what extent a 
judge decides to impose a sentence reduction.  There seems to be a difference in the degree 
of sentence reductions made for men and women.  For example, judges decided on lesser 
sentence reduction for two women who killed  men who had forced them into prostitution, 
while handing out greater sentence reductions to man who had killed the person who had f
forced his daughter into prostitution. 
From another perspective, for the judges, joking about the honor of a man was considered
as provocative as forcing a woman into prostitution. A pattern emerges from these cases:
judges  implement  sentence  reductions  to  female  suspects  if  the  victim  has  committed
something against the law whereas male suspect get sentence reductions even if the victim
has not done anything wrong as detailed below.
In the case of women victims, reductions were given even if the woman was the victim
who got raped.  Furthermore, gossip about the women was reason enough to kill; judges
gave sentence reductions to killers who had committed murder only on the basis of gossip.
These decisions are not legally justifiable since the acts of the women are not illegal and
they legally cannot be interpreted as unjust provocations. In sum, based on the definition of
Aydın and the interviews of Hülya Gülbahar, the judges were making decisions illegally
even  before  the  penal  code  since  they  were  not  interpreting  the  provocation  clause
properly.  
In addition to the Bar Association’s study, Vildan Yirmibeşoğlu, an attorney, published a
book  including  many  cases  regarding  sentence  reductions  and  honor  killings.
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Yirmibeşoğlu (2006)  includes  300  legal  cases  between  2000-2005.  Her  findings  are
interesting even though many of the cases she describes do not include the verdicts of the
judges but the rationale of the murderers.  The cases strikingly reveal that the defendants
occasionally change their stories after talking to a lawyer.  There have even been cases of
blood  feud  where  the  culprit  told  the  story as  one  of  honor  but  the  judge caught  the
loophole in the story and imposed a life sentence on the basis of blood feud.  This example
illustrates that when the victims are men, judges may more often be more suspicious of
stories of the perpetrators.  
Yimibeşoğlu's cases show that the judges gave sentence reductions even for the murder of
a girl who liked to wander around a lot.  In this case, the 15 year- old brother killed the 16
year-old girl.   In  the defense,  the lawyer  of  the 15 year-old claimed that  töre and the
societal relations forced the boy to commit the crime.  In other words, even the lawyer
accepted that the murder was a constructed and panned one.  However, in the end, the
prosecutor  could not  find any evidence that  the murder  was planned and the boy was
released after two and a half years.  
Besides the gender-discriminatory decisions,  Yirmibeşoğlu's study involves decisions of
judges that do not consider, for instance, gossip as a reason for sentence reductions.  For
instance, in a case where the perpetrator claimed that his wife had a relationship with the
son, the judge decided that  the suspect  was telling conflicting stories  after listening to
witnesses. In the end, the judge decided a sentence reduction was not appropriate when the
perpetrator feels rage and anguish from a non-existing event.  Therefore, the provocation
clauses were not used. At a presentation in 2008, Yirmibeşoğlu begins by stating that the
judges are affected by the regional traditions and social norms when reaching a verdict but
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she  also  analyzes  the  changes  in  the  judges'  attitudes  especially  towards  the  sentence
reductions  regarding  the  women's  personal  lives  such  as  marriage  and  divorce.
Yirmibeşoğlu adds that there are even contradictions in the decisions of the same judge
after  the  reform  regarding  sentence  reductions,  which  can  be  regarded  as  a  positive
improvement (http://www.europarl.europa.eu). 
In conclusion, the studies of the Bar Association and Yirmibeşoğlu indicate that there is a
juridical  convention  regarding  the  decisions  on  honor  crimes  leading  to  use  of  the
provocation clause that discriminates between the genders.  Furthermore, some cases in
Yirmibeşoğlu's study show that,  just  as  Koğacıoğlu (2004) argues,  the judges can pick
some clauses over others to reject the use of provocation clauses. The case studies also
demonstrate that the mentality of the judges plays a significant role in decision- making
since the sentence reductions are based upon interpretation and unlawful interpretation is
usually not subject to appeal. Based on these patterns, the following part of the study will
evaluate the sentence reductions after the penal code reform of 2005 with the hypothesis
that  the  juridical  convention  among the  judges  still  continues  and  sentence  reductions
prevail as a result of this convention.
3.4.B.2 Analysis of the Gap between Law and Implementation after the 2005 Reform 
Below, I will present fourteen cases of sentence reductions that were implemented between
2005-2008.  A detailed  inclusion  of  the  judge's  rationale  was  identified  from  various
sources, including the Internet, newspapers, feminist sites and independent news networks.
The analysis  of  these cases  together  points  to  the following six  patterns  regarding the
reasons behind the gap between law and implementation regarding sentence reduction:
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1.  The  lawyers  either  are  not  aware  of  the  new  law  or  they  demand  sentence
reduction upon unjust acts with no justifiable defense
2. Judges are either not aware of the law or they continue to apply the sentence
reductions by considering the women's act as an unjust-wrongful act  when it  is
against social norms
3. The court of appeal (yargıtay) usually agrees with the judge's decisions
4.  The  judges  who  oppose  sentence  reductions  when  there  is  no  unjust  act  in
contradiction with the law are women
5. There are positive improvements regarding the extinction of sentence reductions
for the murderers of raped girls.
6.  A new clause  (765  of  the  new penal  code)  is  used  as  grounds  for  sentence
reduction (proper conducts of suspects during trial including, proper behavior in the
courtroom and not escaping).
Sentence Reductions on the basis of Unjust-Wrong Acts, Legal Cases:
Legal information before beginning the analysis of the cases is necessary to clarify some of
the  decisions.   In  cases  where  there  are  no  witnesses  or  counter  evidence  the  court
considers the perpetrator’s depiction of the story as reality and decides accordingly. 
For example, in February 2008, Ahmet Demir (56) was sentenced to 15 years after killing
his wife Hatice Demir (41) upon significant unjust provocation on the grounds that she was
cheating on him with her  ex-husband (http://www.nethaber.com).   The perpetrator  also
claimed that his wife tried to kill him by giving him a heart attack by having sex after
giving  him  strange  herbal  tea.   In  addition,  he  claimed  that  he  had  increased  heart
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palpitations every time they had sex after having that tea and he somehow later found out
that the herbs in the tea worked as to give him heart attack during heavy physical activity
like sex. The perpetrator,  who is blind, also claimed that  when he suspected his wife's
cheating he asked her about the issue and the wife replied by saying that “I am enough for
both of you.”  After these so-called provocations the perpetrator killed the victim with an
ax.  His  explanations  were  sufficient  enough  to  consider  the  murder  as  having  been
committed under extraordinary provocation and the sentence reduction was decreased to 15
years from life imprisonment. 
Ahmet Demir's case illustrates that there is limited knowledge of the new code since the
term significant unjust provocation is still used even though with the new code there is no
such differentiation.  Second, sentence reduction is made on the grounds that the victim
was supposedly cheating on the perpetrator because there was no clear evidence.  
The case below is an example where the decision conflicts with the new penal code.  This
case was taken from a discussion forum of lawyers and law students where some male
students argued that the sentence reduction was justifiable. In this murder case, the crime
was committed in 2008 in the name of honor by a father in Adana who shot his 19 year old
daughter after she ran away with her lover.  The perpetrator was first given a life sentence,
but then his sentence was reduced to 18 years due to significant  provocation based on the
unjust acts of the victim and also  proper conduct during the trial.  
The father justified the crime as follows (www.radikal.com.tr): “We moved to Istanbul in
2005 and moved back to Adana when we were not able to find a job.  My son and daughter
stayed in Istanbul and continued working at a factory with my brother.  After a while my
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brother called and told me to get my children because they misbehaving. When I went to
Istanbul, I found out that my daughter had run away with a man who was married with two
children.  I looked for my daughter and the police finally found her.  She was ashamed of
what she had done and wanted to come back to Adana with me.  One day she told me that
she wanted to go back to Istanbul and marry the man.  However, I told her that this was
impossible since the man was married. Then she told me that she had sexual intercourse
with the man in the factory and I went mad at that point. I took the gun and pointed it to
my chin asking her to choose between me and her lover. She jumped over me at that point
and the gun fired, accidentally killing her...”  
According to the news, the family thought that the 18-year sentence was too much for such
an honor crime. As depicted in the story of the culprit, the girl was single, 19 years old,
therefore, of lawful age, and she had not committed any crime but rather had disobeyed her
father.   According to  Aydın's  (2005) and Gülbahar's  (2007) explanation on how to use
provocation based upon an unjust act, this court decision was contrary to  clauses of the
new penal code. 
Another  case  from  http://www.nethaber.com, is  a  rather  tragic-comic  one  where  the
sentence was reduced, after the penal code reform by the court of appeal based on proper
conduct in the courtroom, from  life imprisonment without parole to simply imprisonment
in February 2008.  The murderer in this case was a father who murdered his raped daughter
after  the  family had  reached  the  decision  that  she  should  die.   The  murder  had  been
committed four years before and the father was sentenced to life imprisonment without
parole, but his lawyer appealed after the reform to enable him to benefit  from the proper
conduct sentence reduction and he succeeded. This case is an example where the lawyers
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and the judges agree on the need to implement sentence reductions even when the rationale
of the murder was rape and the decision was a planned one. 
Another  case  where  the  father  received  a  reduced  sentence  -  brought  down  from life
imprisonment  without  parole  lifetime  imprisonment  to  17.5  years  for  murdering  his
daughter occurred in Trabzon in December 2007 (http://www.nethaber.com).  The father
killed the daughter on the grounds that he was provoked when his daughter acted against
him in a way that was contrary to his sense of   honor.  The perpetrator had called the
victim to his house on the day of the incident and they had had an argument about the
dishonorable acts of the daughter. The perpetrator was drunk when he shot the daughter
that night. The rationale of the court for sentence reduction was again the same, that the
crime had been committed under extraordinary unjust provocation.  Again, in this case it
can be seen that the new penal code was not implemented correctly and that a sentence
reduction was given even though the daughter had not broken the law. 
Another similar sentence reduction was granted to a husband in Izmir on the grounds that
he had been unjustly provoked when his wife flirtatiously asked the time to a group of
strangers and wore jeans (http://www.nethaber.com).  The event took place in August 2007
at a shopping mall with the perpetrator stabbing his wife 15 times and killing her in front of
their two children.  The court decided that the sentence should be reduced to 20 years upon
unjust provocation and the declaration of the killer that he regretted his crime. This case is
a significant example of where the court decision regarding the sentence reductions can be
independent  of the norms of the region in a negative way.   In  other words,  Izmir is  a
relatively large modern westernized city where the norms are quite different from a small
town where people are familiar with each other.  However, the judge did not take into
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consideration this social environment and implemented sentence reductions where there
were obviously no acts on the part of the woman that contradicts the law.  Furthermore, the
acts of the woman in this case did not even contradict social norms.  This case is also a
good example of the juridical convention that Koğacıoğlu (2004) mentions since the new
penal code could be applied clearly but the judge continued to apply the old law. 
Women, however, cannot benefit occasionally from similar types of sentence reductions.
For example, in November 2006 in Trabzon, a woman killed a man who entered her house
and raped her (http://www.nethaber.com).  The man went to another room of the house and
told the victim that he was waiting for her daughter-in-law and he would rape her as well.
The perpetrator stated that the man had tried to rape her again by attacking her from behind
and that's when she decided to kill him; she engaged in role playing and acted as if she
wanted the intercourse as well. After the man was convinced, she got permission to go to
the other room and there she took the gun and shot him. In this case, he court decided that
the crime was committed under extraordinary provocation by the unjust act and sentenced
the woman to ten years of imprisonment.  In other words, the court treated this raped and
threatened woman the same as the husbands who murder the wives for wearing jeans or
fathers killing the daughters on grounds of acting against chastity. However, the judge in
this case, could have implemented the self-defense clause of the new penal code and decide
on acquitting the woman just as in the following case.
On September 2007, a verdict was reached to acquit a girl (23) who had killed a man who
was raping his mother on a farm where they had been working three years before in 2004
(http://www.nethaber.com).  The girl told the court that in the morning of the event she
heard her mother's screams calling for help and asking to be rescued. She went out and saw
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the half-naked man with an ax trying to rape her mother.  Then, she shot the man and
claimed that she had committed the crime in the name of honor.  The court first decided to
sentence the girl to 24 years in prison and then decreased the punishment to 3.5 years and
released the girl.  However, after the new penal code, a self-defense clause was added with
no 27/2 and the case of the girl was reopened accordingly.  The court decided to acquit her
on the grounds that she committed the crime in self defense. 
In the above case, the rape is not even directed at the girl, it is directed at the mother.  And
the lawyer agrees that the girl could have shot the gun in a way as to injure and not kill the
rapist. However, the lawyer also argued, in her defense, that the crime had been committed
with anxiety and panic to save the mother and the judge accepted the defense. However, in
the previous case, the rape was directed against the woman and she was re-attacked with
the threat of her daughter-in-law being raped. Somehow, the court reached the verdict that
the woman had carefully planned the murder and had not committed the crime in self
defense. The comparison of these two cases depicts the discrepancies of the court decisions
regarding honor when the killer is a woman.
The above comparison, in other words, reveals a significant dynamic in the court cases for
reducing sentences upon provocation. Another comparison between the two verdicts of the
same court with only three weeks in between in the Adana Fifth Criminal Court in July
2004 also represents such a dynamic that discriminates on the basis of gender.  In one these
cases the murderer was a woman, Rabia Yoldaş, who had killed her husband after being
subject to fourteen years of physical and mental abuse. Rabia'a lawyers argued that she
should be tried on the basis of significant sentence reduction upon provocation because of
relationship's violent history.  
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The violent history is that, Rabia had to marry the husband when she was fourteen since
she was raped by him.   After  the marriage,  the husband began beating her  every day,
sometimes until she fainted (www.radikal.com.tr). In a letter she wrote from prison, Rabia
said that her husband had abused her because breakfast was not ready, she fed the children
with his food, she was silent, she replies back, etc... She also said that her head had been
cut by an ax, smashed against a wall so hard that her cousin had to come and clean the
blood from the wall, which was another reason for her husband to beat her. Finally, after
years of struggle Rabia succeeded in opening a divorce case and moving to her father's
house. Her husband called her one day and spoke with an apologizing gentle so she agreed
to talk to him at home. He came and began insulting her again, threatening to sell her into
prostitution.  Rabia lost control and shot her husband. Based on these incidents, Rabia's
lawyers made their defense and requested that the case be seen in light of extraordinary
provocation.  However, the five members of the court unanimously decided that these acts
of the husband constituted only simple reasons for provocation and convicted Rabia to 24
years in prison. The same court, however, gave different verdicts when the suspect was a
man as illustrated below. 
The same judges of the above court had issued a verdict and decreased the sentence of a
man who  killed  his  ex-wife  because  she  was  having  a  relationship  with  another  man
(www.radikal.com.tr). The defense of the man was that he and the victim were separated
for a while and he saw a photograph of her at home with another man.  After this, he took
the children away and let her see the kids outside.  One day, when they again met for the
kids, the killer saw that the woman was coming out from a luxurious car and he lost his
temper at that point.  He killed the ex-wife by stabbing her eight times.  The babysitter
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brought the photographs as proof of a relationship and the court accepted them to be the
basis for reducing the sentence given extraordinary unjust provocation. The man first got
24 years in prison but with the sentence reductions, the punishment was reduced to 6 years
and eight months. 
The comparison of the above cases, which were decided by the same judges, is a relevant
example  of  Hülya  Gülbahar's  argument  that  the  sentence  reductions  on  the  basis  of
provocation is given to male perpetrators most of the time while women cannot benefit
from  the  reductions  since  the  judges  discriminate  between  men  and  women
(www.kazete.com.tr). Gülbahar states that there are countless examples of cases where the
provocation clause  is  applied only to  men.   For  example,  in  1997 the  murderers  of  a
woman  were  sentenced  to  4.5  years  in  prison  after  their  sentence  was  reduced  upon
extraordinary provocation from 16 years,  since the victim ran away with her lover.   In
1996, a 14 year-old boy cut Sevda's throat in the middle of the street during the day and
since he was a minor, got a sentence of only 2.5 years. 
The above case was also a concern for lawyer Vildan Yirmibeşoğlu (2006). Yirmibeşoğlu
talks about Sevda's murder as well and states that the fourteen year old cut her throat with
the help of other people who forcefully grabbed her hands to help the murder but none of
these people were investigated or accused. In sum, according to lawyer Hülya Gülbahar,
these cases indicate that, the provocation clause is used arbitrarily when men are killers and
women are victims and it is not easily implemented when women kill men.  
The penal code, however, brought some positive changes as well. For example there are
cases where the judges no longer give sentence reductions to killers who commit crimes on
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the basis of tore, after a family counsel has decided that such a crime be committed. The
lifetime imprisonment of the murderers of Güldünya Tören, Yasemin Çetin and Meryem
Sezgin are examples of such verdicts.  In other words, as stated in the penal code,  töre
killings are considered to be exempt from sentence reduction upon provocation in some of
the cases. In sum, another dynamic regarding the sentence reductions is the manner in the
honor killing is carried out, in the sense that there are judges who do not give sentence
reductions to töre killings, which are pre-planned crimes rather than spontaneous killings.
The above cases demonstrate that the courts differentiate between  töre killers and honor
killers, punishing töre and decreasing the punishment for honor killings.  These verdicts are
compatible with people's  perception of honor as  depicted in  the UNDP's  report,  where
people distanced themselves from  töre claiming that there are no such practices in their
family but standing up for the concept of honor.  The court decisions are in line with such a
mentality,  condemning  töre but  applauding honor killings. This lauding results in some
killings being considered justified in the name of honor and, hence, worry of receiving a
reduced sentence, as illustrated with the below court decision.
In this case, the killer claimed that he had murdered his wife in the name of honor.  The
wife  was  very  pretty  and  she  was  known  by  the  nickname  “model  Aysel”  in  their
neighborhood.  The husband stated that he loved his wife very much and was very jealous
of her.  He sent the son and the wife to Gelibolu for vacation and that was the time when he
heard gossip that the woman was having affairs with other men. He called her back to
Izmir/Urla and saw the birth control pills in her bag, which provoked him, but he managed
to control himself. Later he saw that she had pierced her belly and the last straw was cell
phone pictures of her taken with other men. After all of these, the man lost his control and
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killed the wife, although he did confess that he regretted what he did. The court decided to
reduce the sentence of life imprisonment and give the man 20 years in prison. However, the
son got upset by the decision and claimed that the murder had been committed because of
economic reasons and his father already knew that the mother was taking pills; in fact, he
was the one who had bought the pills from the drug store. The son insisted that the mother
had not engaged in dishonorable conduct and the father committed the crime only because
of money. This case illustrates that there might be other reasons behind the killings which
are much different from honor and the sentence reductions upon unjust provocation  makes
it easier for the killers to commit crimes against women. 
The provocation  clause  is  abused  by murderers  occasionally to  justify their  acts.   For
instance, the murderers of Gülistan Gümüş, who killed the 20 year old in 2006 because
she refused to marry the man she was told she had to marry, while she was hiding in a
trunk, with Kalashnikovs defended themselves by saying that their arrest was against the
law since they committed a crime in the name of honor and not in the name of töre.  Their
lawyer stated that Gülistan was like a bird in a cage; she was very easy to kill by someone
who had lost control,  and that  there was no way that  the crime was a preplanned  töre
murder. The lawyer further claimed that  töre is like the word of  Allah and comes above
everything  in  the  region  and  this  should  be  a  valid  ground  to  reduce  the  sentences.
However, the case was publicized and the defense of the lawyer was widely criticized in
the media and among the feminist organizations. After two years of trial, the killers were
convicted to life in imprison. This case shows that killers believe that if they argue the
crime was committed in the name of honor, they can get a sentence reduction. This is not
completely untrue but the case reveals another dynamic in sentence reductions: When the
case is publicized, the judges refrain from deciding on sentence reductions. 
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The final case is a long one and needs elaboration since it represents several dynamics
regarding the sentence reductions in killings done in the name of honor upon provocation.
These dynamics are the gender of the judges, gender of the victim and the gender of the
killer. 
The victim, Özlem was killed by her husband in 2004 on grounds that she had refused to
have sex with him, kicked him out of bed and insulted him (www.hukuki.net). The court
decided that these taken altogether  constituted extraordinary unjust  provocation and the
sentence was reduced to 24 years from life in prison. The prosecutor was a woman, Türkan
Yabancı, and she was against sentence reductions on the grounds that the victim was not
obliged to have sexual relations all the time and the killer's claims that she insulted the
husband is a construct of the murderer to receive sentence reduction.  
The important catch in this case was that the husband was occasionally beating the victim
and he confessed this during the trial  after  listening to various witnesses who saw the
bruised face of Özlem. However, the judges stated that there was no evidence of physical
violence against the victim even though the killer himself had confessed that he had been
beating the victim but not as much as the witnesses had claimed. The sentence reduction
was given with this rationale, however, with the objection of a woman judge, Şenay Toprak
who stated that “I do not agree with the verdict of the court since there are no unjust acts
that were in contradiction with the law in the murder and the victim has no guilt at all in
this  incident...”  Finally,  the  Court  of  Higher  Appeal  (Yargıtay  1.  Ceza  Mahkemesi),
consisting of five men decided to on a sentence reduction.
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The above case was introduced in the discussion forum of  www.hukuki.net, a network of
lawyers, by lawyer Dilek Kuzulu Yüksel, giving way to a discussion regarding the verdict.
It was observed that the discussion took place between male and female lawyers regarding
whether the rejection of sexual relations, in combination with insults, would result in unjust
and wrongful acts.  The females criticized the decision whereas most males claimed that
these acts taken altogether can provoke feelings of anger, rage and anguish in the killer,
leading to a justification of the sentence reduction.  What the male representatives missed,
however, was that the “unjust act” defined by law should be in contradiction with law and
refusing to have intercourse is not among such an act. This case also shows that there is a
possibility of questioning the sentence reductions for honor murderers when the judge and
prosecutor is a woman.  Furthermore, when the judges are men, sentence reduction are
debated less and more easily implemented.
3.5 CONCLUSION 
The  primary  aim  of  this  chapter  was  to  detect  patterns  of  the  gap  between  law  and
implementation regarding the penal code reform of 2005 using the sentence reductions for
killings in the name of honor as case studies.  The legal verdicts of sentence reductions
before and after the penal code reform were compared with the theoretical framework of
Dicle Koğacıoğlu,  depicting a juridical  convention when deciding the verdicts  and not
using alternative clauses to increase the punishment of killers. 
The first part of the chapter indicates that honor crimes are prevalent throughout Turkey, as
stated in the report of the National Police. Furthermore,  the profile of the murderers is
independent of economic, social and educational and ethnic backgrounds, as determined by
Mazhar  Bağlı's  research.   In  other  words,  the  findings  show  that  educated  and
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economically  well  off  people  from  all  parts  of  Turkey  commit  honor  crimes.  Bağlı's
research also confirms that the murderers believe they did what they had to do and they
would not get any punishments if only they had a good lawyer. Furthermore, they claim
that increased punishments would not deter them from committing honor crimes.  In sum,
this part of the research, which consists of a literature review on the prevalence of honor
crimes, indicates that honor crimes are much more widespread in Turkey than portrayed in
the media. 
In the second part of the chapter, the gap between law and implementation regarding the
penal code reform of 2005 was explored. The implementation of the new penal code was
confirmed  to  be  problematic,  in  line  with  Koğacıoğlu's  argument  that  judges  have  a
juridical  convention among themselves, arising from their social  relations, that  leads to
eschewing the implementation of lifetime imprisonment in case of murder of women in the
name of honor.  In this part, it was also confirmed that when the victims are women and
killers are men, the sentence reductions are given much more easily than when the victim
are men and murderers are women. In this part, the cases also confirmed that, contrary to
the generally accepted stance in the media, the murders take place all over Turkey and the
sentence reductions  are  not only given in  the regions  where supposedly traditions  and
social norms prevail.  Sentence reductions were given to men who killed their wives in the
name of honor upon the grounds of wearing jeans or piercing in Izmir, a relatively liberal
modern city. In sum, the juridical convention among the judges is independent from the
region over which they preside. 
The findings of the second part also underline that sentence reductions are not as easily
implemented to  töre killings if  the event  is  publicized with clear-cut evidence that  the
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family counsel  made the decision to kill  and organized the murder.  In  those cases, the
killers get  the heaviest sentence of  life  imprisonment.  According to the analysis of the
verdicts, the gender of the judges also makes a difference, although the number of cases is
insufficient to generalize this finding. 
Overall,  the literature review, the past cases with the sentence reduction, the reductions
after the penal code reform and the recent researches on killings in the name of honor show
that murderers use honor as a reason to justify their acts and the issue is depicted in the
media to the extent that a solution seems almost impossible.  In other words, the statements
of apology made by the perpetrators to the feudal family when they cannot not succeed in
killing the victim, the stories of people establishing the impermeability of the subject and
the quantitative research indicating that a great number of people support killings in the
name of honor,  all suggest that honor crimes cannot be resolved or prevented.  However,
the work of  various  NGOs such as  KAMER,  Mor Çatı  and information  regarding the
correlation between murders and the amount of the budget spared for shelters indicate that
the killings can be prevented.  For example, all the 158 women who applied to KAMER
between 2003-2006 were saved and supported in beginning a new life. 
Feminist NGOs and lawyers like Hülya Gülbahar emphasize the importance of shelters and
24/7 call centers to prevent such killings (www.bianet.org).  Furthermore, legal education
should be reconsidered and judges should be informed about the new laws.  The reforms of
the penal code should be implemented and “killings in the name of honor” should be added
under the clauses of those offenses to which sentence reductions on the basis of unjust-
wrong acts cannot be applied (www.bianet.org). 
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CHAPTER 4
KURDISH LANGUAGE RIGHTS 
4.1 Introduction
The two most prevalent problems hindering Turkey's membership process to the EU have
been its poor human rights record and its state mechanism impeding political pluralism
(Şahin 2005, p. 101).  According to Arus Yumul (2005, p. 89), this poor record stems from
the vague definition of citizenship in Turkey.  Yumul (2005, p. 89) states that citizenship in
Turkey is constituted by three mechanisms that discriminate against minorities; first, is the
idea that considers all people who internalize the Turkish language and culture as citizens,
second, is the idea that considers Muslims as citizens, and third, the idea that considers
ethnic Turks as citizens. Yumul (2005, p.289) also argues that these three views have been
operative since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, resulting in a vague definition of
citizenship which revolves around ramifications of nationalism. 
Turkey has been striving to legally eliminate the above mechanisms, mentioned by Şahin
and Yumul that are obstructing political and cultural pluralism, since it became an official
candidate for EU membership in 1999.  Between 1999-2004, the Turkish parliament passed
seven harmonization packages to comply with the EU acquis and the Copenhagen Criteria.
In  2004,  the  European  Commission  decided  that  Turkey had  fulfilled  the  Copenhagen
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Criteria  and  was  given  the  right  to  begin  official  negotiations.   However,  there  were
contentions regarding the implementation of the laws, especially regarding the taboo issue
on  Kurdish  minority  rights.  This  chapter  aims  at  exploring  the  gap  between  law and
implementation regarding the linguistic rights of Kurds, taking private Kurdish language
courses as case study. 
The first part of the chapter will elaborate on the literature and provide the history of the
problem in order  to underline the reasons why the Kurdish minority problem is  still  a
prevalent issue in Turkey today. The second part will concentrate on the theories regarding
citizenship in Turkey. This part benefits from the work of Fuat Keyman and Ayşe Kadıoğlu.
The third part will study the private Kurdish language courses as a case to explore the
reasons behind the gap between law and implementation regarding the language rights
given  to  the  Kurds.  In  this  section,  the  gap  between  law and  implementation  will  be
analyzed by comparing the declarations of the course owners and intellectuals in various
newspapers,  interviews  with  Betül  Çelik,  who is  an  academic  studying  this  issue  and
Remzi Çakın, who was the first person to apply for a Kurdish course in 1996 before the
law on the lifting of the ban on Kurdish was passed in 2002. 
 The last part will concentrate on the private Kurdish language courses as a case study to
illustrate  the  gap  between  law  and  implementation  and  possible  prospects  for
denationalization of citizenship. 
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4.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The origins of the Kurdish problem can be traced back to the final years of the Ottoman
Empire,  the  end  of  nineteenth  and  the  beginning  of  twentieth  centuries.  The  late-
nineteenth century Ottoman Empire was weak and the great powers such as Russia and
Great Britain made plans to obtain governing rights in the Middle Eastern provinces of the
Empire (Kirişçi and Winrow 2003, p. 68). In other words, the nineteenth century Middle
East, which was populated by Arabs and Kurds, witnessed the competition of great powers
until World War I (WWI).  WWI, however, altered the position of the Ottoman Empire in
international relations after it decided to declare war against Britain, France and Russia by
joining the Triple Alliance. 
The Triple Alliance lost the war and the Ottoman Empire signed the Mudros Armistice,
accepting the occupation of the Empire by allies, which was followed by the Sevres Treaty
of 1920 which formally divided the Empire.  With this formal division, the Empire was to
be shared between the allies and Eastern Anatolia was to be divided to open the way for a
Kurdish and Armenian nation (Kirişçi and Winrow 2003, p. 68). However, concomitantly
with  the  Sevres  Treaty,  a  resistance  movement  composed  of  Turks,  Kurds,  Albanians,
Circassians and Laz began in Anatolia, resulting in the formation of a new Turkish nation
in 1920 after  successful  expulsion of  the  occupying forces  from Anatolia  (Kirişçi  and
Winrow 2003, p. 75).  The newly established Turkish state was declared with the Treaty of
Lausanne  in  August  1920,  giving  independence  to  Turkey  and  settling  most  of  the
territorial problems with the Allied Powers. 
This emergence of the Turkish state, which was internationally recognized, thwarted the
emergence  of  an  independent  Kurdish  state  since  priority  was  given  to  fighting  the
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occupying forces that were deployed in all parts of Anatolia (Kirişçi and Winrow 2003, p.
75). The Kurdish tribal leaders, however, expected autonomy after getting their territories
back, but they were disappointed with the Lausanne Treaty when it was ascertained that an
autonomous Kurdish state was not going to be permitted by the allies and the new Turkish
government (Kirişçi and Winrow 2003, p. 78). 
The failure of an autonomous Kurdish state after the War of Independence is explained by
the lack of nationalist sentiments among Kurds and also the lack of unity among different
Kurdish tribes (Kirişçi and Winrow 2003, p. 79).  The lack of unity can be explained by the
fact that there were different Kurdish tribes opting for different resolutions to the territory
problem during the War of Independence. For example, there were strong tribal leaders
opting  for  establishing  their  own  dominance  and  also  tribes  that  joined  the  War  of
Independence  with  Mustafa  Kemal  and  there  were  also  Kurdish  groups  striving  for
independence (Kirişçi and Winrow 2003, p. 79). These distinct approaches to the situation
of Kurds in Eastern Anatolia made it difficult for the formation of an independent Kurdish
nationalist movement and Kurdish people were incorporated in the Turkish state with the
Treaty of Lausanne. Below is an elaboration of these different Kurdish groups: 
Kurds formed 22 of the 56 delegates of the nascent resistance movement in 1919 Erzurum
Congress  (Kirişçi  and  Winrow  2003,  p.  79).  These  Kurdish  deputies  took  executive
positions in the Congress and the resistance movement which was to be formulated around
Islam and Ottoman patriotism (Kirişçi and Winrow 2003, p. 79). These sentiments of Islam
and Ottoman Patriotism were further emphasized in the first Turkish Parliament in 1920,
when 74 Kurdish deputies participated (Kirişçi and Winrow 2003, p. 80). 
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Besides  the  above  resistance  supporters,  there  were  Kurdish  movements  opting  for
secession.  These  movements  formed  the  second  group  of  Kurds.   This  second  group
organized several revolts against the resistance movement in Ankara between 1919-1920 in
order to halt attempts at centralizing the areas that remained outside the occupied territories
(Kirişçi  and Winrow 2003,  p.  80).   Among these rebellions,  the most serious  was the
Kocgiri rebellion, which was successfully suppressed and used by Mustafa Kemal to claim
that the Kurdish rebels aimed at destroying the attempts to save Islam and the Sultan from
the occupying powers. The failure of these rebels marked the failure of an independent
Kurdish state as well. In sum, the division and rivalry between the leaders of different
Kurdish tribes impeded the process of Kurdish independence.  Furthermore, the new map
of the Middle East leading to the division of the Kurdish population between Iraq, Iran,
Syria  and  Turkey made the independence  project  of  some Kurdish  elites  unachievable
(Kirişçi and Winrow 200, p. 84).   
At this point, it is relevant to explore the history of the Turkish official policy against Kurds.
The  establishment  of  the  Turkish  Republic,  which  centered  on  Turkish  nationalism,  
constitutes  the  major  explanation  of  the  emergence  of  Kurdish  ethnic  conflict  in  
contemporary Turkey.  According to Kirişçi and Winrow (2003), the initial stages of Turkish
nationalism were  rather  defined  by territorial  nationality  and  represented  a  more  civic  
nationalist stance  (p.  89).   However,  for  the  reasons  that  will  be  explored  in  the  
following paragraphs, Turkish nationalism turned out to be a strongly centralized system,  
leading to the denial of a separate Kurdish culture (Kirişçi and Winrow 2003, p. 89). The 
Kurdish elite struggled to resist this centralization and rebelled many times until the 1950s, 
but failed to succeed. However,  by the 1980s,  a new Kurdish elite emerged and began  
fighting for independence and recognition against the highly centralized Turkish nationalism
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that aimed at achieving a homogeneous society.
The highly centralized Turkish nation-building process began emerging at the end of the
nineteenth  century  by  some  intellectuals  within  the  Ottoman  Empire  who  aspired  to
introduce Turkish nationalism as a cure to the moribund Empire. However, this emphasis
on Turkish nationalism was not articulated after the War of Independence ended and a new
nation-building process began.  In other words, the period between 1919-1923, where the
new Turkish state engaged in war, is marked by an emphasis on Ottoman patriotism and
Islam to mobilize people from all  ethnic backgrounds.  However,  the period after  1923
witnessed the emphasis on Turkish ethnicity where the Kurdish identity found no chance of
free expression (Kirişçi and Winrow 2003, p. 91). 
Kurdish identity was not  suppressed during the War of  Independence,  which  ended  in
1920, and also until the declaration of the Republic in 1923. On the contrary, it is evident
from Mustafa Kemal's telegrams calling the Kurdish leaders that the initial rationale for
mobilization against the occupying forces was Islam (Kirişçi and Winrow 2003, p. 92). In
other  words,  people  from  all  ethnic  backgrounds,  including  Turks,  Kurds  Laz  and
Circassians, were called together under the rubric of saving the Ottoman nation by Mustafa
Kemal.  The Ottoman nation, however, at that time, did not mean nation in the modern
sense but it referred to the 'nation of Islam' (Kirişçi and Winrow 2003, p. 91). For example,
at  the  opening of  the  Grand National  Assembly in  April  1920,  which was the official
representative of the resistance movement, Mustafa Kemal emphasized the need to save the
Ottoman nation, which was composed of all Islamic elements within the territory that the
new establishment aspired to win back (Kirişçi and Winrow 2003, p. 92). However, this
stance began to change immediately after the end of War of Independence in 1920.
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The  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  Kemalist  elite  initially  revealed  itself  in  the  first
constitution of 1921, which have sovereignty to the people, and not to God or Caliph.  In
Article 3 of this constitution, the notion of 'state of Turkey' was also included, marking a
rupture from Ottomanism for the first time (Kirişçi, Winrow 2003, p. 93). 
After the declaration of Republic in 1923, a series of reforms were introduced aiming at
centralizing the  educational  system and  abolishing the  Caliphate,  which  was  the  main
source  of  Ottoman  legitimacy.  The  new  centralized  education  system  emphasized
Turkishness  and  established  Turkish  as  the  language  of  education,  which  marked  a
significant milestone in the development of Turkish nationalism.  The period following the
declaration  of  the  Republic,  between  1923  and  the  1940s,  and  the  1950s  witnessed
discrimination  against  non-Turkish  Muslims  and  non-Muslims,  with  an  emphasis  on
Turkish ethnicity (Kirişçi and Winrow 2003, p. 98). 
 
The emphasis on Turkish ethnicity and lack of civic nationalism in this period saw the
creation of 'others' within the Turkish state. One group that constituted the others in the
Turkish state was non-Muslims.  The stance against the non-Muslims began in the second
half  of  the  nineteenth  century  when  reforms  were  initiated  with  the  promise  of  an
egalitarian form of conduct between Muslims and non-Muslims (Kadıoğlu 2007, p. 286-
288). 
Another group that  was excluded from the newly established Turkish Republic was all
elements  representing  the  'backward  Ottoman past'  (Kadıoğlu  2007,  p.289).   With  the
primary aim of erasing the backward representation of the Ottoman past, several measures
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were introduced including the use of the Latin Alphabet in 1928.  As Kadıoğlu (2007,
P.289) quotes from Feroz Ahmad “at a stroke, even the literate people were cut off from
their past. Overnight, virtually the entire nation was made illiterate.” In other words, the
newly established Turkish Republic aspired to erase all connections with the Ottoman past
as fast as possible with the introduction of reforms from above and the Republican elite
eliminated all sorts of opposition to this Westernization process.  
This is articulated in Kirişçi and Winrow (2003) with a quotation from Lewis: “the basic
purpose of the change was not so much practical as pedagogical, as social and cultural and
Mustafa Kemal, in forcing his people to accept it, was slamming a door on the past as well
as opening a door to the future” (p. 101).  Kadıoğlu (2007, p. 289) calls this a process of
oblivion and argues that it had led to the exclusion of the non-Muslims and non-Turkish
citizens from the primary and secondary school history books. This had culminated in the
“ignorance of the new Turks regarding the multi-religious and multi-ethnic past of the land
they inhibit.”  In sum, the exclusion of the Ottoman past contributed to the exclusion of
non-Muslims and also the non-Turkish Muslims who spoke non-Turkish languages.  Kurds
were among the groups who were excluded. 
Kurds  are  among  the  groups  that  were  excluded  due  to  their  different  language  and
different religious sect.  The majority of the Kurds belong to the Shafi sect of Sunni Islam
and  they  speak  Kurdish  as  their  mother  tongue  (Kirişçi  and  Winrow  2003,  p.  96).
According to Kadıoğlu (2007) Kurds were assimilated with the systematic introduction of
various reforms and policies in the first decades of the new Republic (pp 288-289). This
assimilation process began with the abolition of Caliphate - a significant representative of
Islam - as the major unifying element between Kurds, pushing the tribal leaders to the
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periphery of the new establishment (Kadıoğlu 2007, p. 288). Further steps were taken in
the field of language restrictions on languages other than Turkish, forbidding the usage of
Kurdish in public places by 1928 (Kadıoğlu 2007, p. 288). Other assimilative procedures
including altering the names of  Kurdish villages  with Turkish ones,  making Turkish a
mandatory course in minority schools and forbidding the use of Kurdish names (Kadıoğlu
2007, p. 289). 
In sum, the Turkification process of the Turkish State began in 1923, after the declaration
of  the  Republic  and  continued  with  more  restrictions  in  the  following  years  over  the
Kurdish identity,  culminating in 16 Kurdish rebellions between 1924-1938 (Kirişçi  and
Winrow 2003, p. 100). The rebellion organized by Sheik Said was the most effective one in
that it led to a change in the new government and put an end to the nascent democracy in
Turkey and ironically strengthened the nationalist Turkish government, paving the way for
harsher reforms (Olson and Tucker 1978, p.205).
 In other words, the Kurds tried to resist the centralization and Turkification attempts of the
nationalist government but failed to formulate a unified movement, which resulted in the
consolidation of the newly established Turkish Republic and its Turkification policy.  For
example,  the  banning of  religious  orders,  lodges  and  cells  (tekke,  tarikat,  zaviye)  was
introduced right after the victory over the Sheik Said rebellion, and Islam was removed
from the constitution as the official religion of the state in the following year, 1926 (Kirişçi
and Winrow 2003, p. 101). However, all these measures initiated the beginning of an ethnic
Kurdish awareness centered around religious motifs. In other words, the beginning of a
Kurdish national movement occurred in this era, in the first years of the Republic when
Kurdish  identity  and  culture  were  suppressed  and  Islam was  eliminated  as  a  unifying
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political element. 
After  the  Sheik  Said  revolt,  there  were  several  revolts  expressing  resentment  to  the
centralization and assimilation policies  of  the government.  By 1935,  there  had already
emerged a deep resentment among the Kurdish nationalist elite, which is illustrated in the
following  quote  from  Dr.  Nuri  Dersimi  who  expressed  his  grievances  to  Tunceli's
governor: “on the one hand when we say we are ‘Turks,’ on the other we are told ‘no, you
are not Turks, you are Kurds.’ Yet when we, the people of Dersim, say we are Kurds, they
hit us hard and say that ‘no, you are not Kurds, there are no Kurds’” (Kirişçi and Winrow
2003, p. 105). In sum, as this quote illustrates, right after the declaration of the Republic,
and after the victory over Sheik Said, the Turkish government began a rigorous phase of
centralization reforms by rejecting the existence of Kurds as a separate ethnic group and
fortified its control over the mainly Kurdish territories by 1939 (Kirişçi and Winrow 2003,
p. 105). 
The above historical background of Kurdish nationalism and the Turkish nationalist stance
against Kurdish nationalism was mainly characterized by Turkish dominance and lack of
Kurdish unity.  However, this picture changed by the end of World War II (WWII) and
Kurds began organizing in the cities with a relatively more unified sense of ethnicity. There
are various contentions regarding this change, one belonging to Keyman and Aydın (2004).
Keyman  and  Aydın  (2004)  argue  that  the  main  reason  behind  the  nascent  Kurdish
nationalism during 1950s was modernization and industrialization, which culminated in a
mass migration from the Kurdish populated villages to the city centers (p. 34). These Kurds
who came to the industrial cities formed political bonds among each other using ethnic and
cultural identities as the basis throughout the 1950s.  
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The decade between the years 1950-1960 also witnessed a turning point in Turkish politics
since  the  era  is  marked  by the  introduction  of  multi-party  politics,  which  resulted  in
serious economic unrest ending with the military coup of 1960. The military intervention
further tightened the assimilation process over the Kurdish minority since it assumed that
it was the fault  of the relatively liberal  governing party,  namely the Democratic Party
(DP),  which the economic situation had deteriorated and Kurds had found grounds for
ethnic self awareness (Kirişçi and Winrow 2003, p. 107).  With this rationale in mind, the
military deported some Kurdish notables from east to west and also changed the names of
some Kurdish villages to Turkish.   However, all these measures could not prevent the
further rise in nationalist sentiments among the Kurds since the liberal 1961 constitution
gave people the civic rights such as permission for student associations and autonomy to
universities (Kirişçi and Winrow 2003, p. 107). 
 The Kurdish population and especially the student unions worked in this era to achieve
recognition from the state. One of these student unions was Revolutionary Cultural Society
of  the  East  (Devrimci  Doğu  Kültür  Ocakları),  which  aimed  at  gaining  linguistic  and
cultural rights with secessionist rhetoric, in contrast to the rhetoric of the Kurdish rebels
that focused on religious motifs during the inter-war period (Kirişçi and Winrow 2003, p.
109). These student groups operated within the left-wing Marxist groups opposing right-
wing groups. Massive violence broke out in Turkey between these groups which resulted in
military intervention in 1971, when many of the student leaders were arrested. 
The period after the 1971 military intervention witnessed a division among the Kurdish
Marxist Leninist groups that had different aspirations and aims.  According to Kirişçi and
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Winrow (2003), there were at least 12 different Kurdish Marxist groups during this period.
However, by 1977, one of these organizations emerged as the most radical and influential
one, i.e., the Kurdish Workers Party- Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK). The period after
the formation of  the PKK was  the continuation of  a  chaotic  era  marked by economic
deterioration, political instability and violence between different student groups. During
this  period of  violence,  which ended with the 1980 military coup,  the PKK organized
various meetings and prepared declarations defining the action plan to achieve secession
(Kirişçi, Winrow 2003, p. 110).  However, after the military coup, all such organizations
were hunted down and their leaders were forced to leave the country. Abdullah Öcalan, the
leader  of  PKK also left  Turkey during this  period but continued to direct  the PKK in
Turkey.  With the strong leadership of Öcalan, the PKK began its actions in 1984, which is
a milestone regarding the Kurdish question in Turkey since from then on the PKK became
the primary actor of this problem (Keyman and Aydın, 2004, p. 34).
The period that began with the military coup is a significant step in terms of the Kurdish
problem in Turkey since both the Turkish and Kurdish sides began taking more violent
actions  against  each  other.   The  Kurdish  side,  namely  the  PKK,  engaged  in  violent
activities resulting in the deaths of   35,000 people, of which 5,000 were civilians (Keyman
and Aydın, 2004, p. 34). The Turkish military rule, on the other hand, initiated a series of
laws  and decrees  that  marked  the  beginning of  serious  human rights  violations  in  the
Eastern Kurdish-populated regions of Turkey. For example, the military issued a law in
1983 banning the  speaking  Kurdish  in  public  places  even  though it  had  already been
forbidden  by  administrative  decrees  since  1930s  to  guarantee  the  assimilation  of  the
Kurdish  language.  Furthermore,  by  1983,  the  Kurdish  region  was  transformed  into  a
militarized  zone,  to  which  the  military  government  that  ruled  the  country  until  1983
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deployed governors  with excessive powers  (Keyman and Aydın,  2004, p.  35).  Another
system was introduced in 1985, namely the village guards system, with the primary aim of
gearing the villages against the PKK, but which resulted in the abuse of the villagers by the
village guards since they were the least disciplined section of the military. 
Besides the above militarization and human rights violations, 1984 witnessed a positive
development regarding Kurdish people in Turkey when Turgut Özal declared that he was
of Kurdish descent  (Kirişçi and Winrow 2003, p. 113).  However, Turgut Özal did not
prevent the declaration of state of emergency in 1987 in the ten cities with a high Kurdish
population.   The state  of  emergency further  tightened the control  over  Kurdish people
giving extraordinary powers to local governors to protect order. Furthermore, in 1991, the
anti-terror law which defined what terror meant in very broad terms, was passed. This
culminated in the detention and arrest of many intellectuals.  However, 1991 also saw a
positive development when the ban on Kurdish language in public places was lifted after
more than one and a half million Kurds migrated to Turkey from the Iraqi border (Kirişçi
and Winrow 2003, p. 113). 
Unfortunately, the above positive development was not enough to begin the amelioration of
the situation in Turkey.  Turkey had a very poor human rights record during the 1990s
mainly due  to  the  treatment  of  Kurdish  people.   For  example,  during  this  period,  the
Kurdish  people  were  forced  to  migrate  from  their  villages  (some  NGOs  estimate  the
number as four and a half million) and their homes were occupied by village guards who
still  inhabit  those homes in the pre-Kurdish regions (Keyman and Aydın,  2004, p.  35).
These  measures  were  taken  to  fight  the  PKK  in  the  region,  where  they  had  begun
operations in 1984. 
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The PKK continued its attacks and burned down villages, schools, and kidnapped teachers
and tourists up until its unilateral declaration of ceasefire in 1995. During these eleven
years,  the PKK attacked Kurdish villages  and forced some Kurdish people to help the
organization.  Caught between the PKK and the government military officials, the villagers
were  further  alienated  during  this  period.  A village  headman  (muhtar),  in  Kirişçi  and
Winrow (2003), states that they were slaves of the Turkish military during the day and of
the PKK at night (p. 131). 
 The PKK attacks also hindered the economic and educational development in the region
since one of the activities of the PKK was to burn 192 schools, with the rationale that they
were instruments  of  assimilation (Kirişçi  and Winrow 2003,  p.  113).  The military was
given immense powers to fight this situation and it was in this period that massive human
rights violations took place in Turkey.  These human rights violations were made in the
name of achieving military victory over the PKK and by 1995, the attacks of PKK had
significantly decreased, resulting in a unilateral ceasefire.  The period after 1995 witnessed
increased attention of the Kurdish problem, mainly due to the violent actions of the PKK in
past  decades.  Some  working  papers  by  NGOs  were  prepared  calling  for  the  state  to
consider the political dimension of the Kurdish problem and to put an end to describing the
issue merely as a matter of terrorism. Prime Minister Yılmaz in 1996 announced that the
Kurdish problem should be solved not  by military but  by political  means (Kirişçi  and
Winrow 2003, p. 144).  
Three years later, in 1999, Turkey became an official candidate for EU membership and the
governments had to take severe measures in terms of improving human rights measures to
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comply with the EU acquis. In 1999, Abdullah Öcalan was captured, bringing relief to the
military  sphere.  With  these  developments,  seven  harmonization  packages  were  passed
between  1999-2004,  when  Turkey  began  negotiations  for  full  membership,  after  the
Commission  decided  that  it  had  fulfilled  the  Copenhagen  criteria.   This  decision  was
lauded by Turkish nationalists but condemned by some Kurdish activists such as Kerim
Yıldız, who wrote a book on the issue entitled “The Kurds in Turkey, EU Accession and
Human Rights.” In this book, Yildiz criticizes the EU for giving Turkey the right to begin
negotiations since there is a huge gap between law and implementation. 
The above contentions regarding the Kurdish issue in Turkey can be explored under the
rubric of citizenship studies.  In other words, to understand the Kurdish issue in Turkey, it
should be situated under the theories explaining the plight of citizenship in Turkey. With
this aim, the following part of this chapter will explore the theories explaining the reasons
why the Kurdish minority issue in Turkey is a citizenship problem.
4.3 Theoretical Approaches  to the Kurdish Problem and Citizenship in Turkey
In this section, two key studies will be explored.  The first one aims at explaining why the
Kurdish problem is a significant issue today and emphasizes situating the Kurdish issue
within the modernization process. The key study is by Fuat Keyman, who, in his study,
initially explores two other paradigms of Turkish modernization and then proposes a more
explanatory theory that facilitates the understanding of the Kurdish problem.
The second study focuses on the denationalization of citizenship in Turkey. The key study
is  by  Ayse  Kadıoğlu;  it  aims  at  exploring  whether  there  is  a  possibility  of  a
denationalization of citizenship in Turkey.  Below is the elaboration of these studies.  
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Keyman argues that the Kurdish problem cannot be understood if it is not situated within
the  modern  state-building  process  of  Turkey.   According  to  Keyman,  the  building  of
Turkey was  synonymous  with  building  a  nation-state,  which  he  illustrates  as  follows.
According to Keyman (2005, p. 271), the end of nineteenth century marks the beginning of
the nation-building process articulated by Feroz Ahmad, “Turkey did not rise phoenix like
from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. It  was made in the image of the Kemalist elite,
which had won the national struggle against foreign invaders and the old regime.”  
Keyman elaborates on the nation-state building process in Turkey and then underlines how
the problem changed its discourse between the years 1920-1980.  He further argues that a
possible  solution  will  arise  after  only the  changing  nature  of  the  Kurdish  problem is
recognized and an emphasis on cultural and political pluralism is made (Keyman, 2005, p.
284). 
According  to  Keyman (2005,  p.  283),  Kurdish rhetoric  was  Islamic  during the  1920s,
Marxist  in  the  1970s  and  became an  identity-based  by the  1980s,  a  phenomenon that
continues…   Keyman (2005, p. 283) also argues that by the 1990s, the Kurdish problem
had become transformed to be one of  ethnic assertiveness culminating in  violence and
identity politics.  The period  after  the1980s  is  also a  period  of  the  modernity crisis  in
Turkey, which characterizes the Turkish official approach to the Kurdish problem.  In sum,
to understand the Kurdish problem, first, its historical development situated in the Turkish
nation-building  process  should  be  understood  and second,  its  changing  nature  with  an
emphasis on the modernity crisis of Turkey by the 1980s should be explored.
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The modernity crisis that began by the 1980s in Turkey was the result of the failure of the
state-centric and homogeneity promoting character of the Turkish state in its attempt to
manage the changing economic and cultural shifts occurring in the country (Keyman 2005,
p. 278). Keyman (2005) identifies three shifts after the 1980s that the state centric policy
failed to adopt.  The first shift is characterized by three developments that led to a gap
between  state  and  society.   These  developments  are  the  introduction  of  economic
liberalization  and  the  end  of  import  substitution  industrialization,  the  resurgence  of
traditionalism and political Islam, and the revitalization of ethnicity, Kurdish ethnicity in
particular (Keyman 2005, p. 278). These three developments culminated in the modernity
crisis  of  Turkish government  and a shift  from ideology to  identity was realized at  the
conclusion of the Cold War.  With this shift, after the 1990s, Kurds began claiming identity
rights and recognition, a demand the state-centric approach failed to manage. 
The second shift occurred between the state and society.  This was characterized by the
increasing decoupling of the nation from the state, which led to politics of difference and
recognition (Keyman 2005, p. 280). The creation of new civil society organizations further
contributed to the politics of difference and ethnic recognition, which the traditional strong
state tradition failed to manage. In this sense, “the Kurdish question was voiced by regional
business and economic organizations as well as by municipalities as a developmentalist
(conservative) claim to modernity and regional development” (Keyman 2005, p. 278).
The third shift occurred in the language of citizenship, which began to be seen in terms of
duties rather than rights (Keyman 2005, p. 281). In this sense, Kurdish nationalism played
a significant role since it operated on “calling for a multi-cultural and pluralist Turkey”
(Keyman 2005, p. 278).
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In  conclusion,  Keyman first  argues  that  the  Kurdish problem can be understood in  its
fullest  form only if  it  is  situated  in  the  historical  analysis  of  Turkish  nation-building
process. Second, it should be underlined that the Kurdish claims have changed since the
establishment of the Turkish Republic and the recent claims are claims of identity, which
can only be solved by the introduction of a multi-cultural and democratic environment.
Without the introduction of such a shift in policy, the strong state tradition in Turkey is
experiencing a problem of governance and legitimacy, with the danger of rendering the
Kurdish problem insolvable. 
In  order  to  understand  what  the  denationalization  of  citizenship  entails,  first,  the
nationalization process  of citizenship should be explained.   Beginning with the French
revolution, up until the 1990s, when citizenship was transformed, the notion of citizenship
was  used  synonymously with  nationality.   In  other  words,  citizenship  was  defined  by
allegiances  to  the  nation.  However,  as  Işın  and Turner  states,  beginning in  the 1990s,
citizenship  came  to  be  defined  as  “social  and  political  recognition  and  economic
distribution” (cited in Kadıoğlu 2007, 284).  Accordingly, citizenship and nationality began
to  separate  from  each  other,  culminating  in  democratization  and  denationalization  of
citizenship. Below is the elaboration of the denationalization practices in Turkey.
Kadıoğlu (2007) argues that the Turkish version of discrimination “deprives the others of
national identity of political and social recognition as well as economic distribution” (p.
291). The recent changes in Turkey regarding denationalization of citizenship occurred in
the form of giving minorities multi-cultural rights so that they could pursue their linguistic,
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ethnic or  religious differences.  The multicultural  rights in  the new form of  citizenship
entail a version of new society where cultural differences are welcomed by the state. 
The above definition of multiculturalism, however,  has not been the practice in Turkey
since its establishment in 1923, as elaborated in the previous section of this chapter.  On
the contrary, the newly established Turkish Republic was constructed on the basis of in the
nationalization of citizenship by making the Sunni sect of Islam and Turkish language the
only acceptable practices. This project towards homogeneity resulted in the discrimination
and assimilation of  different cultures,  languages,  ethnic groups and religions.   Another
instrument  of  the  nationalization  of  citizenship  was  introducing  a  rupture  from  the
backward  Ottoman past  with  reforms-from-above,  such as  changing the alphabet  from
Arabic to Latin. 
The above practices began to alter when Turkey became a candidate for EU membership in
1999. Various amendments were made to the constitution pointing to denationalization of
citizenship and indicating multicultural citizenship. Seven harmonization packages were
passed between 2001-2004 that broadened the concept of citizenship to encompass not just
legal  rights  but  also include recognition of  different  cultural  groups.   For  example,  as
described in more detail  in Chapter 2, minority rights were recognized and freedom of
expression in different languages was made possible with an amendment lifting the ban on
various languages (Keyman and Aydın, p. 36).  However, as Kadıoğlu (2007) points out,
there  was  a  huge  contention  between  legislators  and  bureaucrats  regarding  the
implementation of these amendments.  
One area of the gap between law and implementation was the opening of Kurdish private
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language courses. In other words, the process of denationalization of citizenship is impeded
by certain dynamics in Turkey, including the bureaucracy.  However, as will be explained
in the next section, another dynamic that impeded the denationalization process came from
Kurds themselves. In brief, it was observed that the gap between law and implementation
regarding Kurdish language rights stemmed not only from the state bureaucracy but also
from the Kurdish nationalists.  The underlying dynamics  of  this  gap  is  explored in  the
following part. 
4.4 The Closing of the Kurdish Language Courses:
                  Analysis of the Gap between Law and Implementation
The main aim of this chapter to identify the dynamics that led to the closing of private
Kurdish  language  courses.   The  Kurdish  language  courses  were  legally  permitted  on
August  2002 with  the  third  harmonization  package.   The law paving  the  way for  the
Kurdish  courses  permitted  radio  and  television  broadcasting  and  teaching  by  private
language courses of “different languages and dialects traditionally used by Turkish citizens
in their daily lives” (Özbudun and Yazıcı, 2004, p.19).
The first application for opening a private Kurdish language course was made right after
this law was published in the Official Gazette in Istanbul.  The first course was opened in
Batman, one and a half years later, on April 2004. During these one and a half years, there
were eight  applications waiting for approval  and they were  turned down several  times
because of bureaucratic or procedural constraints. However, at the end of one and a half
years seven Kurdish private language courses were opened, mainly in the Eastern cities of
Turkey. One year later, in August 2005, the newspapers reported a lack of interest in the
Kurdish courses and eventually all eight courses were closed by their owners on August
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2005. This part of the paper aims at exploring the dynamics regarding the closing of these
private Kurdish language courses by placing specific emphasis on the gap between law and
implementation.
4.4. A . Methodology and Findings
To explore  the  gap  between  law and  implementation,  first  of  all,  newspapers  such  as
Radikal,  Özgür  Gündem,  Yeni  Şafak,  Akşam,  Hürriyet,  Sabah,  Evrensel  and  several
Internet sources such as www.savaskarsıtları.org were analyzed by using content analysis.
Content  analysis  revealed  a  gap  between  law  and  implementation.  Secondly,  two
interviews were  conducted with Betül  Çelik of  Sabancı  University Faculty,  and Remzi
Çakın of the Kurdish Culture and Research Foundation (Kürt-Kav) in order to verify the
findings  of  the content  analysis.   The interviews  also indicate  a  gap between law and
implementation.
The  findings  also  show  patterns  regarding  the  reasons  for  the  gap  between  law  and
implementation. According to the newspapers  and interviews, this gap stems from two
sources.  The first source of the implementation problem is the state bureaucracy and the
regulations that strengthen the local bureaucracy's hand regarding the implementation of
the law (www.abgs.gov.tr).  Second, some Kurdish nationalists impede the process since
their main focus is on achieving rights rather than on using them; this means that once they
achieve rights the next action becomes striving for another right rather than using the right
already obtained.  Third,  according to a  research conducted by  Mazhar Bağlı  of  Dicle
University,  Kurdish people did not show an interest in the courses mainly because the
language taught by the politicized Kurds in the courses and the Kurdish spoken by people
in daily life are different languages. In other words, the courses failed to meet the needs of
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people in terms of teaching their daily language. Bağlı  also states that even though the
mother tongue of many people in the mainly Kurdish cities is Kurdish, the main language
they use in every day interactions is Turkish, which decreases interest in learning Kurdish.
Bağlı also points out the low economic return of learning Kurdish as compared to English
as another factor decreasing the interest in Kurdish.  
There was a gap between law and implementation regarding Kurdish language courses that
resulted from the actions of the state and some Kurdish nationalists. The state bureaucracy
impeded the process by demanding from the Kurdish language course owners’ conformity
to  extreme  regulations  such  as  measuring  the  doors  and  windows  in  centimeters  or
delaying the process on purpose by not sending auditors. The Kurdish nationalists impeded
the process by refusing to open language courses and protesting the state. Below is the
exploration of these dynamics. 
Impediment of the Kurdish nationalists and course owners
The first  application  for  opening a  Kurdish private  language course  was made by the
owners of English Fast in Istanbul, Nazif Ülgen, and Remzi Çakın, on August 2002, right
after  the  law  on  Kurdish  courses  was  passed15 (www.radikal.com.tr).  However,  their
application was refused two months  later  since the regulations of the law demanded a
separate  building  with  separate  furniture  and  staff  (www.radikal.com.tr).   Nazif  Ülgen
protested these bureaucratic procedures, which were applied only to the Kurdish courses
since it  was impossible for him to afford another building for the Kurdish course only.
However,  one  year  later,  these  bureaucratic  procedures  were  revoked  and  it  became
possible to open a Kurdish course in the building of an already existing language course.
15 Remzi Çakın is also one of the founding presidents of Kürt-Kav and he owned a Kurdish Language Diploma from
Uppsala  University  in  Sweden.  This  is  important  since  the  regulations  demanded  teachers  who  were  officially
authorized to teach Kurdish even tough Kurdish has been a language prohibited by law since the 1930s. 
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Nazif Ülgen and Remzi Çakın did not file an application this time.  An interview was
conducted with Remzi Çakın to learn the rationale behind this decision.  
The interview was conducted at Kürt-Kav, the first official NGO with the name Kürt in its
title.  According  to  Remzi  Çakın,  the  main  aim  of  Kürt-Kav  is  striving  to  achieve
democratic rights via peaceful means.  The peaceful means are publishing academic and
literary works  in  Kurdish,  opening  schools  and  courses  in  Kurdish  and  providing  the
people in need with credit to begin a business. Çakın also stated that they were the first
group to apply for a language course in 1996, six years before the third reform package
giving the right to open one.  However, the state rejected their demand since the National
Security Council (NSC) was responsible at that time for determining the languages to be
taught  and  it  refused  Kürt-Kav's  demand.  Kürt-Kav  applied  to  the  European  Court  of
Human Rights and the case was still not closed when the law was passed in August 2002.
In  other  words,  Kürt-Kav  was  still  officially  demanding  the  right  to  open  a  Kurdish
language course when the law passed and they got what they strived for with this law.
However, after obtaining the right to open a private course right through this law, Kürt-Kav
protested the law and declared that they refused to open a private language course since it
is not the duty of Kurdish people but the duty of state to finance the teaching of Kurdish.
Remzi Çakın did not give a more specific reason for their radical shift on the issue. He
reiterated that the regulations impeded the process and the state was not sincere. In other
words, Remzi Çakın could not explain the question asking what had changed between June
2002  and  August  2002  that  made  them alter  their  position  dramatically  regarding  the
opening of  private  Kurdish  courses.  However,  in  an  interview on   a  Kurdish  website
(www.kusca.com) another co-founder of Kürt-Kav, Fehim Işık deliberately states that the
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Kurdish language and the assimilation politics that have been going on since the first years
of Republic are inseparable.  In other words, it was observed that the Kurdish activists’
stance is lenient towards the politics of assimilation in Turkey as well as the achievement
of language rights. 
In my interview, Remzi Çakın also claimed that assimilation policies played a vital role in
terms of the extinction of the Kurdish language.  He gave the example that he did not speak
Turkish when he first started elementary school but the teacher spoke only Turkish and
punished the students who failed to do so.  Çakın argued that these policies traumatize
Kurdish children and after a while they disdain their own language. This is the main reason
why the state should implement positive discrimination for the Kurdish language; to make
up for the past assimilation. Fehim Işık rationalizes their refusal to open a language course
with a protest regarding the assimilation policies. Işık states that the 2002 law is a positive
development  regarding  the  lifting  of  a  taboo/ban  on  Kurdish  but  it  is  far  from being
adequate. He further argues that the law was incompatible with the realities of Kurdish
people.  
The above claims, however, do not explain why Kürt-Kav attempted to open a Kurdish
course when there was no law. Işık explains their rationale and states that their primary aim
was to achieve legitimacy and not to open language courses. He continues by stating that
their ultimate aim is to make Kurdish one of the officially spoken languages in Turkey.
Furthermore, he argues that Kurdish should be used in every aspect of life, whether official
or private, and it should be taught at elementary schools and also at universities. In sum,
Işık states that all sorts of impediments on the Kurdish language should be removed and
the state  should also implement  positive discrimination for Kurdish.  Remzi Çakın also
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agrees with a need for positive implementation and further argues that Kurdish should be
mandatory in all schools in Turkey. In sum, for Kürt-Kav, Kurdish language courses are
just  tools  for  achieving  a  level  of  legitimacy  and  recognition  regarding  the  Kurdish
language. 
The above stance of Kürt-Kav was criticized by Betül Çelik in the interview. Betül Çelik
states that in conflict resolution and the minority issues there are three steps.  The first step
is the denial of the minority, the second step is recognition and the third step is positive
discrimination.  Çelik  argues  that  the  state  is  at  the  level  of  passing from denying the
existence of Kurds to recognition but Kurds demand positive discrimination without using
their  recognition  rights.  According  to  Çelik,  failure  to  use  these  rights  causes  some
problems and endangers the achievement of future rights. For example, to achieve Kurdish
Institutes at the universities some Kurdish language experts are needed; therefore, these
experts should begin to learn how to teach Kurdish somewhere. Çelik states that private
Kurdish language courses were going to be instrumental regarding the first steps towards
achieving greater linguistic rights.  However, now that there are no Kurdish courses, there
are no institutions to produce the infrastructure of future rights.  
The above criticism of Çelik was also directed at Dilek Kurban, from the Democratization
Programme  of  TESEV,  who  claimed  that  the  law  for  the  opening  of  private  Kurdish
language courses had almost no meaning since it is not reasonable to give Kurds the right
to learn their language by paying a fee during her presentation at the Third Enlightenment
Symposium on 12.05.2007. In other words, Dilek Kurban said that the Kurdish language
courses  closed  because  of  lack  of  interest,  but  that  the  law was  inadequate  from the
beginning and this inadequacy led to the failure of the courses. In her presentation, Kurban
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added that Kurdish should be taught at schools, officially. Betül Çelik, on the other hand,
states that such demands lack a basis for base for implementation. Çelik states that the
relationship of the Kurds and the state reached such a level that the Kurds want with no
proposal of how to achieve what they want and the state insists on not giving what Kurds
want with no basis at all. For example, the feasibility of teaching Kurdish at schools, the
availability of qualified teachers who can teach Kurdish or the job opportunities for the
graduates of Kurdish Language Department at universities are not explored by Kurdish
people who demand these rights. 
In  sum,  the  interviews  conducted  with  Betül  Çelik,  Remzi  Çakın,  Fehmi Işık  and  the
presentation of Dilek Kurban at the Third Enlightenment Symposium on 12.05.2007 reveal
that some Kurdish nationalists impede the process of implementation regarding Kurdish
private language courses. The impediment stems from the general stance regarding their
ideological position to achieve positive discrimination and refusing to approve any law that
brings about less than that.  However, Çelik argues that this stance is not realistic since
without baby steps, it is impossible to run. 
Furthermore, according to Çelik, refusing to open the Kurdish courses harms the Kurdish
language since through these courses; the infrastructure for future steps can be created.
These include the publication of books and the establishment of a method for teaching the
grammar since Kurdish is not yet a written language.  In a nutshell, even though the state
bureaucracy  was  a  major  factor  in  of  the  development  of  a  gap  between  law  and
implementation, as illustrated in the next section, some Kurdish nationalists themselves
also  impeded  the  process  with  their  stance  of  not  settling  for  less  than  positive
discrimination. 
137
Impediment of the state bureaucracy
After the law permitting the private Kurdish language courses was passed in parliament in
August  2002,  some regulations  were added  to  obstruct  the  implementation  of  the law.
These regulations constituted the bureaucratic impediments, which include not approving
applications  for  eight  months  on  the  grounds  that  the  course  had  not  fulfilled  the
regulations  regarding  building  structure  or  the  height  of  doors  and  windows.  Another
source  of  the  rejection  of  applications  revolved  around the  appropriate  naming of  the
courses. All together, the bureaucratic delays economically harmed the course owners since
they continued to pay rent while waiting for approval.  Furthermore, according to some
course owners, the long waiting time for the courses diminished the enthusiasm of some
eager students and also decreased the eagerness of the course owners to fight with the
bureaucracy.  In  some, the bureaucratic procedures  played a significant role in terms of
harming the implementation process of Kurdish language courses.  These impediments are
explored by giving examples in more detailed in the following part of this section. 
The first application to open a private Kurdish language course was made by Nazif Ülgen
in Istanbul; right after the law was passed on August 2008 (www.radikal.com.tr).  Nazif
Ülgen  applied  to  open  a  course  in  his  already existing language course,  English Fast.
However, his application was denied on the grounds that the regulations (yönetmelik) of the
law on Kurdish private courses require a separate building with separate furniture and staff.
At this point, Nazif Ülgen gave up his intentions to open a Kurdish course since renting a
separate  building would not  be feasible.   However,  one year  later,  this  regulation was
revoked and Nazif Ülgen did not apply for a Kurdish course. The possible reason for this is
discussed in  the previous section regarding the impediments  coming from the  Kurdish
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nationalists. 
The second case in which the state bureaucracy impeded the implementation of the law on
private teaching of Kurdish occurred nine months later, in Urfa (www.radikal.com.tr).  The
owner, Ömer Kurt, claimed the he was being kept for no meaningful reason and he has
been losing money since the National Director of Education in Şanlıurfa (Şanlıurfa Milli
Eğitim  Müdürlüğü)  demanded  that  he  change  the  name  of  the  course.   The  Director
demanded that  the name be changed to “Urfa Private Local Dialect  Language Course”
from “Urfa Private Kurdish Language Dialects Teaching Center.” The owner rejected the
proposal of the Director of Education and he was in return denied approval. This case first
illustrates that not only physical impediments, but obstruction regarding what to call the
course  were  obstacles  slowing  the  process  of  establishing  Kurdish  language  courses.
Second, since the owner did not accept the proposal of the directorate, it is evident that the
Kurdish courses involve some political gain   of the owners.  In other words, the primary
aim is to prove something politically rather than to contribute to the Kurdish language.
This politicized stance is not criticized in this thesis. However, it should be underlined that
in the case of Kurdish courses, politics harmed education.
Another case of bureaucratic difficulty occurred in Van, where it took one year and three
months to get the permission to open the course (www.evrensel.net). The owner, Hasan
Güven, stated that the local bureaucracy first did not give permission due to the regulations
on the fire escape even though they applied to open a course in an already operational
language course building.  According to Güven, this indicates that the local bureaucracy is
discriminatory against Kurdish. Further impediments they faced included the disapproval
of the name and structure of the building.  However, on March 2004, the course opened
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after one and three months of strife with thousands of Kurdish people celebrating. 
Similar popular support was given to Aydın Üneşi,  the owner of the Kurdish Language
Course  in  Batman  (www.miliyet.com.tr).   The  course  in  Batman  was  one  of  the  first
courses to begin lessons in April 2004 after tragicomic bureaucratic impediments that took
more than nine months. One of the bureaucratic procedures that had to be met had to do
with the standardization of door heights; the inspectors demanded that the doors be at least
ninety centimeters whereas the existing doors were eighty five centimeters. After the doors
were fixed, the Local Director of Education postponed the application since the name of
the course was not appropriate. The name of the course was the Batman Private Kurdish
Language Course but, according to the regulations, the inclusion of the word “dialect” was
mandatory. The application was rejected again for this reason. Finally, after almost a year,
the Batman Kurdish course opened in April 2004.
Besides the above courses in Van, Batman and Urfa, the courses in Adana and Diyarbakır
faced similar  problems.   Eventually,  they were all  opened in  2004 and began Kurdish
lessons. However, in August 2005, exactly one year after the first course in Batman was
opened, all the owners gathered to announce that they were closing the courses. The main
reason published in the newspapers was that the courses could not finance themselves due
to lack of interest. The findings confirm the lack of interest.  However, the findings also
indicate other reasons for the closing of these courses, as illustrated below. 
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4.5 CONCLUSION
The content analysis of various web sites and interviews indicates two  patterns leading to
the closing of  the seven private Kurdish language courses,  which were first  opened in
August 2004 and all closed by August 2005. 
Various statements were made by both state officials and Kurdish nationalists regarding the
reasons behind the closings. State officials stated that the main reason was lack of interest
in  the  Kurdish  language.   There  were  two  types  of  explanations  from  the  Kurdish
nationalists and course owners.  The first explanation was a kind  of criticism of Kurdish
people.   For  example,  Aydın Üneşi,  the  owner of  the  course  in  Batman,  argued in  an
interview that  one of  the reasons for  the  closing was the insensitivity of  the Kurdish
people in the sense that thousands of people gave support at the opening but only a couple
of hundred showed real interest (www.yeniasya.com.tr).
The above self-criticism by Aydın Üneşi, however, was rare among the course owners and
the Kurdish nationalists.   On the contrary,  the majority of  course owners  and Kurdish
nationalists  such  as  Remzi  Çakın  blame  the  traditional  state  policy  against  Kurds,
constituting the second type of explanation on behalf  of  Kurds.   During the interview,
Remzi Çakın argued that the main reason for closing is not lack of interest. He claimed that
there are many unofficial Kurdish language courses in Turkey, including Istanbul, where
hundreds of Kurdish courses are offered in various NGOs and centers of the Democratic
Society Party (DTP). However, when asked, he could not give specific names or specific
course  hours.  His  rhetoric  made  it  seem  more  like  he  was  talking  about  a  general
enthusiasm about Kurdish rather than a concrete interest.  
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The above stance of Remzi Çakın was also observed in the content analysis of newspapers.
According to the analysis of the declarations of and interviews with the course owners and
Kurdish intellectuals,  lack of  concrete interest  is  the result  of  three factors.  First,  only
elementary or middle school graduates are allowed to participate in the courses.  This is
objectionable because it  becomes too late to teach a language after a certain age.   The
second factor concerns the security of the people who attend the courses. Remzi Çakın
argued that the students who register for the courses are also registered in  police records
and, considering the policy against Kurds, this constitutes a threat to the lives of students.
In other words, the identification of the names of the people in police records is a kind of
stigmatization, deterring people from registering. 
The two above factors, which led to the closing of the courses, stem from the third factor,
the  prevalent  assimilation  policy  against  the  Kurds  since  the  1930s.  The  assimilation
policies included the ban on the Kurdish language and, according to Remzi Çakın, there
were times when Kurds were charged money for  each word of  Kurdish they spoke in
Diyarbakır. Such policies led to Turkish being preferred over Kurdish over time.  This also
explains Mazhar Bağlı's finding regarding the rate at which Kurdish was used in daily life
(http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr).  According to this research, which was conducted in nine cities
with two thousand and one hundred seventy household heads, the rate of Turkish used in
daily interactions is 63% whereas for Kurdish, it is 32.8% (http://www.haberx.com).  Bağlı
also states that  the type of Kurdish used in these courses and in Kurdish televisions is
radically different from the Kurdish used in the daily interactions of people. Bağlı argues
that:
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“The language that the politicized Kurds use has problems.  The politicized Kurds want to use the
dialect of a time when Kurds were more secular and even when they had different religious beliefs. In
other words, the Kurdish used by these politicized groups and the Kurdish spoken by the people are
very different. It is different in its structure and grammar. In other words, the Kurdish taught at these
courses  is  not  functional  in  daily  life;  therefore,  it  is  not  surprising  that  they  had  to  close.”
(http://www.haberx.com/n/1064422/kurtce-kurslarina-talep-yok.htm).
As stated in the above quote by Bağlı, besides the pressure and impediments from the state
there are other reasons for the closings of the Kurdish courses. However, the pressure on
the Kurdish language still continues.  For example, in the human rights report of Amnesty
International 2003, Turkey was criticized for failing to implement the freedom of speech
laws  regarding  the  Kurdish  language,  meaning  Kurdish  courses  (www.radikal.com.tr).
Turkey  was  also  criticized  for  prohibiting  Kurdish  names  and  prohibiting  the  use  of
Kurdish in official places. 
This dark picture and the contentions with respect to Kurdish minority rights make the
discussion of the theories of citizenship in Turkey relevant.  For example, how legitimate is
it to argue that Turkey is moving towards denationalization of citizenship? To evaluate this,
the case of Eğitim-Sen (the education and science laborers syndicate) is a relevant example.
Eğitim-Sen was sued by The Ankara Chief Prosecutor’s Office in 2002 and in 2004 with
the intention of getting it closed down because it argued for the right to be educated in
one’s  mother  tongue (www.radikal.com.tr).   However,  both cases  were  rejected by the
Court of Labor and the Court of Press in Ankara, on the basis of   international agreements
(http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr).  This  indicates  that  the  Turkish  state  bureaucracy  is  not
homogeneous and that there are different views regarding citizenship and minority rights.
One of these groups is rather traditional, opting for a strong central state and homogeneous
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society.   However,  some  others  opt  for  a  more  multicultural  society  and  for
denationalization of citizenship.  In brief, as Kadıoğlu argues, the latest developments in
Turkey  indicate  a  move  towards  denationalization  of  citizenship,  unless  a  nationalist
backlash occurs. This chapter revealed a similar tension.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis was mainly concerned about the legitimacy crisis of the republican model of
citizenship that was “challenged during the 1990s by the language of rights and freedoms
which  involved  both  individual  and  group-based  claims  to  autonomy,  pluralism  and
democracy” (İçduygu and Keyman 2005, p.8).  This crisis entered a new phase in 1999
when Turkey became an official candidate for EU membership.  After this date,  Turkish
legislation was altered to comply with the EU acquis to encompass a pluralistic notion of
citizenship based on rights rather than membership. 
Transformation of  citizenship from membership to  rights  has  been  the  main focus of
studies  on  the  metamorphosis  of  nation  state,  which  are  mainly  concerned  about  the
divorce of the nation from the state.   In other words, the recent literature on citizenship
questions the notion of citizenship which had hitherto been defined merely as membership
in the nation state (Kadıoğlu 2008, p. 167).   Recent studies criticize the old notion of
citizenship as membership, which pushes different identities such as ethnicity, gender or
religion to the rear and aims at  manifesting a citizenship primarily around duties.  The
contemporary notion of citizenship, on the other hand is mainly concerned with the rights
of individuals and the celebration of different identities by providing then the same rights
with  the  mainstream  identities.   This  thesis  explored  this  contemporary  notion  of
citizenship in Turkey by asking the extent to which different identities are recognized and
given the same rights as the mainstream identity.  
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The mainstream identity in Turkey is Sunni Muslims who complied with the project of the
Kemalist  elite  after  the  establishment  of  the  Republic  in  1923.  This  project  aimed  at
modernizing Turkey via  revolutions  from above and   involved  the  exclusion of  many
identities.  Among these excluded identities were non-Muslims, non-Turkish speakers, non-
Turks and women (Kadıoğlu 2007, Koğacıoğlu 2007).  In sum, the Turkish republic and
the Kemalist elite summoned the Sunni Turkish-speaking men who detached themselves
from the backward Ottoman past as the mainstream actors in the then-newly established
state. This version of citizenship was protested by many excluded groups and Kurds in
particular, which revealed itself in the form of rebellions beginning in 1925 and continuing
today. Another excluded group was women, who were incorporated into the system by
removing their individualities as women and assigning them duties within the larger project
of modernization (Kadıoğlu 1999, p. 123). 
This exclusive version of citizenship of the Republic, however, entered a legitimacy crisis
during the 1990s due to the effects of globalization, which contributed to the dissolution of
nation-state  (Kadıoğlu  1999,  p.  64-67).   This  legitimacy crisis  was partially solved  by
legislating seven harmonization packages to comply with the EU acquis between 1999-
2004.  However, the contentions regarding the implementations of these laws continue.
They revolve  around  the  argument  that  even  though  Turkey  fulfilled  the  Copenhagen
Criteria by the harmonization packages, there are still major problems of implementation.
This thesis explored these problems of implementation by studying the cases of Kurdish
private  language  courses  and  sentence  reductions  given  to  the  perpetrators  of  honor
killings.   Kurdish  private  language  courses  were  allowed  by  the  third  harmonization
package  in  August  2002  and  the  sentence  reductions  given  to  the  murderers  who
committed crimes in  the  name of  honor were removed  from the penal  code in  2004.
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However, it was observed that these laws were not implemented in various cases and the
main aim of this thesis was to study the findings pertaining to the cases where the gap
between law and implementation was manifested. 
The  findings  of  the  thesis  are   that  there  is  a  gap  between  law  and  implementation
regarding both the sentence reductions and Kurdish courses.  However, the dynamics of the
gap leading to the interruption of implementing the laws are different. In the Kurdish case,
the problems of implementation arise from the mainstream Turkish bureaucracy and also
from Kurdish nationalists.   In the women's case,  however,  the continuation of sentence
reductions  stems  only  from  the  juridical  convention  and  women  have  no  role  in  the
interruption of implementation.  Both sides impeded the implementation process in the
Kurdish  case  whereas  only  the  state  bureaucracy  impeded  the  implementation  in  the
women's case as detailed below. 
The state bureaucracy in the women's case is attached a specific name-juridical convention
by Dicle Koğacıoğlu (2007). The juridical convention was detected as the main pattern
leading to sentence reductions in the third chapter of this thesis. It was confirmed that the
judges prefer reducing the sentences of the perpetrators of  honor crime even though they
can opt for alternative clauses in the penal code to increase the punishments. The main
reason beneath the judges' preference is their mentality, which considers women's chastity
and honor as the property of men. Furthermore, the judges' mentality is compatible with
the general  understanding of women's  rights and honor in Turkey as confirmed by the
studies of the UNDP and KAMER. 
The studies of the UNDP and KAMER indicate that women get killed not because they act
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against the general customs of chastity but because they refuse to obey. In other words, the
notion of honor is used as a cover by the society to discipline women.  The judges share
this same mentality and they implement sentence reductions under the cover of “wrong
acts”  provoking  the  perpetrator.  The  wrong  acts  include  wearing  jeans  or  piercings,
depicting the mentality of judges. Other research such as the study conducted by Mazhar
Bağlı draws a pessimistic picture regarding the prevention of honor crimes.  According to
this research, the perpetrators of honor killings are widely respected in prison and are also
accepted into all social environments after they get out. In other words, the study shows
that even if the sentence reductions were not implemented, this would not deter the honor
killings since the society respects  men who kill in the name of honor. 
This pessimistic picture, however, is illuminated by the activities of feminists like Hülya
Gülbahar lobbying for  the opening of shelters  and 24/7 call  centers.   The activities  of
various NGOs such as KAMER show  that individual cases can be prevented by providing
women  with  shelters.  For  example,  KAMER saved  seventy  lives  between  2003-2006,
indicating the importance of call  centers and shelters.  In  sum, the prevention of  honor
crimes  is  a  long-term  project  and  it  was  confirmed  in  the  thesis  that  they  cannot  be
prevented  just  by  issuing  laws.   Besides  the  laws,  the  juridical  convention  and  the
mentalities of people should be altered – something that  can only be achieved by investing
in the positive discrimination of women at every layer of society. 
Positive discrimination is also demanded by the Kurdish nationalists and this constitutes
the primary problem between the state and the Kurds. Betül Çelik states that the state is at
the  level  of  recognizing  the  Kurdish  minority  but  the  Kurds  demand  positive
discrimination leading to  incongruence  in  communication,  which has  been  deliberately
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implemented by the Turkish state since the 1930s, when Kurds were denied their language
rights.  Beginning in the 1930s and lasting until  today,  the  existence of  the Kurds was
denied by the republican model of  citizenship.  This picture began to change after the
1990s when Turkey entered a new phase of democratization suedue to its aspirations to
become an EU member.  The fourth chapter of  the thesis explored the democratization
reforms regarding the rights of Kurdish minority.  The content analysis of various Turkish
daily newspapers and interviews revealed that the gap between law and implementation
stems from the Turkish bureaucracy and the Kurdish nationalists. 
The  Turkish  bureaucracy  impeded  the  opening  of  language  courses  by  delaying  the
application process and not  giving permission for  sometimes nine months.  During this
time, the owners of the courses continued to pay rent and lost money.  Furthermore, the
students  who  applied  to  the  courses  lost  enthusiasm since  the  process  took  too  long.
According  to  the  Kurdish nationalists,  the main  reason  for  the closing of  the Kurdish
language  courses  was  this  lengthy process,  which  led  to  a  decrease  of  interest  in  the
courses.   However,  some course owners,  such as Aydın Üneşi  also accuse the Kurdish
people since thousands gave support at the beginning but only a few hundred showed up
when  it  came to  registering.  This  accusation  of  Aydun Üneşi  was  confirmed with  the
interview conducted with Remzi Çakın, who applied to open a private language course in
1996 but refused to open one when the law passed in  2002. Çakın stated that  he had
applied to open a course to make a point; to make the Kurdish language gain legitimacy;
and their primary aim was political rather than educational.  
This position of  Remzi Çakın is criticized by academics like Mazhar Bağlı on the grounds
that the failure of the courses stem from their politicized nature.   Bağlı  states that the
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language  used  by  the  politicized  Kurdish  elite  and  by  the  Kurdish  public  in  general
indicates a serious gap between the aims of the elite and lives of the Kurdish people. In
sum,  the  stance  of  the  Kurdish  nationalists  combined  with  the  state  centric  model  of
bureaucracy led to a decreasing interest in the courses and they all closed  by 2004.
In conclusion, this thesis aimed at detecting the patterns emerging from  the gap between
law and implementation of two case studies; sentence reductions for  honor killings and
Kurdish private language courses. The thesis explains the problems of implementation with
respect to Kurdish courses by using Ayşe Kadıoğlu's (2007) study discussing the prospects
of denationalization of citizenship in Turkey.  The thesis confirmed Kadıoğlu's study that
Turkey is moving towards a denationalized version of citizenship with the harmonization
packages passed to comply with the EU acquis. However, this process has its problems of
implementation  and  there  are  indicators  signaling  a  retrenchment  of  denationalization,
which  is  manifested  by  the  state  bureaucracy  and  Kurdish  nationalists  impeding  the
process.  Another  danger  to  denationalization  of  citizenship  comes  from  the  juridical
convention  among  the  judges  who  reach  verdicts  to  the  disadvantage  of  women  by
preferring some legal clauses over others.  The weakness of the thesis emerges at this point
regarding  the  suggestion  of  a  solution  to  the  implementation  problems.  The  women's
problem in general requires investment and education, however, suggestion of a detailed
action plan for improving women's condition was not included due to time limitations. The
solution  to  the  Kurdish  case  is  proposed  as  a  move  towards  a  pluralistic  notion  of
democracy by academics like Fuat Keyman but this thesis could not explore the specific
action  plans  to  achieve  this  pluralistic  version  due  to  time  limitations.  In  summary,  a
nutshell, this thesis aimed at exploring the patterns of democracy problems by examining
two case studies, but for a better understanding of the gap between law and implementation
150
more cases should be explored to enable more patterns of  the dynamics leading to the
impediment of the process leading to democratization of citizenship in Turkey.
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